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Abstract 
 
Legitimacy refers to the perceived rightfulness of authorities, and is central to 
citizens’ perceptions of institutions such as the government. Legitimate authority is 
linked to acceptance of institutions and long-term stability of societies. As such, 
rebuilding the legitimacy of institutions such as the government and judiciary 
(‘institutional   legitimacy’)   is essential for stability in post-conflict societies. In this 
thesis, I explore the factors that lead citizens to view their government as legitimate 
following the reconstruction of central government institutions after a conflict. I draw 
on sociological, political science, social psychological and statebuilding theories to 
develop and present a theoretical model of post-conflict legitimacy.  
The model has three key components. The first encompasses relational and 
instrumental antecedents of legitimacy. Relational antecedents encompass fair and 
neutral decision-making, as well as respectful and dignified treatment, and are 
referred to collectively as procedural justice. Instrumental antecedents are those which 
involve outcomes to citizens, and include distributive justice (fairness in outcome 
distribution), outcome favourability (personal gain in outcomes), and government 
performance (the ability of the government to function effectively and provide 
services to citizens). These main variables are investigated along with contingencies 
relating to social groups that may influence the relationship between procedural 
justice and legitimacy, such as national identification and group power.  
The second component incorporates the statebuilding concept of ‘local  
ownership’   as   a   potential   means   of   rebuilding   government legitimacy. Local 
ownership refers to the extent to which local citizens in post-conflict societies lead 
and operate reconstruction efforts. This component therefore posits that citizen voice 
and local influence will build the legitimacy of post-conflict governments. 
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The third component proposes a social interaction effect on legitimacy, in 
which citizens both influence and are influenced by the views of those around them. 
This component therefore proposes an influence of local context on perceptions of 
post-conflict institutions.  
Nepal was chosen as a case study in which to apply the model. Nepal 
transitioned into a secular democratic republic in 2008, following ten years of civil 
war, and has been engaged in rebuilding central governance institutions. A pilot study 
(N=300) and two waves of survey-based quantitative fieldwork (each N=1500) were 
conducted nationwide in Nepal, employing a random sampling procedure. The 
purpose of the pilot study was to test the survey design and fieldwork procedures. The 
first wave of cross-sectional data collection aimed to test components 1 and 2 
proposed in the theoretical model, and the second wave of cross-sectional data collection aimed to replicate, expand and improve on the measurement of key variables in wave 1, as well as test component 3 of the theoretical model. 
Testing of the first model component revealed that procedural justice was by 
far the strongest predictor of post-conflict institutional legitimacy, and was 
significantly stronger than instrumental variables such as distributive justice, 
government performance, and outcome favourability.  Further, the relationship 
between procedural justice and legitimacy was moderated by national identification 
and group power, suggesting that procedural justice operates through social identity to 
exert its positive effect. Moreover, the effect of procedural justice on government 
legitimacy was not simply due to trust and performance perceptions of local 
institutions, and was  not  diminished  by  the  government’s  ability  to  provide  essential  
services (as predicted by the statebuilding literature).  
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Testing of the second model component revealed that two elements of local 
ownership—voice and local influence—weakly predicted legitimacy, with these 
relationships varying according to participants’   position in the Nepalese caste 
hierarchy.  
Testing of the third model component revealed a significant social interaction 
effect, such that citizens’  legitimacy  beliefs  are influenced by the legitimacy views of 
those around them. This effect persisted even when demographic, regional, and 
individual-level variables were controlled.  
This thesis concludes that procedural justice is more predictive of post-conflict 
institutional legitimacy than instrumental outcomes. Further, the relationship appears 
to operate through the social identification mechanisms proposed by procedural 
justice theory in the context of a developing country with a strict caste system. Results 
suggest that statebuilding   concepts   of   ‘local   ownership’   affect elites and low-status 
groups in different ways. A final way that legitimacy is rebuilt is through social 
influence, such that citizens are influenced by the views of those around them. This 
thesis offers detailed insight into post-conflict sociopolitical processes and the 
mechanisms through which institutional legitimacy is built and diminished during 
democratic transition. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION  
 
Legitimacy, the perceived rightfulness of authorities, is central  to  people’s  perception  
and acceptance of power and authority, and is essential to the functioning and stability 
of institutional authorities (Alagappa, 1995; Beetham, 1991; Coicaud, 2007; Crick, 
1993; Habermas, 1976; Weber, 1978). Political scientists refer to legitimacy as a 
‘reservoir of support’ for governments (Dahl, 1956; Easton, 1965, 1975), and note the 
importance of creating and maintaining legitimacy as a foundation for the 
authoritativeness of the state (Lipset, 1959). Institutional legitimacy has been found to 
encourage decision acceptance, promote a sense of obligation to obey authorities, and 
is linked to behavioural outcomes such as compliance, cooperation, and engagement 
with authorities (Tyler & Jackson 2013). For these reasons, establishing legitimacy is 
identified as a priority in rebuilding post-conflict institutions (Brinkerhoff, 2005, 
2012; Carment et al., 2010; Heathershaw & Lombach, 2008; Paris & Sisk, 2009; 
Rotberg, 2004; USIP & PKSOI, 2009). However, the inability of conflict-affected 
states to gain sufficient institutional legitimacy has   been   described   as   “the most 
disappointing aspect of post-conflict   reconstruction” (François & Sud, 2006, p.151). 
The present project aims to address this topic by empirically exploring the 
antecedents of government legitimacy in the post-conflict setting of Nepal.  
 
According to Weber (1978), power must be accepted as legitimate by those subjected 
to it in order to be secured and maintained. He outlined three  ‘ideal  types’  of  authority,  
each with their own source of legitimacy. These include charismatic authority, in 
which legitimacy is derived from the leadership of a charismatic or strong individual; 
traditional authority, in which legitimacy is derived from a historical lineage of 
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power, such as the Church or Kings; and legal-rational authority, based on rationally 
created rules and laws. In line with this formulation, Nepal’s post-conflict 
statebuilding period—from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement reached in 2006 
until the present—can be characterised as a shift from traditional authority to legal-
rational authority, as the state transforms from a Hindu monarchy with power 
structures based in caste hierarchy, patriarchy and instrumental dominion into a 
secular democratic republic (Askvik, Jamil & Dhakal 2011). In fact, this transition 
echoes Weber’s   predicted order of the modernising development of states from 
charismatic to traditional to legal-rational authority (considered to be the most 
advanced). The current intermediary phase of Nepal’s  transition from a long-standing 
traditional authority to a modern liberal political system makes it a particularly 
interesting case study of  citizens’  post-conflict legitimacy beliefs.  
 
Theories of how legitimacy beliefs are formed in the post-conflict state can be broadly 
classified into two main perspectives: those focussed on citizen evaluations of 
outcomes, and those focussed on citizen evaluations of processes. Outcome-based 
theories of legitimacy conceive of support for democratic regimes as the consequence 
of citizen evaluations of the economic and political performance of those regimes 
(Cook, Hardin, & Levi, 2005; Gilley, 2009; Levi, 1988, 1997; Mishler & Rose, 2001; 
Rothstein, 2005; Sarsfield & Echegaray, 2006; Van De Walle & Scott, 2009). 
Outcome-based theories hold that citizens hold perceptions of institutional legitimacy 
primarily due to instrumental outcomes, such as distributive justice or outcome 
favourability (Chanley et al., 2000; McAllister, 1999). That is, instrumental theories 
hold that citizens base their assessments of the worthiness of an  institution’s  output, 
whether that output is distributed fairly, and whether it advances personal welfare 
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(e.g., Bok, 1997; Orren, 1997). In fragile and post-conflict societies, the ability of the 
government to provide basic services to citizens is often considered to be a key 
indicator of instrumental government performance (McLoughlin, 2012; Roberts, 
2011).  
 
By contrast, process-based theories of post-conflict institutional legitimacy hold that 
the procedures by which institutions operate are equally important for building 
legitimacy (e.g., Brinkerhoff et al., 2007; 2012; Chesterman, 2007; Donais, 2009; 
Richmond, 2011). These approaches to building post-conflict legitimacy are premised 
on procedural mechanisms designed to foster a sense of inclusiveness in the new 
political system.  
 
Procedural justice is a central element of the process-based approach to building 
legitimacy, holding that factors such as fair decision-making and respectful treatment 
provide internal motivations for citizens to legitimate and obey authorities (Lind & 
Tyler, 1988; 1989; 2006a; Tyler & Blader, 2000; 2003; Tyler & Lind, 1992). 
Although procedural justice was originally assumed to exert its positive effects by 
giving people a sense of control over outcomes that affected them (Thibaut & Walker, 
1975), further research found that people continue to value procedural justice despite 
the favourability of the outcomes they receive (Tyler, 2003; 2006a; Tyler & Blader, 
2003). These models have roots in Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 
1979), which hold that people are motivated to derive value from the groups they 
belong to. Procedural justice, in the form of fair and respectful treatment by an 
authority, signifies the worthiness of an individual within a group, leading citizens to 
identify with and confer legitimacy to the authority, which in turn enhances 
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cooperation and deference (Jackson et al., 2012). Though not discounting the 
importance of outcomes, procedural justice has been shown to predict institutional 
legitimacy in a range of domains. In the present study, procedural justice concerns are 
contrasted with instrumental outcomes in predicting post-conflict government 
legitimacy in Nepal.  
 
Two elements of procedural justice—voice and neutrality— share overlap with the 
prominent statebuilding approach  of  ‘local  ownership’.     Local  ownership  is  an  ideal  
practice during post-conflict reconstruction. Local ownership theories hold that 
institutional legitimacy is generated when local political authorities, with broad 
support among members of civil society, participate in policy discussions that affect 
them and hold influence over decision-making processes, as opposed to foreign actors 
and agencies (Brinkerhoff, 2007; Killick, 1998; Simonsen, 2005). Despite its 
centrality in statebuilding frameworks, the concept of ‘local   ownership’ remains 
vague and understudied (Anderson, 2010). One underlying mechanism being 
investigated in the present study is the psychological concept  of  ‘voice’,   i.e.,  having  
input into a decision making process, and how it may contribute to government 
legitimacy by fostering a sense of procedural justice. Indeed, in the social 
psychological literature, the most potent aspect of procedural fairness has been 
identified as the opportunity to participate in decision making processes (see, De 
Cremer & Alberts, 2004; De Cremer, Cornelis, & van Hiel, 2008), with opportunities 
for voice resulting in the evaluation of procedures as more fair (Brockner et al., 1998; 
Folger et al., 1979; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Van den Bos, 2005; Van den Bos, Wilke, & 
Lind, 1998; Van Prooijen, Van den Bos, & Wilke, 2002). This study aims to link the 
statebuilding ideal of local ownership with social psychology theories of voice and 
 21 
neutrality to demonstrate why local ownership may build institutional legitimacy in 
the long-term. 
 
It has also been found that expectations, sometimes derived culturally, can influence 
how people react to opportunities for voice (e.g., Brockner et al., 2001; Van den Bos, 
Vermunt, & Wilke, 1996; Van den Bos et al., 2010). People with high expectations of 
providing input into a process will react more negatively to being denied voice than 
people with low expectations (Brockner et al., 2001; Van den Bos et al., 2010). If 
citizens vary in how they react to the provision of voice, opportunities to participate in 
political decision-making may not necessarily lead to the expected legitimacy 
outcomes predicted by post-conflict statebuilding literature (Chesterman 2002; 
Donais, 2008; Sharp, 2013; Shaw & Waldorf, 2010; Roberts, 2011). Thus, this project 
also aims to test the potential variation in the relationship between local ownership 
and legitimacy for different groups in Nepalese society. 
 
The final way in which post-conflict legitimacy may be built is not through top-down 
institutional assessments, but through bottom-up social influence. That is, citizens 
may not only seek information about the legitimacy of authorities from authorities 
themselves, but may instead look to those around them for information regarding the 
post-conflict political order. Little work, however, has been conducted on the effect of 
normative influence on institutional legitimacy beliefs (though other authors have 
explored the idea theoretically, e.g., Horne, 2009; Meares, 2000). Thus, the final way 
legitimacy may be rebuilt is through perceived norms, which may signal community 
acceptance of post-conflict political arrangements and in turn influence individual 
legitimacy beliefs. In this way, legitimacy beliefs do not need to be derived from 
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direct contact with authorities, and may be spread indirectly through fellow citizens, 
and that this influence could be in addition to individual-level perceptions of 
institutional behaviour. 
 
In summary, the current project sets out to answer the following research questions:   
 
1) What is the relative contribution of instrumental and relational concerns in 
building post-conflict institutional legitimacy? 
2) Does   ‘local   ownership’   build   post-conflict institutional legitimacy, and is it 
effective for all citizens? 
3) Is there a social interaction effect on legitimacy perceptions, in that citizens 
will both influence and be influenced by those around them? 
 
These research questions are tested in a case study of Nepal, utilising two waves of 
large-scale, nationwide quantitative data collection during a crucial period of 
transition in Nepal.  
 
The issue of government legitimacy is highly relevant in Nepal due to its varied and 
volatile social developments, caste hierarchies and identity politics (Whelpton, 2005). 
Nepal was established as a Hindu kingdom in 1798, and since that period has 
experienced varying forms of ruling government. This includes a long line of Hindu 
Kings, as well as the Rana regime (1846-1951); a non-democratic panchayat system; 
and a parliamentary monarchy. Most recently, following a decade-long Maoist 
insurgency aimed at overthrowing the monarchy, Nepal has become a secular 
democratic republic. It has been led since 2008 by an interim government tasked with 
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drafting the constitution for   the   ‘New   Nepal’.   While there have been high 
expectations   in   the   ‘New  Nepal’,   the   process   of   democratisation   has   also   seen   the  
emergence of political instability as regional, ethnic, and caste groups jostle for power 
in the newly inclusionary system (see for example Hachhethu & Gellner, 2010; Jha 
2014; Lawoti, 2013; Lawoti & Hangen, 2013; von Einsiedel, Malone & Pradhan, 
2012). As mentioned previously, the transformation of Nepal can be conceived of as a 
shift  from  Weber’s  ideal  type  of  traditional  authority to the ideal type of legal-rational 
authority. Given that procedural justice can be considered a facet of legal-rational 
legitimacy (Tyler, 2006b), the observation of process-based legitimacy perceptions in 
Nepal potentially captures the increasing importance of legal-rational concerns in the 
state-building process.  
 
This study will adopt an integrated theoretical model to understand government 
legitimacy in post-conflict Nepal. The first research question is explored by 
comparing the importance of outcome and process variables in predicting legitimacy, 
i.e., whether relational theories of procedural justice will generalise to the post-
conflict context in Nepal, as  citizens’   legitimacy beliefs shift from a traditional to a 
legal-rational basis. The second research question is addressed by linking 
statebuilding concepts of local participation and ownership to legitimacy perceptions. 
Here, Nepalese  citizens’ perceived level of voice and influence in political decision-
making is assessed and linked to perceptions of legitimacy. The influence of the caste 
system in adjusting expectations around voice is also explored. The final research 
question concerns a potential social interaction   effect   on   citizens’   legitimacy  
perceptions, in which citizens both influence and are influenced by those around them.  
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The second chapter of this thesis reviews relevant literature, beginning with a broad 
overview of the conceptualisation and measurement of legitimacy and the importance 
of legitimacy in post-conflict statebuilding. Outcome-based models of legitimacy and 
process-based models of legitimacy are contrasted and discussed, and potential 
moderators of the relationship between procedural justice and legitimacy—
identification, group power, and law legitimacy—are reviewed. Next, statebuilding 
literature concerning the role of local ownership in building post-conflict legitimacy is 
examined and linked to relational theories of legitimacy. Finally, I argue for a social 
interaction effect on legitimacy perceptions, exploring literatures on social norms, 
neighbourhood effects, and social interaction models. This literature is then drawn 
together in a model of institutional legitimacy in the post-conflict state, which will be 
used to guide data analysis. The third chapter provides a detailed background of the 
conflict in Nepal, its subsequent reconstruction, and the current socio-political state, 
in order to provide relevant background information of the Nepal context and to help 
justify the appropriateness of Nepal as the case study utilised here.   
 
The methodological approach adopted in this project is outlined in the fourth chapter, 
from the initial pilot phase of the project, to the first and second waves of fieldwork 
that were conducted nationwide in Nepal in 2012 and 2013. The challenges associated 
with large-scale quantitative fieldwork in a post-conflict developing country, and how 
this context influenced data collection, are discussed in this chapter.  
 
Results from the first wave of fieldwork are presented in chapter 5, using a series of 
multiple regression models to test each component of this study's theoretical model, 
as outlined in chapter 2. Chapter 6 presents results from the second wave of data 
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collection in Nepal. The discussion of both waves of fieldwork in terms of the 
theoretical model forms the basis of chapter 7, along with the limitations of the study 
and future directions for research. The final chapter returns to answering this study's 
three main research questions, and reflects on broader implications of this project in 
terms of post-conflict reconstruction and democratic transition.  
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The present study seeks to compare instrumental theories of legitimacy with 
procedural justice theories of legitimacy in the post-conflict state. It further assesses 
how local ownership influences legitimacy perceptions in this context, and how 
citizens in a post-conflict  society  influence  one  another’s  legitimacy  beliefs.   
 
This literature review will provide an overview of the theorised role of institutional 
legitimacy and the importance of government legitimacy in the context of post-
conflict reconstruction. The literature reviewed in this chapter spans the fields of 
political science, statebuilding, peacebuilding, sociology, and social psychology.  
 
Sources of institutional legitimacy can be broadly understood as either instrumental or 
procedural. Instrumental sources of legitimacy are utilised largely in the political 
science and statebuilding literature (e.g. see Cook, Hardin, & Levi, 2005; Gilley, 
2009; Levi, 1988; 1997; Rothstein, 2005; Sarsfield & Echegaray, 2006; Schmelzle, 
2012; Scharpf, 1999; Van De Walle & Scott, 2009), whereas procedural sources of 
legitimacy are emphasised in both statebuilding and social psychology (e.g. see Factor 
et al., 2013; Hough et al., 2013; Rothstein, 2009; Sacks, 2011; Seligson, 2002; 
Sunshine & Tyler, 2003a, 2003b; Tyler & Blader, 2000; 2003; Tyler, 2006a, 2006b; 
Tyler & Huo, 2002). These different understandings of legitimacy will be reviewed, 
with a focus on how they apply specifically to the post-conflict context. Next, 
statebuilding theories of local ownership and its relationship to legitimacy are 
outlined. Finally, literature pertaining to social influence on legitimacy beliefs is 
reviewed, including social psychological and sociological research on normative and 
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social interaction effects. These broad literatures will be drawn together to arrive at an 
integrated model of post-conflict institutional legitimacy that is tested in a two-wave 
quantitative survey in Nepal. 
 
1. The purpose and objects of legitimacy 
A stable political and social order relies on citizens cooperating with political 
institutions and authorities and complying with rules and laws (Beetham, 1991; 
Easton, 1965; Weber, 1978). Compliance can be motivated by coercion, whether 
through military power, a system of rewards for compliance (Schaar, 1984), or 
through fear of punishment for disobedience (Beetham, 1991). According to Weber, 
compliance with authorities can also be facilitated through the internal motivations of 
citizens. Weber claims that these internal motivations are strongly influenced by 
judgments relating to institutional legitimacy. One useful way to conceptualize 
institutional legitimacy is as a form of loyalty (Gibson et al., 2005), or in Easton’s  
(1965)   term,   a   ‘reservoir   of   goodwill’.   Both conceptualisations capture the idea of 
citizen recognition of institutional authority, regardless of the short-term favourability 
provided by political parties and leaders. In short, legitimacy is the recognition of 
moral authority, providing a framework through which citizens view social and 
political arrangements as rightful (Tyler, 2006b). Legitimate institutions are said to 
appeal to citizens’ values, which helps to motivate self-regulatory behavior (this is 
termed   ‘value-based’   legitimacy;;   see Cotterrell, 1999; Jackson & Sunshine, 2007; 
Levi et al., 2009; Nisbet, 1974; Swedberg, 2006; Tyler & Jost, 2007; Tyler & Lind, 
1992). 
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Research consistently shows that when those in power are judged as appropriate and 
just, citizens will perceive an obligation to defer to and obey their decisions and rules 
(French & Raven, 1959; Jost & Major, 2001; Kelman & Hamilton, 1989; Tyler, 
2006a, 2006b; Zelditch, 2001). Therefore, from   an   authority’s   perspective,  
legitimated power makes ruling more efficient and effective (Ayres & Braithwaite, 
1992; Englebert, 2000; Lamb, 2010).  Hence, legitimacy is considered a more stable 
basis of authority than coercion and self-interest, as it promotes power relations based 
on decision acceptance, voluntary compliance, and cooperation with and participation 
in political and civic life (Dalton, 2004; Easton, 1965; 1975, Lipset, 1961; Norris, 
2002; 1999; Gibson & Caldeira, 2003; Gibson, Caldeira, & Baird; 1998, Seligson, 
2002; Tyler & Jackson, 2013; Weber, 1978). By contrast, low regime legitimacy is 
thought to act as a signal that can motivate citizens to call for social change (Hegtvedt, 
2004), and potentially generates protest, unrest, and rebellion (Kaase, 1979; Kornberg 
& Clarke, 1992). In a review of legitimacy theories, Zelditch (2001, p. 40) concludes: 
“legitimacy  is  always  a  matter  of  voluntarily  accepting  that  something  is  ‘right,’  and  
its consequence is always the stability of whatever structure emerges from the 
process”.  Every  system  of  power,   therefore,  “attempts  to  establish  and  cultivate the 
belief in its legitimacy and to demonstrate a moral authority beyond any purely 
coercive  capacity”  (Beetham, 1991, p.1415). 
 
These understandings of legitimacy can encompass many forms of authority and 
institutions,   i.e.,   different   ‘objects   of   legitimacy’   (Lamb, 2005; 2010). More 
importantly, the processes surrounding the legitimation of each entity may be distinct 
(Zelditch, 2001). Therefore it is important to understand and specify which 
institutions and authorities are under examination when studying the concept of 
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legitimacy, as this will change the scope and approach of one's investigation. A useful 
taxonomy of institutional objects of legitimacy is provided by Easton (1965; 1975), 
who specifies that regime legitimacy (consisting of institutional form, processes, and 
policies, and all branches of the government) should be treated as distinct from the 
political community (comprising all citizens, residents, and actors within the state 
border) and political authorities (relating to specific leaders and political parties). In 
making these distinctions, Easton introduced the concept of diffuse support (for a 
regime) vs. specific support (for political parties or authorities).  
 
In the present study the object of legitimacy is the institution of government, similar 
to  Easton’s  notion of diffuse regime support. Based on this understanding, the central 
institution of government, and the way it operates and makes decisions, is the object 
of legitimacy beliefs, regardless of the political party leading the government. This 
approach   also   invokes  Weber’s   (1978)   notion   of   legitimacy   as   a   belief   held   by   the  
governed, as opposed to the argument that legitimacy is determined through an 
objective set of criteria that authorities must fulfil (Zelditch, 2001). Instead, the 
subjective (or descriptive) understanding of legitimacy highlights the relationship 
between state and society, in which an authority makes a claim to legitimacy and 
citizens consent to that claim (Coicaud, 2013; Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012). This 
perspective also aligns itself theoretically with social psychological and 
criminological research that conceptualises legitimacy as comprising perceptions of 
trust, respect, confidence, and moral authority (e.g., Sunshine & Tyler, 2003a). This 
work illustrates that subjective perceptions of legitimacy are important because they 
are linked to behavioral compliance and decision acceptance. Related to this, research 
in the post-conflict   field   often   emphasizes   the   importance   of   ‘local   legitimacy’   i.e., 
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legitimacy in the eyes of individuals and groups within the domestic population (e.g., 
Whalan, 2013). It is argued that legitimacy in the minds of citizens is most effective 
in predicting the success of post-conflict reconstruction efforts.  Therefore, this 
project adopts the perspective of subjective legitimacy to investigate how institutional 
legitimacy is rebuilt in post-conflict societies. 
 
2. Institutional legitimacy in the post-conflict state 
Statebuilding is concerned with rebuilding the institutions of a state, such as armies, 
police forces, judiciaries, banks, tax collection agencies, health and education systems 
(DFID, 2010). Statebuilding is a central focus in fields such as development, political 
science, and international relations (Berger & Weber, 2006; Dobbins, 2003; Etzioni, 
2004; Fukuyama, 2004; Hopp & Kloke-Lesche, 2005; Ottaway, 2002; Lister & 
Wilder, 2005; Rocha Menocal, 2011; Rondinelli & Montgomery, 2005; Whaites, 
2008). It is a priority of the international community, as it is seen to promote 
economic and political transformations, as well as contribute to global stability and 
security (Buisson, 2007; Rothchild & Roeder, 2005; Turner, 2004; World Bank, 
2002). Rebuilding central governance institutions is integral to statebuilding efforts 
(DFID, 2010; Turner, 2004). 
Post-conflict statebuilding often refers specifically to efforts by external actors or 
donors to build or rebuild failed, weak or conflict-affected states (Brinkerhoff, 2007; 
2012; Cox, 2001; Dobbins et al., 2001; Hartzel et al., 2003; Knoll, 2006; Milikin & 
Krause, 2002; Steffeck, 2003; Stewart, 2008). It can also encompass   Fukuyama’s  
(2004) more general notion of the formation of new governmental structures and the 
strengthening of existing institutions (see also Chandler, 2006; 2010; Englebert & 
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Tull, 2008). Peacebuilding   is   a   related   process,   which   aims   to   establish   ‘positive  
peace’   after   a   conflict,   defined   as   “social   harmony,   respect   for   the rule of law and 
human rights, and social and economic development”  (DFID,  2010, p.14). As defined 
in Paris and Sisk (2008, p.1-2),   statebuilding   is   “a   particular   approach   to  
peacebuilding, premised on the recognition that achieving security and development 
in societies emerging from civil war depends on the existence of capable, autonomous, 
and   legitimate   institutions”.   This also reflects the aims of more recent UN post-
conflict missions that have shifted from a pure peacebuilding focus to one of 
statebuilding (Reilly, 2010). Therefore the literature in this section is referred to as the 
‘statebuilding  literature’,  although  it  shares some overlap with peacebuilding theories 
and research.  
One aim of statebuilding is to re-establish the State as the highest authority 
(Brinkerhoff et al., 2012; Chesterman, 2004; Paris & Sisk, 2008), and legitimacy 
plays a key role in this process (Franck, 1990; Hurd, 2007; Koh, 1997; Whalan, 2013). 
As a result, legitimacy features prominently in applied statebuilding frameworks (see 
Boutros-Ghali, 1992; Carment et al., 2010; Paris & Sisk, 2009; USAID, 2005; USIP 
& PKSOI, 2009). For example, building institutional legitimacy is identified by the 
Department for International Development as a primary requirement for peace, 
security and resilience over the long term (DFID, 2010), and is the key focus of 
diplomatic actors (e.g. the US State Department, the UN Security Council; 
Brinkerhoff 2005). The President of the World Bank in 2009 called for building state 
legitimacy   to   be   the   ‘strategic   centre   of   gravity’   for all statebuilding operations 
(Zoellick, 2009).  
Why is legitimacy so critical in a post-conflict state? First, there is always a risk that 
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post-conflict societies will relapse into violence and instability (Autesserre, 2010; 
Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Whalan, 2013). Low legitimacy perceptions are said to be 
key indicators of whether countries will spiral into civil war (Holsti & Holsti, 1996; 
Themnér & Ohlson, 2014). One proposed way legitimate institutions facilitate peace 
is by transforming a society from one that solves problems with violence to one that 
operates through political institutions to resolve conflict (Samuels, 2006; Whalan, 
2013). Further, illegitimacy has the potential to be self-reinforcing, as when 
governments turn to coercion to assert control, their service delivery capacity can 
decline, intensifying the potential for conflict and leading to the further weakening of 
government legitimacy. Thus, illegitimacy becomes both a cause and a consequence 
of state fragility (Brinkerhoff et al., 2012; Sacks, 2011).  
Second, legitimate post-conflict institutions can quell ethnic tensions. Post-conflict 
societies are often fractured along ethnic lines, and different groups may compete to 
influence the emerging state structure. Where the divisions of armed conflict overlap 
with ethnic categories, the salience of ethnic identities can increase (Simonsen, 2011). 
This can exacerbate conflict between ethnic groups and the government, as the former 
vies for access to resources and constitutional recognition (Stewart, 2008). Most 
fragile and conflict-affected countries are characterized by power relationships based 
on patronage, and exhibit tension between different forms of authority that can make 
claims to legitimacy through both traditional and formal means (DFID, 2010; 
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), 2009; Papagianni, 
2008). Regime legitimacy can establish the central government as the key decision-
making authority, which can subdue completing claims to legitimacy arising from 
sources outside of formal state structures (Anderson, 2012). Hence one of the 
purposes of post-conflict legitimacy is to assist in the formation of a collective 
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identity across ethnic or religious lines (Handrahan, 2004; Knoll, 2006), highlighting 
that legitimacy has a role in national identity formation (Smith, 1998; Themnér & 
Ohlson, 2014).  
Finally, legitimate post-conflict governments can produce rules and laws that are 
more likely to be seen as fair and necessary by the population, which is crucial to 
effective post-conflict statebuilding (Hansen, 1997). Activities such as constitutional 
and security sector reform, holding democratic elections and negotiating state 
structure (e.g., forms of federalism) are typically regarded as central to post-conflict 
‘rule  of  law’  reform  (Call, 2007; Fukuyama, 2010; Haggard, 2014). The consequences 
of citizen acceptance of these rules and structures are fundamental and far-reaching. 
For example, constitution-making is often an immediate priority in a post-conflict 
society (Cohen, 2006; Horowitz, 2007; Paris & Sisk, 2008; Samuels, 2006; Widner, 
2007). A new constitution serves as “the framework of principles and rules upon 
which the  new  state  will  be  based”  (Brahimi, 2007, p.7). If citizens are left with the 
impression that an illegitimate authority produced the constitution, it may not be seen 
as a lasting, fixed framework, undermining the contributions it can make to post-
conflict stability and security (Hansen, 1997).  
As these examples illustrate, it is important to consider how the process of 
legitimation is shaped across varying contexts (Seligson & Carrion, 2002). Studies 
indicate that in long-standing democratic systems, legitimacy creates a buffer that 
allows political institutions to weather severe crises, which is not the case in a new 
emerging democracy (Finkel, Muller, & Seligson, 1989; Seligson & Muller, 1987). In 
other words, the   ‘reservoir   of   goodwill’   evident in developed countries with strong 
state capacity has yet to be established in fragile post-conflict societies (Mischler & 
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Rose, 2001). In such contexts, political support can be more volatile. In particular, 
many value-based models of legitimacy (e.g., Levi et al 2009) assume an initial 
trustworthiness of state institutions that post-conflict societies rarely possess. Thus, a 
key difference between post-conflict legitimacy and legitimacy in stable Western 
democracies is the ‘starting point’ of regime legitimacy (Brinkerhoff et al., 2012). 
Often the starting point for legitimacy in a post-conflict  state  is  little  more  than  “hope,  
fear,  and  a  desire  for  change”  (Brinkerhoff  et  al., 2012, p.19), based on new leaders 
and transitional justice. The importance of legitimacy ‘starting  points’  is  reinforced by 
evidence that previous experiences with democracy influences the formation of 
legitimacy, in that countries with democratic political systems prior to conflict view 
democratic institutions as more legitimate after conflict (Hartzel et al., 2001). 
Therefore, the factors that contribute to perceptions of legitimacy in longstanding 
democratic systems cannot be assumed to apply in societies where democratic 
institutions and processes are unfamiliar.  
This section has conceptualised legitimacy as a central component of post-conflict 
reconstruction. Yet, establishing post-conflict legitimacy is notoriously difficult. The 
widespread inability of conflict-affected states to gain sufficient legitimacy has been 
described  as  ‘the  most  disappointing  aspect  of  post-conflict  reconstruction’  (François  
& Sud, 2006, p.151). Some argue that norms of legitimacy in the developing world 
are not well-established enough to allow the Western notion of legitimacy to take hold 
in domestic populations in non-Western societies (e.g., Roberts, 2008).  
How then can legitimacy beliefs be cultivated? This chapter now turns to the sources 
of post-conflict legitimacy, beginning with instrumental theories and moving on to 
procedural theories. Instrumental theories of legitimacy hold that the capacity to 
 35 
govern effectively is sufficient for citizens to bestow legitimacy on a state (Schmelzle, 
2012). Procedural theories of legitimacy regard the fairness of procedural mechanisms 
as one of the main ways in which institutional legitimacy is attained and sustained 
(e.g., Beetham, 1991; Rothstein, 2009). The next section outlines these approaches 
separately to highlight the differences and similarities between these two sources of 
legitimacy. 
 
3. Sources of institutional legitimacy  
 
a. Instrumental sources of post-conflict legitimacy   
The building of institutional legitimacy via instrumental means is a common approach 
to generating post-conflict legitimacy (e.g., Cook, Hardin, & Levi, 2005; Gilley 2009; 
Levi, 1988; 1997; Rothstein, 2005; Sarsfield & Echegaray, 2006; Scharpf, 1999; 
Schmelzle, 2012; Van De Walle & Scott, 2009). Broadly, the instrumental approach 
takes the conceptual position that the possession and distribution of resources is a key 
task of those who hold power (Whalan, 2013), and legitimacy will be granted to those 
who exercise this power effectively. 
There are several related components of instrumental sources of legitimacy, including 
government effectiveness, distributive justice, and outcome favourability. 
Government effectiveness relates to how well the government achieves the goals it 
was designed to accomplish (Schmelzle, 2012). For example, the provision of basic 
services is seen as an essential element of post-conflict effectiveness:  “it is clear that 
people in post-conflict spaces need water, food and shelter, for example, long before 
they need and benefit from the rule of law, political rights and associated frameworks”  
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(Roberts, 2011, p.14).  
Public perceptions of government effectiveness in providing instrumental outcomes 
and  achieving  objectives  is  often  described  as  ‘institutional  performance’  (see Lipset, 
1959). Institutional performance—the fulfillment of the core functions of state 
services—is often regarded as the starting point for legitimation in a post-conflict 
state (Brinkerhoff, 2007; see also Carpenter, Slater & Mallet, 2012; Cook, Hardin & 
Levi, 2005; Levi, 1988; McLoughlin, 2013; Milliken & Krause, 2002; Rothstein, 
2005). The present study is concerned with the pathway from performance to 
legitimacy. That is, whether perceived government performance influences 
perceptions of institutional legitimacy in a post-conflict state.  
Theorising on the causal mechanism linking government performance and legitimacy 
is extensive. Rothstein  (2011)  makes  the  argument  that  the  state’s  output  to  citizens  is  
the primary source of its legitimacy, and increasing the quantity or quality of 
government output will reduce public opposition to ruling governments.1 The OECD 
(2011) proposes that the mechanism linking government performance and legitimacy 
is the “material expression of reciprocal state-society relations” (p.57). This refers to 
the idea of the social contract, in that when individuals perceive the competent 
delivery of public services, they judge the producer of those goods as legitimate 
(Baird, 2010; Barkey, 1994; Hechter, 2000; Levi & Sacks, 2009; Schmelzle, 2012). In 
other  words  government  services  “make the state tangible” (Van De Walle & Scott, 
2009, p.10) with local service provision providing an opportunity   for   ‘sightings’   of  
the state (Corbridge, 2005), which enhances people’s  expectations  of  their  rights  and  
obligations with regards to authorities (Paddison, 1983). Hence, statebuilding via                                                         1 That is, citizens direct their loyalty to governments that provide them with welfare-enhancing goods 
(Barkey, 1994; Hechter, 2000; van de Wall & Scott, 2011).  
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increasing the reach of the central government through direct service provision is seen 
as an effective way to expand the influence of the state (Brinkerhoff, 2005; Jackson & 
Scott, 2007; Van de Walle & Scott, 2011). 
Empirically, however, the relationship between government performance and 
improved government legitimacy is mixed. Declining service quality has been linked 
globally to declining levels of trust in the state (although this mostly has been 
established in relation to stable countries; e.g., Fjeldstad, 2004; Levi et al., 2009; Van 
De Walle & Bouckaert, 2003). In a cross-sectional analysis of Afrobarometer data 
from sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and six Arab countries, Levi and Sacks 
(2009) found that government approval and trust ratings were affected by service 
provision, though  only  indirectly  through  citizens’  sense of food security. Brinkerhoff 
et al. (2012)  used  Iraqi’s  satisfaction  with  water  services  as  a  measure  of  government 
effectiveness, and citizens’  willingness to pay more for water services as a proxy for 
trust in the state. Results indicated that citizens in provinces with relatively better 
water services reported higher willingness to pay for improvements to the water 
system. However, the relationship was non-linear, and Brinkerhoff et al. (2012) 
conclude that although post-conflict governments can build legitimacy through 
service delivery, the gains are fragile and complex.  
Along with basic perceptions of government performance, perceptions of distributive 
justice and outcome favourability of resource allocation are other instrumental 
variables that may influence perceptions of post-conflict legitimacy (e.g., see 
Ndaruhutse, 2013; Rothstein, 2011). Distributive justice refers to the perception that 
resources are distributed equitably across groups in a society (Adams, 1965; Lerner & 
Lerner, 1981; Tyler et al., 1997; van den Bos et al., 1998). Outcome favorability 
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reflects   assessments   that   such   distribution   is   advantageous   to   one’s   own   group, or 
favourable personally. In line with this, the perceived ability of authorities to deliver 
fair outcomes has been found to enhance legitimacy (Muller, 1979; Rogowski, 1974). 
What constitutes a fair outcome may be based on equal distribution or some form of 
'deservingness' criteria (Lerner & Lerner, 1981; Tyler et al., 1997), but distributive 
justice theories conceive of citizens as primarily judging authorities on the 
distribution of resources. 
It is widely believed that regimes in fragile and weak states generally do poorly at 
equitable and inclusive resource allocation and redistribution. Distributive 
mechanisms in these environments tend to function through patronage, which 
negatively impacts service delivery, economic opportunity, welfare, and ultimately 
legitimacy. Those in power often exploit resource control—both at the national level, 
as  in  Saddam  Hussein’s  Iraq  (Brinkerhoff  & Mayfield, 2005) or at the local level, as 
in Afghanistan (Lister & Wilder, 2005)—resulting in high levels of distributive 
injustice. When government services are perceived to be differentially distributive 
across geographic areas, or favouring particular ethnic/religious or socioeconomic 
groups, legitimacy perceptions are said to be negatively affected (Lister & Wilder, 
2005; McLoughlin, 2013; Sacks, 2011; Zakaria, 2003). For example, qualitative 
research in Liberia, Nepal and Colombia found that where corruption resulted in 
unequal   access   to   services,   it   was   detrimental   to   citizens’   views   of   the   state’s  
legitimacy (Dix et al., 2012). Stewart (2008) found that horizontal (group-based) 
inequalities, which include the provision of services, can delegitimise regimes and 
provoke conflict.2  The propensity for group-based distributive injustice to provoke 
intergroup conflict has lead Stewart (2008) to argue that addressing inequalities                                                         2 This  forms  part  of  the  ‘grievance’  theory  of  the  political  economy  of  conflict;;  see  Collier  &  Hoeffler  
1998; 2002; Collier 2005; Elbadawi & Sambanis 2002. 
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between groups should be the first priority in a post-conflict period. However, this 
research does not establish the relationship in the opposite direction, that is, that 
distributive justice is linked to legitimacy and compliance.  
 
In summary, although these studies suggest a link between instrumental outcomes and 
legitimacy, the empirical relationship is far from clear. In fact, some studies find 
negative or curvilinear relationships between the provision of services and 
government legitimacy (e.g., Brinkerhoff et al., 2012; Sacks, 2011).  
Why might the relationship between instrumental outcomes and legitimacy be 
difficult to observe in empirical terms? First, there is no universal agreed threshold at 
which service provision can be regarded as adequate (see also OECD, 2008; Sacks, 
2012; Schmelzle, 2012). This would vary greatly according to citizen expectations of 
the role of the state (Amundsen, 2010).  One task of a post-conflict government is to 
create initial expectations of what it can deliver and then successfully convince 
citizens that those expectations are being met (Sacks, 2012). If initial expectations are 
raised too high, legitimacy could suffer even as basic services are provided. There is 
also variation in which particular services matter to citizens. For some groups, 
drinkable water, roads, sanitation, and security may be more salient needs compared 
to the provision of other public services, such as education. That is, expectations of 
government performance may differ across groups, and this can change over time 
(Sacks, 2011).  
The link between government delivery of instrumental outcomes and perceived 
legitimacy is intuitively appealing, especially in relation to post-conflict societies 
where basic services can be a matter of life and death. However one potential flaw 
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with these perspectives is that they overlook how values and identity may shape 
government legitimacy. I will now review non-instrumental sources of legitimacy in 
order to explore alternative pathways to post-conflict legitimacy.  
 
b. Procedural sources of post-conflict legitimacy 
Alternative explanations of post-conflict legitimacy are not concerned primarily with 
the outcomes of the reconstruction period and services from the government, but 
instead are focused on the processes underpinning the actions and decisions of post-
conflict governments and international actors.  
One major theorised source of procedurally-based post-conflict legitimacy is 
democratic elections. The idea that free elections are vital to post-conflict political 
legitimacy is usually assumed in the statebuilding literature (Goodwin-Gill, 2006; 
O’Donnell, 2007). Yet, statebuilding in practice has highlighted that external 
interventions aimed at facilitating democratic transitions to build institutional 
legitimacy are extraordinarily fraught and difficult in societies without histories and 
traditions of democracy (see Bermeo, 2003; Call & Cook, 2003). This is even the case 
with massive external assistance and support for the implementation of democratic 
elections. For example, democratic elections in Iraq are generally considered to not 
have enhanced political legitimacy of the subsequently formed government, as the 
U.S. administration and its allies had hoped (Pletsch, 2005; Rangwala, 2006; 
Rothstein, 2009).  
Building on a literature doubting democratic elections as a sufficient criterion for 
legitimacy, Rothstein (2009) uses post-conflict Croatia as a case study for generating 
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legitimacy via perceptions of procedural fairness in the implementation of public 
policies. He proposes that procedural fairness in a post-conflict state will influence 
political legitimacy more than voting in an election:  “legitimacy has more to do with 
the exercise of government power than the access to this power by participation in 
elections”  (Rothstein, 2009, p.14; see also Grimes, 2006).  Key  to  Rothstein’s  concept  
of fair processes is impartiality (Rothstein, 2009; Rothstein & Teorell, 2008), and 
along with other authors (e.g., Ball, 2007; Cupit, 2007; Hartzel et al., 2001; Seligson, 
2002), he sees corruption and exclusion (i.e., unfairness in the process of decision-
making) as the main impediments to legitimacy in developing countries.  
In this literature it is proposed that unfair processes affect government legitimacy in 
post-conflict  societies  by  undermining  citizens’  perceptions  of  impartiality  (Seligson, 
2002; Sacks, 2011). Another lens for considering how perceptions of fairness 
influence institutional legitimacy comes from social psychological models of 
procedural justice. These models focus not only on impartiality, but on the relational 
information conveyed via procedural justice. This perspective provides an 
explanatory model for how fair processes harness the identity and values of citizens 
that are central to building sustainable legitimacy in the long term. This line of 
research will be discussed in the following section as a useful way to understand how 
post-conflict legitimacy is generated.  
 
b. The procedural justice model of legitimacy 
 
As opposed to models proposing that legitimacy is a direct result of practical 
outcomes, alternative models demonstrate that relational concerns arising from 
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judgments of procedural justice are more likely than instrumental concerns to shape 
the perceived legitimacy of authorities (Hough et al., 2013; Factor et al., 2013; Tyler, 
1997; 2006a, 2006b; Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997; Tyler & Blader, 2000; 
2003; Tyler & Huo, 2002; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003a, 2003b). These relational models 
of procedural justice are premised on the idea that citizens focus on the fairness of 
procedures because the experience of a fair process communicates important 
information about social relationships and self-identity (Blader & Tyler 2009; Lind, 
Greenberg, Scott, & Welchans, 2000; Lind, Kulik, Ambrose, & de Vera Park, 1993; 
Tyler, 1987, 1989; 1994; Tyler & Blader, 2000; 2003; Tyler & Lind, 1992). 
Procedural justice comprises two central elements, one regarding the quality of 
decision-making (voice, neutrality), and one regarding the quality of interpersonal 
treatment (respectful and dignified treatment; Tyler & Huo, 2002).  
 
At the heart of the relational model of justice is social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 
1979, 1986; Turner et al., 1987). This theory originates in the work of Tajfel (1981; p. 
255) who  defined   social   identity   as   “that  part  of   an   individual’s   self-concept which 
derives from [her or] his knowledge of [her or] his membership in a social group (or 
groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that 
membership”. Self-categorisation theory extended this framework by placing a 
particular emphasis on the salience of group memberships in social situations (Hogg 
& Abrams, 1988; Turner et al., 1987). When a particular social identity is salient, 
individuals act and think as members of that group (Brewer, 1991) and rely on the 
group as a guide for their own thoughts and behaviors (Terry & Hogg, 1996). 
Research   shows   that   people’s   judgments about their standing within a group 
influences how strongly they identify with that group (De Cremer, 2002; Jetten, 
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Branscombe, & Spears, 2002; Noel, Wann, & Branscombe, 1995; Sleebos, Ellemers, 
& de Gilder, 2006; Smith, Tyler, Huo, Ortiz, & Lind, 1998). According to social 
identity theory, when power operates through identification and influence, it becomes 
legitimate and is more sustainable than resource control or brute force (Turner, 2005). 
 
The group value model of procedural justice employs social identity theory to argue 
that fair decision-making and respectful treatment communicates information to 
citizens about their status and value within the group (Tyler & Lind, 1992). In the 
case of a central  government,   the  information  conveyed  is  about  citizens’  status  and  
value within the national group (Loader & Mulcahy, 2003; Reiner, 2010; Waddington, 
1999). According to the group value model, people want to be valued within the 
groups they belong to, hence the importance of procedural justice. When procedural 
justice is high, people feel valued within the national group, and are motivated to 
legitimate the authority of that group (Lind & Tyler, 1992).  
 
 In summary, procedural justice helps to improve perceptions of the legitimacy of 
institutional authorities. Tyler (1990) examined self-reports of a random sample of 
Chicago residents regarding their attitudes and behaviors toward the law. Results 
indicated that when citizens felt that authorities used fair procedures in making 
decisions, and treated them with respect and dignity, they were more likely to judge 
the institution as legitimate, regardless of the actual outcome of the decision. Further 
studies confirmed this link between procedural justice and legitimacy, and the effects 
of legitimacy on compliance with rules (Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997) and 
cooperation more generally (Tyler & Blader, 2000). Tyler and Huo (2002) compared 
the influence of four relational factors—voice, neutrality, respectful treatment, and 
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trustworthiness—along with instrumental concerns, on people’s  overall  rating  of  their  
experiences with legal authorities and the perceived justice of those interactions. The 
results indicated that each of the four procedural elements was significantly more 
important than the instrumental outcomes in shaping judgments about authorities. In 
other words, people made justice and legitimacy judgments primarily on the basis of 
procedural factors, not instrumental outcomes.  
 
The effects of procedural justice on institutional legitimacy have been demonstrated 
across a range of contexts, for example in the area of policing (Mazerolle et al., 2013; 
Bradford, Murphy & Jackson, 2013), mediation (Nolan-Hayley, 2014), correctional 
institutions (Baker et al., 2014); criminal justice (Barnes et al., 2013), workplaces 
(Andrews et al., 2013Greenberg & Colquitt, 2013), and political institutions (Hibbing 
& Theiss-Morse, 2001). Studies have also demonstrated that procedural justice 
influences political trust in the absence of inter-personal interaction between 
authorities and citizens. For example, a study by Grimes (2006) investigated the 
causal effect of procedural justice on political trust and decision acceptance in 
Sweden, and found that perceptions of procedural fairness in the decision-making 
process   for   a   new   railway   was   causally   responsible   for   citizens’   trust   in   the   rail  
authority, and their acceptance of the decisions made by the authority.  
 
Based on the research outlined above, one could argue that post-conflict legitimacy is 
best   built   through   procedural   justice,   by   harnessing   citizens’   identification  with   the  
ruling authority. The outcome of this would be increased cooperation, compliance, 
deference, and engagement. Conversely, political authorities and institutions will lose 
local legitimacy when they do not adhere to procedurally fair norms (Clawson & 
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Kegler, 2001; Farnsworth, 2003; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2001; Murphy, 2004), and 
citizens will be more likely to contest decisions or circumvent laws (Grimes, 2006; 
Hegtvedt, 2004; Tyler, 2001).  
 
Only a small amount of research has tested procedural justice theory outside of a 
Western, economically advanced, democratic context (Sacks, 2011; Tankebe, 2008). 
A study of procedural justice and identity politics in a nascent democracy (Tanzania) 
found   that   levels   of   process   satisfaction   with   the   government’s   handling   of   two  
political issues predicted trust and identification with the leading political party 
(Epstein et al., 2012). This study compared majority and minority groups and found 
that procedural justice was more important in predicting trust in political parties for 
minority (i.e., structurally low power) groups.  However, only trust for incumbent 
authorities was measured (i.e., political parties and leaders), as opposed to regime 
legitimacy (i.e., government institutions), and the study did not compare the effects of 
fair processes and instrumental outcomes. In another transitional setting, Tyler (2009) 
examined the effect of procedural justice on rule-following in post-conflict South 
Africa and found support for the idea that procedural justice increased rule-following, 
mediated by national identification. In post-conflict Sierra Leone, Sacks and Larizza 
(2012) found that positive interactions between citizens and local authorities 
strengthened citizens’   attitudes   toward   local political authorities, implying that fair 
and respectful treatment may increase trust in authorities. In the context of policing in 
South Africa, Bradford, Hough & Jackson (2013) found that although procedural 
justice was correlated with police legitimacy, the effect was smaller than in Western 
contexts, and police effectiveness (in terms of security) was more predictive of 
legitimacy. Similarly, Tankebe (2008) found that in Ghana, police effectiveness was 
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the key antecedent of political trust (although procedural justice was also predictive). 
These findings, however, are concerned with police legitimacy in developing societies, 
not government legitimacy in post-conflict societies (a key concern of this study), and 
as such, their assessment of instrumental outcomes is restricted to security concerns 
(as opposed to broader service delivery and distributive justice). Finally, Sacks and 
Larizza (2012) used Afrobarometer data to test the relationship between service 
delivery,  procedural  justice,  and  citizens’  trust  and  legitimacy  beliefs in three African 
countries. The study showed consistent evidence for a relationship between 
procedural justice and trust for the incumbent government. While this work attempted 
to compare instrumental and relational concerns, it suffered from some 
methodological limitations, with legitimacy beliefs measured through a single 
question (i.e. “The   tax   department   has   the   right   to  make   people   pay   taxes”,   coded  
dichotomously,  and  ‘trust  in  government’  was measured  by  the  question  “Do  you  trust  
the  President?”,  coded  dichotomously).  
 
In summary, a large body of research links procedural justice to judgments of 
institutional legitimacy, and that these judgements operate through identification with 
citizens’   social   groups   (i.e.,   the   group-value model; Tyler & Lind, 1992).  Though 
some evidence exists for its applicability outside of stable, Western democracies (as 
detailed above e.g., Epstein et al., 2013; Gibson, 2002; Sacks & Larizza, 2012; Tyler, 
2009), the effect of procedural justice on institutional legitimacy has largely remained 
unstudied in developing societies. The question of whether the benefits of procedural 
justice translate into different cultures and political contexts remains under-researched.  
This project seeks to test the applicability of the procedural justice model in building 
post-conflict legitimacy, and compare procedural justice to instrumental factors.  To 
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contribute further to the literature, potential moderators of the procedural justice 
effect will also be explored. These include identification (Huo, 2003), power 
(Hegtvedt & Johnson, 2009), and law legitimacy (Murphy et al., 2009), and will be 
briefly outlined in the next section. 
 
i. Moderators of procedural justice  
 
1. Identification 
As outlined above, identification is central to perceptions of procedural justice, and 
fair  and  respectful  treatment  by  authorities  signals  both  an  individual’s  worth  within  a  
group,  and  the  worth  of  the  group  itself.  Identification  is  the  ‘bridge’  between justice 
and legitimacy, and is regarded as a key causal mechanism linking these concepts 
(Bradford et al., 2014; Tyler & Blader, 2003).  
People can have multiple identities, and may identify more strongly with a larger (or 
superordinate) group, i.e., the nation, or identify with a smaller (or subgroup), i.e., an 
ethnic group within the nation (Brewer, 1991; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner et al., 
1987).   Research   suggests   that   superordinate,   or   national   identity,   shapes   citizen’s  
relationships with the government, whereas subgroup (e.g., ethnic) identity does not 
(Huo et al., 1996; Huo, 2003; Smith & Tyler, 1996; Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith & Huo, 
1997; Wenzel, 2002). Superordinate identity is theorized to be more important for 
relational concerns because when citizens identify strongly at the national level, the 
government is perceived as representing their ingroup, and when subgroup identities 
are stronger, the government is perceived as representing an outgroup (Bradford et al., 
2014).  
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In line with this theory, empirical research shows that when people identify with the 
superordinate group, relational concerns are more salient, whereas when they identify 
more with a subgroup, instrumental concerns are more salient (Smith & Tyler, 1996).  
For example, Huo et al. (1996) found that in the US, minorities who identified more 
strongly at the superordinate level displayed higher levels of decision acceptance 
under conditions of fair treatment than those with weaker superordinate identification. 
When national identification was low, acceptance of decisions was linked to their 
favorability. 
 
However, strong subgroup (e.g., ethnic or racial) identification does not necessarily 
undermine the relationship between justice and legitimacy. Huo (2003) sampled 
African Americans, Latinos, and Whites about their interactions with legal authorities 
who are generally regarded as representative of majority groups. The findings 
indicated that those who identified highly with the superordinate category of 
American relied more on relational concerns and less on instrumental concerns, when 
evaluating   the   authority’s   decision. That is, the relationship between procedural 
justice and decision acceptance was stronger for citizens who identified strongly with 
the national group. In   contrast,   identification   with   one’s   ethnic   subgroup   did   not  
influence the strength of the relationship between relational quality and decision 
acceptance. The study concluded that subgroup identification does not undermine 
relational concerns in terms  of  deferring  to  an  authority’s  decision.   
 
In the post-conflict environment, group identity at the national level may be strained 
by years of conflict and subsequent ethnic tensions during reconstruction (Bhatta, 
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2013; Diamond, Linz, & Lipset, 1995). Non-ethnic identities may be weaker, and 
fostering them difficult, because binding superordinate identities have been fractured 
by the previous conflict (Simonsen, 2011). The research above on the influence of 
group identity indicates that weak national identification could mean relational 
concerns are less important for citizens in a post-conflict environment. Therefore, this 
project seeks to examine whether identification at the subgroup and superordinate 
levels influences the relationship between procedural justice and legitimacy. This 
would replicate existing findings from Western, peacetime contexts, and provide 
evidence that even in a post-conflict environment where superordinate identification 
can be strained, procedural justice still encourages citizens to legitimize superordinate 
authorities.    
 
2. Power 
Another link between procedural justice and legitimacy is perceived group power. 
The relational model of procedural justice suggests that attention to justice concerns 
may be higher among those who have the most marginalized social identity or the 
lowest social standing (Tyler & Lind, 1992; Smith & Tyler, 1996). This is due to fair 
procedures signaling respect from authorities and society (Huo, Binning, & Molina, 
2010a; Smith, Tyler, Huo, Ortiz, & Lind, 1998; Tyler, Degoey, & Smith, 1996). As 
outlined previously, a   study   of   majority   and   minority   groups’   relative   attention   to  
procedural justice in a new democracy (Tanzania), found support for the relational 
model of procedural justice, showing that less powerful minority groups cared more 
about relational concerns in support for the incumbent government than powerful 
majority groups (Epstein et al., 2013). Related research has found evidence that 
fairness cues are particularly salient for minority group members, who look to 
 50 
authorities for information about their group’s   social standing (Huo, Binning, & 
Molina, 2010b; Huo & Molina, 2006; Huo, Molina, Binning, & Funge, 2010; Huo, 
Smith, Tyler, Ortiz & Lind, 1998; Langendijk, Van Dijke, & De Cremer, 2009). This 
research suggests that low-power citizens are more likely to use process information 
in formulating support for authorities (Tyler & Lind, 1992), as attending to procedural 
justice  cues  resolves  any  uncertainty  about  a  minority  group’s  standing  in  the  larger  
society. For these groups, neutral decision-making and respectful treatment are 
regarded as reassuring (Lind, 2001; Thibaut & Walker, 1975).  
 
As discussed previously, relationships between groups are often strained in a post-
conflict society, and ethnic groups can look to national authorities in an effort to seek 
information about their standing in the new social order (Simonsen, 2011). Further, 
statebuilding and peacebuilding operations stress the importance of fostering a sense 
of inclusion for marginalised groups in order to the build legitimacy of the new state 
(e.g., Donais, 2012; Pfister, 2014; Schuman, 2014). The social psychology research 
outlined above suggests that procedurally just treatment may be especially important 
for these marginalised and lower-power groups. Therefore this project aims to 
examine the relationship between procedural justice and legitimacy for both more and 
less powerful groups in post-conflict societies, to test the relative importance of 
relational concerns for these groups.  
 
3. Law legitimacy  
Institutional legitimacy concerns the rightfulness of the institution of government, 
whereas law legitimacy concerns the fairness, validity, or appropriateness of the laws 
passed by the government (Haggard, 2014; Murphy, Tyler & Curtis, 2009). Citizens 
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may view a regime as illegitimate, but still perceive an obligation to obey the laws it 
promulgates (or conversely, disagree with specific laws, but view the overall regime 
as legitimate; Nachbar, 2012). Within the broader procedural justice and legitimacy 
literature, views about law legitimacy have been shown to interact with procedural 
justice to produce legitimacy judgments (e.g., Murphy et al., 2009), with research also 
focusing on value alignment with laws and voluntary compliance (e.g., Burby & 
Paterson, 1993; Levi, 1998; McGraw & Scholz, 1991). 
 
These findings are relevant in a post-conflict setting, as establishing the rule of law is 
central to reconstruction efforts premised on building successful liberal democratic 
institutions (Haggard, 2014; Samuels, 2006; Stromseth, 2007; Tolbert, 2006). The 
rule of law is a principle of governance, involving all  actors  under  a  state’s  umbrella  
being accountable to the laws of the state, which are consistent with international 
human rights norms and standards (World Bank Secretary General, 2004).3 Rule of 
law reform is said to benefit post-conflict societies by helping to facilitate economic 
development, democratization, poverty reduction, and peacebuilding (DFID, 2001; 
Samuels, 2006; UN Secretary General, 2004).  
 
Cohen (2006) raises an important paradox in the restoration of post-conflict order. 
That is, authorities must quell resistance through the imposition of rules and laws in 
order to gain legitimacy, but the more they do so, the less legitimate they may be 
perceived (see also Bhuta, 2005). One potentially attenuating factor in this scenario is 
the creation of laws that are seen as legitimate (fair and just, with a perceived moral 
obligation to obey) by the majority of citizens. That is, laws that are perceived as                                                         3 Although, the definition and scope of the rule of law is vast and varies among scholars and 
practitioners in the post-conflict field (see Samuels, 2006).  
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legitimate may enhance the legitimacy of authorities. In this project, law legitimacy is 
investigated in terms of its impact on the legitimacy of the government, and its 
interaction with procedural justice.  
 
Generally, the outcome of law legitimacy is considered to be greater compliance with 
existing laws. As mentioned previously, however, it has also been shown to interact 
with procedural justice to produce institutional legitimacy-related behaviours. In a 
study of compliance with police, Murphy et al., (2009) found that questioning the 
legitimacy of the laws lead to an increased focus on procedural justice in motivating 
compliance with the police. That is, when citizens did not feel the law was legitimate, 
they relied more heavily on relational information in assessing authorities. Hence, 
procedural justice and law legitimacy can interact to secure citizen compliance.  
 
Despite a vast body of work on post-conflict rule of law reform (Call, 2007; Paris, 
2002, 2004, 2010; Stromseth, 2007; USAID, 2005; USIP & PKSOI, 2009) the effect 
of law legitimacy on institutional legitimacy remains empirically under-evaluated 
(Fearon, 2010; Haggard, 2014). Therefore in this project, the effect of law legitimacy 
on the relationship between procedural justice and institutional legitimacy is explored. 
That is, will the content of the laws promulgated by a post-conflict government 
undermine or enhance the proposed influence of procedural justice on government 
legitimacy?  
 
Summary 
The previous sections have summarised key theories of post-conflict legitimacy, 
encompassing instrumental and procedural perspectives. Social psychological theories 
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of procedural justice have been offered to explain why fair processes may matter in a 
post-conflict state, with potential moderators of the relationship between procedural 
justice and legitimacy including identification, power and law legitimacy. Although 
instrumental and procedural approaches have been deliberately contrasted here, it 
should also be noted that many scholars either emphasise both instrumental and 
procedural factors, or focus on one approach but provide the caveat that other factors 
are at play (e.g., Brinkerhoff, 2007; Levi, Sacks, & Tyler, 2009; Nachbar, 2012; Sacks, 
2011). This project aims to take into account both approaches and contrast their 
effects in terms of enhancing post-conflict legitimacy beliefs, along with examining 
the contingencies of the relationship between procedural justice and post-conflict 
legitimacy.  
 
4. The  role  of  ‘local  ownership’  in  rebuilding  institutional  legitimacy 
 
There are two elements of the procedural justice model of legitimacy that share 
considerable overlap with theorizing on post-conflict legitimacy: the importance of 
voice, and the importance of neutrality, which overlap with the statebuilding concepts 
of local participation and local ownership. In this section I will summarise literature 
on post-conflict local ownership, and argue that local ownership and participation 
build post-conflict legitimacy through fostering a sense of procedural justice.  
  
Most post-conflict institution building involves outside actors and international 
interventions. Some scholars argue these international organizations (such as the UN) 
can positively influence local perceptions of new governments in post-conflict 
societies through the provision of incentives, financial inducements, economic 
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sanctions, international recognition and legitimation, and thereby play a role in 
enhancing the likelihood peace (Hartzel, 2000; see also Rothchild, 1997; Zartman & 
Touval, 1992). Others argue that international interventions create tension and 
undermine the creation of institutional legitimacy, as the reconstruction process is not 
perceived to   be   ‘owned’   by   locals   (Brinkerhoff, 2005; Chandler, 2010; Duffield, 
2007; Papagianni, 2009; Themnér & Ohlson, 2014). In fact, this issue has gained 
considerable attention in the literature in relation to the legitimacy of international 
peace operations (see Buchanan & Keohane, 2006; Chesterman, 2002; Clark, 2005; 
Harland, 2004; Morphet, 2002). For example, although the international community 
created and maintained post-conflict mechanisms and policy reform in post-conflict 
Bosnia   that   fulfilled   external   criteria   of   ‘good   governance’,   it   did   not   create  
institutions that were led and operated by Bosnians. It is argued that these 
internationally created institutions were incapable of legitimising the Bosnian state 
and overcoming ethnic divisions (Chesterman, 2005; Roberts, 2004). ‘Local 
ownership’   is   said   to   redress   such   imbalances   by   engaging   local   citizens   and  
minimizing foreign influence over post-conflict processes (Donais, 2012; Hullmeller, 
2014; Pfister, 2014; Schuman, 2014). 
 
Emphasizing inclusiveness in post-conflict processes has become a goal of long-term 
peacebuilding strategies, and has become a prominent part of the policies of post-
conflict administrations from Bosnia to Iraq (e.g., the UN Peacebuilding Commission; 
Simonsen, 2011). Broadly, it is held that successful development and post-conflict 
reconstruction is country-led and country-owned (World Bank, 2005), and that local 
ownership builds post-conflict legitimacy (Brinkerhoff, 2005; de Carvahlo, 2011). 
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What is local ownership? Ideally, it is when local political authorities, with broad 
support among members of civil society “decide of their own accord that policy 
changes are desirable, choose what these changes should be and when they should be 
introduced, and where these changes become built into the parameters of policy and 
administration, which are generally  accepted  as  desirable”   (Brinkerhoff, 2007, p.17; 
see also Killick, 1998). In other words, local actors should have influence over 
decision-making processes that affect the post-conflict state, as opposed to foreign 
actors and agencies. Roberts (2004) proposes an even more consultative approach to 
local ownership, involving hearing and responding to needs put forward locally as 
part of the reconstruction process, to then be prioritised and supported by global 
actors. Both elements of local ownership therefore emphasise local participation in, 
and influence over, post-conflict processes. In other words, local groups in post-
conflict societies should have an opportunity to voice their opinion during processes 
that affect them. These notions of local ownership may be seen as conceptually 
similar to the social psychological literature on voice.  
 
Voice describes the perception of process control in the form of receiving the 
possibility to voice one’s  view  (Folger,  1977;;  Lind  &  Tyler,  1988;;  Thibaut  &  Walker,  
1975). An extensive field of research shows that having an opportunity to provide 
input into a decision-making process results in the evaluation of procedures as more 
fair, compared to when an opportunity for voice is not provided (Brockner et al., 
1998; Folger, Rosenfield, Grove, & Corkran, 1979; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Van den Bos, 
Wilke, & Lind, 1998; Van Prooijen, Van den Bos, & Wilke, 2002; Van den Bos, 
2005). Opportunity for voice has been shown to have positive effects even if it is clear 
to recipients that their opinions cannot affect   the   final   decision   (termed   ‘non-
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instrumental’  voice;;  Folger, 1977; Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, 1990; Platow, Brewer, & 
Eggins, 2008).   Furthermore,   voice   positively   influences   people’s   perceptions   and  
behaviors, including satisfaction ratings of decisions, relational judgments, protest 
intentions, and task performance (for overviews, see Folger & Cropanzano, 1998; 
Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Blader, 2000; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Therefore, voice—
the opportunity to express opinions to authorities, regardless of whether those 
opinions are influential—is linked to the perception of procedural justice, which in 
turn is linked to the legitimacy of authorities (as outlined in the previous section; e.g., 
Gibson, 1989; Tyler, 1990;;   2003).   In   this   project   it   is   proposed   that   ‘local  
ownership’—understood as local voice and influence over post-conflict decision-
making processes—promotes the perception that authorities are more just, which is a 
potential mechanism linking local ownership to legitimacy. 
 
Despite being at the forefront of post-conflict statebuilding programs, elements of the 
‘local   ownership’   agenda   are   still contested in the peacebuilding and statebuilding 
literatures (e.g., Brinkerhoff & Mayfield, 2005; Chandler, 2004; Papagianni, 2009). 
Knoll (2006) conceives the debate as a conflict between the degree of local 
participation and the quality of local participation (often judged in accordance with 
Western liberal norms). Further, case studies from post-conflict societies illustrate 
how   fraught   the   process   of   ‘local   ownership’   can   be   on   the   ground.   For   example,  
Jackson’s   (2005) analysis reveals how the design of local participation in Sierra 
Leone relied on traditional institutions, i.e., the chiefdom. This eventually undermined 
the legitimacy of the new governance system, as chiefs carried negative associations 
with segments of the population. Post-conflict consultation and inclusion mechanisms 
by international actors can be resented by the winners of the conflict, as they are seen 
 57 
to undermine hard-won victories (Simonsen, 2011) Yet, exclusion of minorities and 
segments of the population negatively affects the degree to which the new 
government is seen as legitimate by the broader population (Jackson, 2005). 
Brinkerhoff and Mayfield (2005) note that reliance on traditional leaders for help in 
the early days of creating local councils in Iraq led to suspicions that councils served 
the interests of elites and powerful families. Conversely, local councils and 
decentralisation mechanisms established in post-conflict Afghanistan were rejected as 
illegitimate foreign imports, despite being aimed at increasing local participation 
(Brinkerhoff & Mayfield, 2005).   These   case   studies   indicate   that   ‘local   ownership’  
can operate on different levels and for different segments of the population.  
 
This aligns with social psychological research finding evidence for variations in the 
psychological experience of voice and ownership. These variations have been 
explained as resulting from orientations such as individualism vs. collectivism (e.g., 
Leung, 2005); masculinity vs. femininity (e.g., Van den Bos et al., 2010), and power 
distance (Brockner et al., 2001). Variation has also been found at the individual level 
relating to situational expectations of voice. That is, the explicit denial of voice 
produces stronger procedural unfairness evaluations than when the opportunity for 
voice is never offered as available (Van den Bos 1999; 2003). Given that people are 
influenced by their cultural surroundings (e.g., Cohen & Leung, 2009; Hofstede, 
2001; Leung, 2005; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Schaller & Crandall, 2003), cultural 
factors can influence the expectation of having a voice in processes, which in turn 
affects perceptions of justice in reaction to being provided or denied voice. The 
relevant question for this project is what influence such expectations have on the 
relationship between voice, influence, and legitimacy. In a highly stratified society 
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(such as Nepal, see chapter 3), caste groups at the bottom of the social hierarchy have 
been traditionally denied voice and may have lower expectations of receiving 
opportunities for voice from authorities (Brockner et al., 2001; Chen & Francesco, 
2000; Tyler, Lind, & Huo, 2000). For these groups, being denied voice and influence 
may not affect the perceived legitimacy of the government.  However, for local elites 
accustomed to their input being sought and having influence over political processes, 
the denial of voice or the perception of foreign influence may adversely affect 
perceptions of government legitimacy. Therefore this project also seeks to examine 
how group positioning in a social hierarchy might influence citizen reactions to local 
ownership in a post-conflict state. That is, whether the opportunity for voice and 
influence increases perceptions of government legitimacy for all members of a post-
conflict society.  
 
In summary, there is a plethora of critical analysis regarding local ownership and 
post-conflict legitimacy, but expectations around local ownership don't always 
materialise in practice (de Carvalho & Schia, 2011; see also Caplan, 2005). This 
project will therefore attempt to establish whether a) two facets of local ownership—
local voice and local influence—influence government legitimacy, as predicted by the 
statebuilding literature; and b) whether these variables operate to influence legitimacy 
beliefs for different segments of the population, i.e., local elites and historically 
marginalized groups.   
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5. Social interaction effects and institutional legitimacy 
 
The final factor to consider in how legitimacy perceptions of post-conflict institutions 
are formed is the potential social influence of other citizens. The literature on building 
legitimacy outlined previously takes as its basis that individual legitimacy beliefs are 
shaped  by  authorities’  behaviours  and  institutional  change.  Procedural   justice  theory  
in particular is concerned with the legitimacy judgments of those who are in direct 
contact with authorities, but has less to say about how legitimacy is generated and 
sustained indirectly, via other citizens, rumour and gossip, the media, or interested 
onlookers (Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012; Jackson et al., 2015; Loader, 2013). In this 
section I will briefly discuss two ways in which social influence may affect individual 
legitimacy beliefs, including normative perceptions and social interaction/endogenous 
effects,  with  reference  to  a  large  body  of  ‘neighbourhood  effects’  research  implicating  
geographical clustering in political beliefs and attitudes (for reviews see Sampson et 
al., 2002; van Ham et al., 2012). 
 
One way that legitimacy perceptions may be influenced socially is through normative 
perceptions. A social   norm   refers   to   group   members’   perceptions   of   the   group  
consensus regarding, for example, the typical or appropriate treatment by an authority 
or group (Sherif, 1936). A vast literature on conformity shows that people will adjust 
their privately-held attitudes and beliefs to align with group norms (Chaiken et al., 
1987; Hardy, 1957; Kelman, 1958; Wood, 2000; Zimbardo & Leippe, 1991). Further, 
perceived group norms have been shown to influence political attitudes (Mutz, 1998; 
Palma & McClosky, 1970). Little work, however, has been conducted on the effect of 
perceived norms on institutional legitimacy beliefs. That is, can perceived norms 
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indicating community acceptance of post-conflict political arrangements influence 
individual legitimacy beliefs, as one facet of 'social influence'?  
 
In this formulation, both the way people perceive institutional rules and structures, as 
well as how they perceive that others perceive institutions, will influence individual 
legitimacy perceptions of central government institutions. It is possible that if a 
person perceives fellow citizens engaging in public behaviours that express consent 
for authorities (such   as   “swearing an oath of allegiance; joining an acclamation; 
voting in an election or plebiscite”; Beetham, 1991, p.25-6) they may believe that the 
majority of citizens in their community view the government as legitimate, and adjust 
their own beliefs accordingly. In other words, “actions  expressive  of  consent  serve  to  
reproduce and reinforce the legitimacy of a given set of social arrangements”  
(Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012, p.67, discussing Gidden’s, 1995, ‘structuration  theory’).  
 
A related way  that  fellow  citizens  may  influence  an  individual’s  legitimacy  beliefs  is  
through  social  interaction  effects.  Putnam  (1966)  proposed  a  ‘social  interaction’  effect  
on political attitudes, which suggests that community influence is mediated through 
personal contact between members of the community. He states: “such social 
interaction within the community would, on the whole, tend to support political 
attitudes commonly held by community  members,  and  to  undermine  "deviant"  views”  
(p. 641). He proposed that when citizens interact with one another, they influence one 
another’s   political   attitudes,   and   that   this   effect   explains   clustering   in   voting  
preferences. However, his theorizing and empirical research concerns support for 
political parties, rather than perceptions of institutional legitimacy, and little previous 
research has been conducted on clustering of legitimacy perceptions. Comparative 
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political science research (e.g., Anderson & Singer, 2008; Huang, Chang, & Chu, 
2008) has attempted to explain variance in legitimacy perceptions between nations 
(e.g.,   the   EU)   as   a   function   of   particular   characteristics   of   each   nation’s   political  
system (e.g., inequality rankings). However, cross-national multilevel analysis of this 
kind is not what is being proposed here. Instead, it is suggested that smaller units of 
grouping (e.g., villages or neighbourhoods), in which citizens are likely to interact 
with and influence each other, may provide insight into clustering effects in 
legitimacy beliefs within a nation.  
 
In   this   sense,   the   ‘neighbourhood   effects’   literature   provides   further   insight.  
Neighbourhood effects have been shown to influence outcomes such as mental and 
physical health, as well as individual political beliefs and behaviour (Carney, 2013; 
Sampson, 2002). Social interaction effects are related to neighbourhood effects, 
though are not necessarily geographically confined, as they only require 
communication between citizens (see Blume & Durlauf, 2001; Brock & Durlauf, 
2001; Manski, 2000 for overviews). Again,  however,  ‘neighbourhood  effects’  explain  
clustering between neighbourhoods with exogenous variables such as neighbourhood 
socioeconomic status. Although exogenous factors may well influence legitimacy 
beliefs, endogenous factors, or the influence of peers on individual beliefs (Manski, 
2000), are the focus of interest here. No previous study has investigated the possibility 
of a social interaction effect on legitimacy beliefs within a post-conflict context.  
 
Thus, although the effect of local context influencing citizens in similar ways has 
been previously discussed in the literature, investigating clustering of legitimacy 
perceptions, particularly in a post-conflict environment, is unexplored territory. 
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Previous research on social norms would suggest  that  citizens’  individual  legitimacy  
beliefs could be influenced by the perception of a social consensus regarding the 
legitimacy of an institution. Previous research on social interaction effects would 
suggest that this social consensus is likely to be particularly influential within 
geographical clusters wherein citizens interact with each other—that is, an 
endogenous effect. Therefore, legitimacy perceptions may be clustered within a 
nation and between communities, and some of the variance in this clustering may be 
independent of demographic characteristics (e.g., SES), as well as perceptions of 
institutional-level factors (e.g., procedural justice and performance) due to the social 
interaction effect proposed here. Thus, the final component of this investigation into 
the antecedents of post-conflict legitimacy is the possibility of a social interaction 
effect, in which an   individual’s legitimacy beliefs both influence and are influenced 
by the beliefs of others around them.  
 
  Summary 
Citizens may not only seek information about the legitimacy of authorities from 
authorities themselves. It is suggested that citizens also seek messages about 
authorities from fellow citizens. In this way, legitimacy beliefs do not need to be 
derived from direct contact with authorities. One way that legitimacy may be rebuilt 
in the minds of citizens is through the influence of other citizens—their interactions, 
behaviours, and values. This effect could be crucial, as a citizen who perceives that 
the government provides services and operates fairly may nevertheless hold low 
views of institutional legitimacy if other citizens in their region express attitudes and 
behaviours that broadcast the message of government illegitimacy. Thus, post-conflict 
legitimacy may be rebuilt through social interaction.  
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6. Overview of theoretical model 
 
Based on the preceding literature, a model has been developed to outline how post-
conflict government legitimacy is formed, and its impact on cooperation with and 
support for government authority. The first component concerns a comparison of 
instrumental and procedural sources of post-conflict legitimacy.  
 
Component 1: Instrumental and procedural sources of government legitimacy 
 
Figure 1: Instrumental and procedural sources of government legitimacy 
 
The instrumental pathway contends that instrumental outcomes, that is, the 
performance of the government, and the distributive fairness and outcome favorability 
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of resources, will be a source of post-conflict legitimacy. This pathway suggests that 
the provision of resources, and how they are distributed, will motivate citizens to 
regard authorities as legitimate. In contrast, the procedural pathway emphasizes the 
importance of impartiality in cultivating legitimacy beliefs, as well as social 
psychology research emphasizing the importance of procedural justice in influencing 
legitimacy perceptions. These theories suggest that it is not the resources people 
receive, but the manner in which they receive them that influences trust, respect, and 
confidence in authorities.  
The relative importance of instrumental and procedural sources of legitimacy will be 
compared in the setting of a post-conflict environment. Although this model contrasts 
instrumental and relational concerns, it is not proposed that this is will be a zero-sum 
effect. Performance, distributive justice, and outcome favourability are all expected to 
heighten perceptions of government legitimacy, along with a strong procedural justice 
effect.  
The next feature of this component concerns the impact of three particular 
contingencies on post-conflict government legitimacy. Three potential moderators of 
the relationship between procedural justice and legitimacy have been drawn from the 
literature and are proposed in this model—identification, power, and law legitimacy. 
As outlined above, past research suggests that relational concerns will be stronger for 
citizens who identify strongly at the superordinate level, whereas instrumental 
concerns will be more important for citizens who identify strongly at the subgroup 
level. The effect of identification on the relationship between procedural justice and 
legitimacy will be tested here to discern whether identity processes influence the 
relationship between procedural justice and legitimacy in a post-conflict society.  
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Next, the relative importance of procedural justice for predicting legitimacy is 
proposed to be moderated by perceived group power. This highlights the idea that 
relational concerns are more important for powerless members of society, as 
procedural justice provides reassurance that their group has value and standing in the 
society. Given that the statebuilding literature emphasizes the inclusion of 
marginalized groups in the post-conflict society as essential to generating legitimacy, 
the model also includes perceived group power so as to account for how procedural 
justice is particularly important for such groups.  
Finally, rule of law approaches to statebuilding afford law legitimacy a central role in 
post-conflict statebuilding. Thus, law legitimacy—laws that citizens feel morally 
obligated to obey—is also hypothesized in the model to influence the relationship 
between procedural justice and legitimacy.  
 
Component 2: Voice, influence, and legitimacy in the post-conflict state  
 
Figure 2: Voice, influence, and legitimacy in the post-conflict state  
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Component 2 highlights the role of local ownership in legitimacy building, 
operationalised by voice and group trust and influence. The relative trust and 
influence of a) local groups at different levels of society, and b) foreign groups, 
including regional governmental, non-governmental, and inter-governmental 
organisations, are included in this component. Relative group power is also included 
as potential moderator of the effects of voice and group influences on legitimacy, in 
line with research showing that expectations derived from cultural norms around 
power can influence reactions to voice.  
 
Component 3: Social interaction effect 
 
Figure 3: Social interaction effect 
 
The third way that legitimacy may be generated and sustained is through the social 
influence of other citizens. Previous research on the alignment of beliefs and political 
attitudes with perceived social norms, as well as theorising on social interaction 
effects   that   influence   citizens’   beliefs,   suggests   that   legitimacy   may   be   produced  
socially. It is suggested here that citizens both influence and are influenced by those 
around them, and that this influence may be observed in addition to individual-level 
perceptions of institutional behaviour (as proposed in components one and two).  
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Combining the three components  
 
Figure 4: Overall theoretical model 
 
In this chapter I have drawn on statebuilding, peacebuilding, development, political 
science, sociology, and social psychological literatures to arrive at the theoretical 
model of government legitimacy that underpins this study. In this model, each 
component—the instrumental vs. relational model of legitimacy, local ownership 
concepts, and social influence effects—are drawn together in a way that attempts to 
comprehensively describe the antecedents of government legitimacy in a post-conflict 
society. This model will be tested empirically via a study of the post-conflict 
developing society of Nepal. The following chapter will provide an overview of the 
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history of conflict in Nepal, describe the reconstruction process, and provide 
justification for the appropriateness of Nepal as a case study by which to test this 
model.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 69 
CHAPTER THREE: SOCIAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF NEPAL 
This project aims to uncover how perceptions of institutional legitimacy are generated 
in a post-conflict society. In the previous chapter, a multidisciplinary literature was 
drawn on to develop a theoretical model of post-conflict legitimacy. In this chapter I 
will provide context for the model being tested in this project by outlining the 
sociopolitical history of Nepal in five sections. First, a brief history of the early Shah-
Rana regimes; second, the post-1950s hybrid regimes; third, the Maoist conflict; and 
fourth, the post-conflict period leading to the present. Finally, a discussion of caste, 
class, ethnicity, region, and religion in Nepal provides an introduction to the salience 
of different group identities in Nepalese society. The relevance of the Nepalese 
sociopolitical context to the literature reviewed in the previous chapter, and to the 
specific theoretical model being tested in this project, will be discussed at the end of 
this chapter.  
In 2008, Nepal held unprecedented nationwide elections that were also the most 
peaceful in its history (Hachhethu & Gellner, 2010). The elections marked the 
transition of Nepal to a secular democracy following a long period of conflict and 
instability, 12 years after the beginning of the Maoist insurgency that would topple a 
centuries-old Hindu Kingdom. The sociopolitical transformation of Nepal in the last 
century includes a change in the system of government from a monarchy to a republic, 
from a Hindu state to a secular state, and from a unitary government to federalism 
(Sharma, 2012). Further, political power that was once dominated by high-caste 
Hindus from the hills (the Bahuns and Chhetris, who together make up 31% of the 
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population) began to expand to include representation for other segments of Nepalese4 
society (including other hill castes; Madhesis (people from the southern plains); 
Janajatis (indigenous groups); Dalits (low-caste  former  ‘untouchables’);;  and  women  
(see for example Hachhethu & Gellner, 2010; Jha, 2014; Lawoti, 2013; Lawoti & 
Hangen, 2013; von Eindsiedel, Malone & Pradhan, 2012). This setting provides an 
ideal case study in which to test the relationships proposed in the theoretical model 
developed for this project.  
1. The Shah-Rana regimes  
Prior to 1769, Nepal was divided into many different autonomous states, principalities, 
and   kingdoms.   At   this   time,   the   geographical   area   occupied   by   modern   Nepal’s  
capital city, Kathmandu, was itself comprised of three kingdoms ruled by different 
dynasties. The founder of the Nepali state was a king from the western Gorkha region, 
Prithvi Narayan Shah, who began integrating Nepal into a single nation with the goal 
of  establishing  “asal  Hindustan,”  or  true  Hindu  land  (Whelpton, 2005). His expansion 
continued into Indian territory until eventual defeat at the height of British colonial 
powers. The treaty between the Gorkhali Army and the British East India Company 
denoted the borders of the Nepali state that are still in place today. Unification 
brought together different tribal, ethnic, linguistic, and caste groups, who had 
previously lived in largely autonomous self-governing regions, and forced them under 
a single system of government and a single national identity.  
 
                                                        4 I	  follow	  Gellner	  (2007),	  and	  norms	  of	  usage	  in	  Nepal,	  in	  employing	  ‘Nepali’	  as	  a	  noun,	  meaning	  either the people or	  language	  of	  Nepal,	  ‘Nepalis’	  as	  the	  collective	  noun	  for	  citizens	  of	  Nepal,	  and	  
‘Nepalese’	  as	  an	  adjective.  
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The Shah rulers promoted an extremely hierarchical culture in the new state, with all 
power flowing to and from the Shah family. The institution of the monarchy drew 
strongly on traditional Hindu ideology to legitimize its power, with most royals and 
ministers coming from high Hindu castes. Throughout the Shah regime, the values, 
language and dress of this group became synonymous with Nepali nationalism (von 
Einsiedel, Malone & Pradhan, 2012). Shah rule continued until a violent coup by Jung 
Bahadur Rana, a military official of the royal court, who instituted an autocratic 
system based on hereditary power. The Rana family would provide Prime Ministers 
for the next 104 years, with the Shah monarchy still acting as state figureheads, but 
were effectively rendered powerless. 
 
The most significant outcome of the Rana regime was the Muluki Ain (Civil Code), a 
legal document similar to a constitution, which was established in 1854. The Muluki 
Ain was based on orthodox Hindu ideology and sought to organize society by 
formalising the caste system, gender hierarchy and superiority of the Hindu religion 
(Whelpton, 2005). This code provided a legal basis for caste discrimination, including 
caste division of labor and differential punishments by caste (Hachhethu & Gellner, 
2010). Unsurprisingly, public dissatisfaction grew under the Rana regime, with the 
opposition party in exile, the Nepali Congress (NC) leading anti-regime efforts in 
partnership with the disempowered Shan King. In 1951, the 104-year Rana oligarchy 
ended.  
 
King Tribhuvan had been held a prisoner by the Rana Prime Ministers, and was 
supportive of the armed struggle against the Rana regime. As a result, he enjoyed 
high support from Nepalis, and the post-revolution period gave birth to a hybrid 
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system of sovereign monarchy alongside democratic structures (such as a multi-party 
competitive system, periodic elections, an independent judiciary, and a modern 
bureaucracy). However, King Mahendra, who ascended the throne following his 
father’s  demise   in  1955,  gradually   consolidated   the  bases  of   royal   rule.  Against   the  
spirit of the 1951 and 1959 constitutions, which posited the monarchy and democracy 
as complementary to each other, actual politics in the post-Rana period became 
characterised by conflict between traditional forces led by the King and modernising 
forces led by nascent political parties (Jha, 2014). 
Nepal’s   first   elections   were   eventually   held   in   1959,   and   were   won   by   the   Nepali  
Congress party. King Mahendra promptly dismissed the parliament (with the help of 
the army) and promulgated his own constitution centralizing royal power. Nepal was 
again a constitutional monarchy- specifically, a Hindu Kingdom. Thus began the 
highly authoritarian panchayat period, during which political parties were banned. 
 
2. The struggle for democracy 1960-1996 
In an attempt to strengthen its legitimacy, the Panchayat regime actively promoted a 
single Nepali identity based on Hindu culture. As had been the case previously under 
the Shah-Rana regimes, many low-caste, ethnic, and non hill-dwelling groups 
experienced this identity as exclusionary, and the beginning of the anti-monarchy 
revolution began in opposition to this system (Hachhethu & Gellner, 2010). Further, 
the increasing centralization and reach of the state during this period created 
expectations that the government had the capacity to deliver services and redistribute 
wealth. Instead, local officials withheld resources   and   formed   ‘distributional 
coalitions’ which channeled funds into their own pockets (Pfaff-Czernanka, 2004). 
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Here we can see  the  shaping  of  Nepali  citizens’  relations  with  authorities  in  terms  of  
the key procedural and distributive variables employed in this project.    
 
The Nepali Congress (NC) began armed resistance to the monarchy on a small scale 
throughout the 60s and 70s (an effort that would later be taken up by communist 
forces). The Panchayat regime initially contained these struggles, with help from 
elites in Kathmandu, which (despite some internal tensions and conflicts) was 
essentially united around the King in his determination to suppress violent opposition.  
 
Increasingly, however, the legitimacy of the partyless system became eroded. 
Corruption and nepotism had spread throughout the leadership, eventually spilling 
over into public scandals reaching up to the royal palace. Public faith in royal 
leadership and an active king finally ran out in the late 1980s, when a referendum 
called by King Birenda was manipulated in favour of the panchayat regime. Global 
democratic movements in the late 1980s, including perestroika in the Soviet Union 
and the fall of the Berlin Wall, along with regional democratic movements in 
Bangladesh and Pakistan, spurred idealistic Nepali youths to push for democratic 
reform in Nepal (Jha, 2014). The 1990 mass movement Janaandolan I (the first 
‘People’s  Movement’)  was  born  of  the  frustrations of the panchayat system, drawing 
together many sections of Nepali society, including marginalized ethnic groups, 
opposition political parties, trade unions, and the rising educated middle class. The 
movement even drew support from Indian leftist groups, including Indian political 
parties and civil society (Hachhethu & Gellner, 2010; Jha, 2014).  
 
Janandolan I was initially dealt with severely, with more than 50 citizens killed by 
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police gunfire, and hundreds more arrested. Eventually, however, the King capitulated. 
The panchayat system was dissolved, the ban lifted on political parties, and political 
prisoners released. Post-panchayat multiparty democracy resulted in small changes to 
the status quo in Nepal, as the government mobilised the concept of development. For 
example, the government developed physical infrastructure such as roads and air 
transport, radio, and the educational and administrative system (Hachhethu & Gellner, 
2010). Whereas the government during the Panchayat era monopolised national radio, 
there was a media boom in the years after 1990, as newspapers and FM stations 
multiplied, offering different perspectives from across the political spectrum (Onta, 
2004). 
Still, the post-panchayat hybrid system was highly unstable, with multiple changes in 
government over short periods of time. Absolute monarchy had been replaced with a 
constitutional monarchy, with the 1990 constitution limiting royal powers rather than 
abolishing them, and granting limited rights to citizens while maintaining the 
structure of Hindu Kingdom. In this political context, the Maoist insurgency was born. 
In 1995, NC leader Sher Bahadur Deuba became Prime Minister of Nepal with the 
support of the pro-monarchy party, the Rastriya Prajatantra Party. In 1996, the 
Communist  Party  of  Nepal  (Maoist)  launched  the  ‘People’s  War.’ 
 
3. Maoist conflict 
Two structural causes have been identified as fueling the conflict in Nepal: endemic 
poverty, and group inequality (Deraniyagala, 2006; von Eisiedel, Malone & Pradhan, 
2012), both of which have been associated with civil conflict in broader cross-national 
studies (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002; 2004; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Horizontal 
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inequalities (HIs) refer to inequalities between socio-culturally defined groups with 
shared identities formed around religion, ethnic ties or racial or caste-based 
affiliations (Stewart, 2008). Nepal has some of the highest levels of horizontal 
inequalities in the world (Fund for Peace, 2007), with group and regional inequalities 
in economic, social, and political spheres. For example, high caste groups in Nepal 
such as bahuns and chetris have better health indicators, school attendance rates, and 
lower levels of poverty than other caste/ethnic/religious groups (World Bank & DFID, 
2006). Studies of the Maoist conflict have linked regional deprivation to the intensity 
of conflict in those areas (Bray, Lunde & Murshed, 2003; Murshed & Gates, 2004; 
Deraniyagala, 2006), and the pervasive exclusion of vast swathes of the population 
based on caste, ethnicity, religion, gender, and region feature prominently in most 
analyses of both pre- and post-conflict Nepal (detailed later in this chapter; see Dahal, 
2005; Folmar, 2013; Hall, 2011; Hangen, 2007; 2013; Hangen & Lawoti, 2013; 
Lawoti, 2008; 2013; Malagodi, 2011; Shneiderman & Turin, 2012; Tiwari, 2010; 
Sijapati, 2013; von Eisiedel, Malone & Pradhan, 2012).  
Thus,  in  February  1996,  when  the  leaders  of  the  Maoist  United  People’s  Front  began  
their violent insurgency, they could readily identify the fault lines in Nepalese society 
and use them to their advantage. While the Maoist combatants were initially few in 
number, historically disenfranchised groups began to join the People's Liberation 
Army (PLA) as the Maoists promised gender equality, land reform, socio-economic 
progress, wealth redistribution and the elimination of the caste system. School 
children were recruited to the Maoist training camps, particularly in areas where 
socioeconomic or ethnic exclusion was most apparent (Eck, 2010). Other people were 
compelled to join due to intimidation and forced conscription, or to high 
unemployment and severe poverty. The charismatic leadership of the rebel soldier 
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Prachanda also fueled popular support for the movement (Pfaff-Czamecka, 2004). 
After 4 years of conflict, in February 2000, the Maoists claimed that there were only 9 
(out   of   a   total   of   75)   districts   that   had   not   come   “under   their   direct   influence”  
(Mulprabaha, February 14, 2000; in Shakya, 2009).  
The Maoists largely relied on guerilla tactics suited to the mountainous and hilly 
terrain of Nepal, attacking and capturing police posts in isolated areas, and resorting 
to violence strategically (Chalmers, 2010; Deraniyagala, 2006). With no outside 
support, they were self-funded through bank robberies, taxing land under their control, 
and extorting local businesses and families (von Einsiedel, Malone, & Pradhan 2012). 
Remarkably, only 40% of the Maoist forces carried permanent weapons, many of 
which were homemade (Mehta, 2005). The fight against the Maoists was first led by 
an ill-equipped police force, and later by the Royal Nepalese Army.  
Political instability was both a cause and consequence of the conflict during this 
period, with three different Prime Ministers from 1996-1999, each with a different 
approach   to   the   ‘People’s  War’.  Prime  Minister  Bhattarai  was  an  advocate  of  back-
channel talks and a softer diplomatic approach, whereas his replacement, G.P Koirala, 
took a more aggressive, security-based approach (Jha, 2014). The political situation 
further  destabilized  in  2001,  when  Crown  Prince  Dipendra,  the  King’s  son,  massacred  
King Birenda and his immediate family in the Palace. Dipendra was indicted for the 
murders, though died from a self-inflicted gunshot wound after three days in a coma 
(during  which  he  was  briefly  crowned  King  according  to  succession  laws).  Birenda’s  
brother, Gyanendra, was eventually crowned the new monarch of Nepal. In the same 
year, a ceasefire was brokered between the government and the Maoists, which 
promptly collapsed when the Maoists attacked Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) barracks, 
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prompting the government to declare a state of emergency. RNA forces were 
deployed against the Maoists, and the civil war intensified. In May 2002, the Prime 
Minister (Deuba) dissolved the Parliament with the backing of the Palace and the 
Army. By October, King Gyanendra would dismiss the Prime Minister and take an 
outright political leadership role, appointing a Palace royalist as Prime Minister.  
 
These power struggles between the monarchy and the political parties, as well as the 
state’s   limited  presence   in   rural  areas  of   the  country,  provided  a  political   context   in  
which the Maoists were able to make tremendous gains (Riaz & Basu, 2007). 
Violence continued to escalate between 2002 and 2005, with multiple ceasefires 
signed and then collapsing months later. There were more than 4500 fatalities in 2002, 
the peak year of the conflict, when the Army was first deployed against the Maoists. 
Perceived excessive use of force against the Maoist fueled local resentment against 
the state during this time (Davis et al., 2012; Whelpton, 2005). In areas under their 
control, the Maoists established viable parallel state structures, most notably the 
‘People’s  Courts’   and ‘People’s  Governments’ (von Einsiedel, Malone, & Pradhan, 
2012), and provided basic services, which further increased public support. The 
Maoists also harnessed identity processes to garner support by highlighting their 
commonalities with rural citizens and   playing   up   the   ‘outsider’   status   of   the  Army  
(Davis et al., 2012). For example, in Shneiderman and Turin (2004), a villager 
recounts the arrival of Maoist combatants in their village. The villagers were prepared 
to acquiesce to the rebels out of fear. Instead, the Maoists treated them respectfully 
and as equals, listening and empathizing with villagers, who felt that the Maoists 
understood  their  grievances.  The  villager  asks:  “If   the  Maoists  are  like  us,  does  that  
also  mean  that  we  are  like  them?”  The  Maoists were also effective in communicating 
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their ideas to illiterate and uneducated villagers through cultural practices and artistic 
performances (Eck, 2010), and to literate villagers through propaganda (Davis et al., 
2012). Alongside these quaint-sounding community engagement efforts, however, 
were darker strategies, including various forms of manipulation, violent coercion, 
intimidation and extortion (Graham, 2007).  
 
As the conflict progressed and escalated, international involvement increased. China 
was supportive of the anti-democratic status quo, despite the Maoist ideology of the 
insurgents. The  Nepali  government  aligned  itself  with  the  US  ‘War  on  Terror’  in  the  
early 2000s, attracting the support of Washington and resulting in the Maoists being 
placed on one of the US terrorist designation lists. The most significant involvement 
by far, however, was the Indian government (Sharma & Donini, 2010). Not just 
geographical neighbours, Nepal and India share an open border, strong ethnic ties, 
economic and trade interests, and political links. India would eventually lead the 
international strategy of shifting support away from the King and towards a 
democratic solution involving the Maoists (Mishra, 2004).  
 
This crucial shift in international support was largely  driven  by  the  King’s  seizure  of  
power in 2005.  Citing a steady deterioration of conditions in the country, King 
Gyanendra dismissed the Cabinet and constituted a Council of Ministers under his 
executive power. He declared a state of emergency, ordered the arrest of political 
leaders, and curbed civil liberties.  This royal coup had the unintended effect of 
uniting the mainstream political parties into Seven Party Alliance, and the Alliance 
with   the  Maoists   in   the   fight   against   ‘autocratic   monarchy’   (Jha, 2014). The royal 
coup also turned public opinion, leading to the 2006 Janandolan II (the second 
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‘People’s   Movement’),   a   nineteen-day uprising led by the Maoists to remove the 
monarchy and restore democracy to Nepal. Remarkably, the campaign was successful. 
King Gyanendra conceded, and a newly empowered Parliament was restored.  
 
The first tasks of the  Parliament  were  to  abolish  the  policy  of  ‘untouchability’,  curb  
royal powers, and declare the Royal Nepalese Army under civilian control. Reflecting 
the sentiments of ethnic minorities and those who fought against the Hindu monarchy, 
the new government declared Nepal a secular state. Peace talks with the Maoists also 
began during this period, and in November 2006, the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) was signed, declaring the end of civil war and laying the 
groundwork for a new Constituent Assembly (CA) to re-write the constitution of 
Nepal. Under strict rules about representativeness, parties were obliged to ensure that 
there would be 50% women candidates, as well as proportional representation of 
Dalits, Madhesis, Janajatis, and nine particularly disadvantaged districts. Both the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 2006 and the Interim Constitution 2007 
envisioned the authority of state based on democratic principles and reconciliation 
(Dahal, 2013). A UN peacekeeping mission (the UN Mission to Nepal; UNMIN) 
assisted the transition to peace in a limited role over four years, before disbanding in 
2011.  
 
Despite two Madhes movements sparked in the Terai (the southern plains of Nepal), 
violence was largely contained following the Peace Agreement.5 Yet the decade long 
                                                        
5 The first Madhes movement was in 2007, the second in 2008, and both were broadly motivated by 
political inclusion for the under-represented ethnicities living in the Terai region. Conflict ceased when 
an agreement was reached between the interim government and Madhesi parties, guaranteeing a 
Madhes province and proportional representation for Madhesis into government institutions, including 
the Nepal Army (NA). A detailed analysis of the 2007 and 2008 Madhes movements can be found in 
Bhattachan (2012).  
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armed conflict had already affected the majority of Nepalese lives. Overall, the 
Maoist insurgency had resulted in the deaths of 13,347 people, 1300 people missing, 
and extensive property and infrastructure damage (Tiwari, 2010; Thapa & Sinjapati, 
2004). The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
released a report outlining serious violations and abuses of human rights during the 
conflict (OHCHR, 2012). During the ten years of the conflict, the Maoists had 
destroyed about 90% of the buildings in 4,000 Village Development Committees 
(VDCs; similar to municipalities). Meanwhile, the government lacked the institutions, 
resources, and presence in rural areas to provide basic services to many citizens 
(Sharma & Donini, 2010). In the post-war economy, many citizens returning to their 
rural villages after fleeing the conflict had not established the means to sustain their 
basic needs, and some were forced back to towns and cities in search of work (IDMC 
& NRC, 2010). 
 
4. Post-conflict period  
Elections were held on the 10th April 2008, and the Maoists emerged with a decisive 
victory- a surprising outcome for both the local and international communities 
(Hachhethu & Gellner, 2010). In the first sitting of the new Constituent Assembly, the 
monarchy was abolished and Nepal declared a Federal Democratic Republic. The 
Maoist  leader  Pushpa  Kamal  Dahal  (‘Prachanda’)  was  elected  the  first  Prime  Minister,  
and the opposition party general secretary, Ram Baran Yadav, was named President. 
Although these initial steps were promising, political instability continued long after 
the  violence  had  subsided.  Nepal’s  new CA parliament had been tasked with writing a                                                                                                                                                                 
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new  constitution  representing  the  grievances  and  interests  of  one  of  the  world’s most 
diverse and complex societies, and the instability that followed would reflect the 
enormity of this task.  
 
At the end of 2008, the Maoist party took a sharp ideological turn against both the 
opposition party (NC) and India. The Maoists had fired the army chief, General 
Katawal, whereas the President and NC leader Yadav wanted him to stay. Prime 
Minister Prachanda disagreed so strongly with the situation that he resigned on the 
ground   that   the   President   was   behaving   in   a   way   that   was   “unconstitutional”,   and  
blamed  “foreign  forces”  (i.e.,  India)  for  a  conspiracy  against  the  Maoists.  The  United  
Marxist-Leninists party (UML), the third-largest party in Nepal at the time, were 
called on to elect a new Prime Minister, and their leader, Madhav Kumar Nepal, 
stepped into the job in May 2009. In 2010, the Maoists called for an indefinite 
nationwide strike demanding his resignation. Although the strike failed due to middle 
class resistance, the Prime Minister resigned in mid-2010, around the same time that 
the CA was forced to extend its term for another year. The Parliament was unable to 
elect another Prime Minister despite multiple rounds of voting, with the next two 
prime ministers (over eight months) elected via secret alliances. The first pact was 
between the Maoists and the UML (to elect Jhalanath Khanal), and the second 
between two Maoist leaders (to elect Baburum Bhattarai). Following the election of 
Bhattarai, a key piece of the Peace Agreement began implementation: the integration 
of former Maoist combatants (numbering 6,500) into the Nepal Army.   
April-November 2012 was an especially tumultuous time in Nepalese post-conflict 
politics.   Dissent   broke   out   within   the   People’s   Liberation   Army   (former   Maoist  
combatants), and the Maoist-led government was forced to send the Army to take 
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over the cantonments where the former Maoist combatants were being held and re-
trained. CA agreement was reached on some constitutional issues, including a mixed 
form of government and the number of federal provinces to be formed, but politicians 
from across the political spectrum opposed the agreement when it came to be voted 
on. These included the ‘Kiran’   faction  Maoists,   two   different  Madhesi   parties   and  
MPs from various ethnic minority groups. Maoist and Madhesi parties attempted to 
revise the agreement, which was then rejected by the NC and the UML.  
 
Meanwhile, as the deadline for promulgating a constitution approached, crippling 
strikes (bandhs) were being held across the country by umbrella ethnic organizations 
demanding constitutional representation. Strikes in the Far West demanded federal 
states along ethnic lines (i.e., federal states represented by the majority caste/ethnic 
group in the state). Protests in Kathmandu opposed this identity-based federalist 
system. Strikes forced businesses and transportation to shut down, and groups of 
protesters marched through Kathmandu, threatening shop owners who opened their 
doors, pulling people off bicycles and motorcycles, and torching taxis. Kathmandu, a 
city of 3 million people, could be effectively shut down by these strikes during this 
period (The Himalayan Times 2012a; 2012b; 2012c; 2012d). 
 
The  CA’s  term  was  due  to  expire  on  the  27th May 2012. Frantic negotiations and deals, 
including attempts to extend the terms of the CA, were held during this time, and each 
was  unsuccessful.  The  term  of  Nepal’s  first  elected  CA  ran  out  on  midnight  of  the  27th 
May. The elected government, led by Prime Minister Bhattarai, suddenly became a 
‘caretaker’ government. Attempts to hold a new election failed completely, with two 
major parties (NC and UML) refusing to participate in elections under a government 
 83 
held by the Maoists. Strikes and protests were a daily occurrence. It was during this 
period that the pilot and first wave of fieldwork for the current project were 
undertaken (in July and September 2012 respectively).  
 
In 2013 the Maoists, led by Prachanda, softened some of their more hardline stances 
towards  India  and  the  People’s  War,  and  reiterated  a  commitment  to  the  peace  process.  
Plans were made to hold a second election to the CA in November 2013, with Chief 
Justice  Khila  Raj  Regmi  the  official  figurehead  of  the  ‘election  government’,  ensuring  
the participation of the formerly reticent NC and UML parties. To the surprise of 
many observers, the election was successful. The NC emerged as the largest party, 
with the Maoist and Madhesi parties suffering a severe defeat. The second wave of 
fieldwork for this project was held just prior to these elections, in October 2013.  
 
At present, post-conflict daily life in Nepal involves long power shortages, fuel 
scarcity, and insecurity (Nepal & Jamasb, 2011). The   ‘chronic   poverty’ rate is 25 
percent and the unemployment rate 40 percent (Dahal, 2013), and the Nepali state is 
weak, limited and absent in certain geographical areas (Riaz & Basu, 2007). The 
government’s   ability   to   enforce   rule   of   law   and   deliver   essential   public   goods   has  
been significantly weakened (Dahal, 2013), and recent research has found that 
improvements in security in Nepal are hampered by political instability and perceived 
interference by political leaders in police and judicial procedures (Racovita, Murray, 
& Sharma, 2013). Further, peacebuilding efforts and international aid have not 
extended to the majority of Nepalis living outside of Kathmandu (Denskus, 2009). At 
the end of 2010, more than 4 years after the end of the conflict, about 50,000 people 
were still displaced by the war and by inter-ethnic violence, and remained unable or 
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unwilling to return to their homes (Dahal, 2012). An acute scarcity of food in remote 
areas and among the marginalized poor tribal communities reflects uneven deficits in 
service delivery. Some have declared the country a failing state (e.g., Kraxberger, 
2007; Riaz & Basu, 2007), although the situation in Nepal at the time of these 
analyses was particularly dire. Others see more potential and reject the notion of 
Nepal as a failed state (e.g., Hangen, 2012), or view the current problems as a 
temporary failure in service delivery (e.g., Webster, 2011). Unarguably, however, 
Nepal remains in a transitional period.  
 
In summary, the period between 2012 and 2013 was an interesting time in which to 
conduct research on post-conflict government legitimacy in Nepal. Old forms of 
authority based on traditional leadership had formally dissolved but remained highly 
salient, and the institution of democracy was in its absolute infancy. The aim of this 
project—to uncover sources of institutional legitimacy in such a transitional period—
was highly relevant in this context and justified Nepal as a case study. Next, I will 
briefly describe the social system in Nepal to contextualize the arguments made here 
regarding identity processes.  
 
 
5. Caste, ethnicity, and identity in Nepal  
 
The caste system in Nepal was present from the birth of the state, when Prithvi 
Narayan Shah sought to organize his newly consolidated territory by creating a 
system in which to place the myriad groups living within his lands (Stiller, 1973). His 
Dibya Upadesh (treatise on government) describes   Nepal   as   a   ‘garden’ with 36 
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species of ‘flower’, or jaat (caste), organized into four varnas. The varnas denote the 
four levels of ritual status (purity) ascribed to the groups within it, which in turn 
dictates the type of work prescribed for the individuals belonging to the group. 
Varnas also dictate social interaction in a variety of settings, such as who a person 
may eat with and accept water from (Hofer, 1979). The four varnas are, in descending 
hierarchical order, the Brahmins (priests), Kshatriyas (warrior/rulers), Vaisyas 
(merchants/artisans), and Sudras (servants). Below the four varnas were the 
Untouchables, who did work judged to be ritually polluting, such as butchery. Weber, 
(1996) in his study of religion in India, understood caste to  be  a  ‘closed  status  group’: 
 
 “What  is  a  status  group?  ‘Classes’  are  groups  of  people  who…  have  the  same  
 economic  position…  ‘Status’,  however,  is  a  quality  of  social  honour  or  lack  of  
 it, and is in the main conditioned as well as expressed through a specific style 
 of   life…  All   the   obligations   and   barriers   that  membership   in   a   status   group  
 entails  also  exist  in  a  caste,  in  which  they  are  intensified  to  the  utmost  degree”  
 [1996, p.39-40] 
 
For  someone  to  not  know  their  caste  or  ethnic  group  in  Nepal  is  “unimaginable…  it is 
a largely taken-for-granted   fact   of   life   that   everyone   has   a   caste   or   ethnic   identity”  
(Gellner, 2007, p.1). Further, the caste/ethnic identity of others is readily identifiable 
for most Nepalis, either from surnames or contextual information. The particular 
salience of caste and ethnic identity in Nepal can be traced back to the Rana regime 
and the Muluki Ain, which formalized the orthodox Hindu ideology and 
classifications of Prithvi Narayan Shah (Hofer, 1979; Levine, 1987). This effectively 
fused the religious notion of the dharmasutras to the civil and criminal laws of Nepal 
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(Hofer, 1979; Gellner, 2007), creating legal separation between the elite wearers of 
sacred thread (Tagadhari) and the alcohol-consuming classes (Matwali). According to 
the Mulukhi Ain, some Matwali were considered legally enslaveable and others were 
not,   and   some   were   considered   ‘clean’   and   others   ‘untouchables’   (Gellner, 2007; 
Hangen, 2013).  
 
Non-indigenous groups from both high and low castes migrated throughout the 
country  early  in  Nepal’s  history.  Descendants  of  those  who  settled  in  the  hills  are  now  
known as parbatiyas, or hill-dwellers. Those inhabiting the plains are known as 
Madhesi, which  literally  means  ‘plains-dweller’,  and  has  come  to  refer  specifically  to  
those of Indian origin (of both high and low caste). Indigenous groups (janajati), who 
have their own non-Hindu religions (largely animistic belief systems such as Kirat), 
fall in the middle of the caste system, below the high-caste Bahuns and Chetris, but 
above the former Hindu untouchables. Indigenous inhabitants of Kathmandu valley, 
the Newars, have their own caste system, and each of their (approximately) 20 caste 
groups was distributed into the broader Nepalese caste hierarchy according to their 
ritual status (Gellner, 1995). Muslims are considered to be a unique category 
(Siddique, 2001), separate from indigenous and Hindu groups, though associated most 
closely with the Madhesi.  
 
Thus, when discussing group identities in modern Nepal, it is possible to broadly 
categorise on the basis of intersections between caste, ethnicity, region, and religion, 
e.g., high caste Hindu hill group, low caste Hindu hill group, hill janajati 
(indigenous/ethnic groups), Terai-Madhesi Janajati, and so on. Within each broad 
category may be dozens of subgroups of specific castes and ethnicities, each with 
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their own cultural practices, but united within the broader category created by the 
original Mulukhi Ain legal framework, and sharing a similar social status in modern 
Nepal.6 Gender and class also cut across these categories (Hangen, 2013).  
 
For   the   majority   of   Nepal’s   history,   one   group   has   enjoyed   the   highest   status   and  
dominated culturally, economically, and politically: the Hindu hill caste elites (Lawoti, 
2013). Politics, universities, media, the judiciary and the civil services are 
overwhelmingly dominated by the upper-caste bahuns and chetris, despite comprising 
only 30% of the population (Gaige, 1975; Neupane, 2000; Lawoti, 2005; see 
Appendix A for population breakdown by caste/ethnic group). A combination of 
factors explains this long-term influence. First, high-caste Hindus from the hills were 
aligned with leaders of the state of Nepal from its formation (Whelpton, 2005), setting 
in motion the system of dominance that continues to the present. Second, the 
ownership of land is a key measure of wealth in Nepal, with many higher caste groups 
owning large tracts of land. Again, in many cases, this land was gifted at the time of 
the formation of the Nepalese state as reward for supporting state expansion (Hangen, 
2013). Conversely, many lower castes (especially Dalits) and indigenous groups were 
excluded from land ownership or faced high land taxes (Regmi, 1971), and are often 
dependent   on   working   others’   land   for   survival   (Giri, 2012). At the same time, 
migration from the hills into the Terai areas and the Far East resulted in high caste 
groups owning large parts of the land formally farmed by indigenous groups in these 
fertile regions (Hangen, 2013). Additionally, as Gellner (2007) observes, the 
dominance of high caste groups is partly due to policies of intermarriage, with the                                                         6 This section is intended as an introductory summary of the intricate history and systems of identity in Nepal, with specific relevance to how they are operationalized in this project. For a more nuanced anthological perspective on caste, ethnicity, religion, and their influence on politics and conflict in Nepal, see books by Hofer (1979); Gellner et al. (1997); Gellner & Quigley (2007); Hangen (2013); Lawoti and Hangen (2013).  
 88 
offspring of chetri men and indigenous women being considered chetris themselves, 
allowing population growth of the group. Finally, a conscious political attempt was 
made under the panchayat system in the 50s, 60s, and until the 90s, to create an 
overarching   ‘Nepali’   identity   for   the   purposes   of   nation   building   via   assimilation. 
During this period, advocating the interests of any particular social group was banned, 
meaning marginalized groups could not address group-based inequalities politically 
during this time. The combination of institutionalized caste discrimination, land 
ownership rules, and the banning of group-based social activism from the 60s through 
to the 90s meant that the profits of development and increased education were largely 
dominated by bahuns, chetris, and higher caste Newars (Gellner, 2007). Despite 
constitutional reform in 1990 recognizing the multicultural, multi-ethnic state of 
Nepal, marginalized groups remained excluded socially and politically (Hangen, 
2013).  
 
Despite the revolutionary rhetoric and victory of the Maoist insurgency, horizontal 
inequality is still largely prevalent in modern Nepal. Not all individuals from the high 
caste Hindu hill group are privileged, and in certain areas, individuals from ethnic 
groups enjoy greater social or economic power. Broadly, however, Hill caste groups 
dominate socially and politically, and are the most visible forces in the apparatus of 
state power (Riaz & Basu, 2007).  
 
6. Applying the theoretical model in Nepal 
 
As evidenced by the background information above, Nepal provides an interesting 
context in which to test ideas about rebuilding post-conflict legitimacy. The history of 
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Nepal illustrates that the assimilationist approach to nation building is linked directly 
to uprisings (e.g., the 1990 and 2006 Janandolans). Also the Hindu identity that 
provided cultural legitimacy to the prior political order (Riaz & Basu, 2007) has 
repeatedly alienated and agitated minority groups in Nepal. Nepal is being forced to 
move away from traditional authority and patrimonial culture, and build modern 
legitimacy based  on  Weber’s   legal-rational authority. The beginning of this process 
seemed promising, with the Maoists turning a decade-long insurgency into a 
resounding democratic victory, led by the charismatic figure of former rebel leader 
Prachanda. Yet, as in many post-conflict states, initial optimism was quickly 
diminished, and political instability, social tension, and lack of economic recovery 
have marked post-conflict Nepal. By and large, the current political system has made 
little  effort  to  bridge  the  ‘sovereignty  gap,  authority  gap,  and  legitimacy  gap’  (Ghani  
& Lockhart, 2008). Askvik, Jamil, and Dhakal (2010) found that the central 
government, and the parliament specifically, were the least trusted social and political 
institutions in Nepal. The longevity of democracy rests on establishing the legitimacy 
of the central government. Yet Nepal presents a challenging case due to its 
sociocultural heterogeneity, endemic poverty, and horizontal inequalities.  
 
The extent to which Nepalese citizens perceive the central government as legitimate, 
and how such legitimacy judgments are influenced by procedural- and performance-
based evaluations, is a timely question in post-conflict Nepal. The antecedents of 
legitimacy being tested in this model—government performance, procedural justice, 
distributive justice, outcome favourability, law legitimacy, voice, internal and external 
group trust, and social consensus—are all pressing national issues. For example, how 
to best manage the competing interests of various identity groups is identified as 
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essential for building the legitimacy of the new government in Nepal (Hangen, 2013), 
and is also a central tenet of procedural justice theory. The indigenous nationalities 
movement has placed redistribution and increased political participation at the 
forefront of their campaign (Hangen, 2013). The political influence of India (Donini 
& Sharma, 2008), economic influence of China (Dahal, 2013), and public suspicions 
over non-state agencies operating in Nepal (Dahal, 2013), provides concrete examples 
of relevant post-conflict group influences, and how they may enhance or undermine 
legitimacy. Finally, the frequency of political protest in Nepal has become a major 
roadblock to progress. Bandhs (strikes) are frequently used to wield political 
influence, both by ethnic identity groups and youth militias mobilised by mainstream 
political parties. The potential of perceived legitimacy to quell disruptive political 
action (as outlined in chapter 2; e.g., Brinkerhoff, 2007; Holsti & Holsti, 1996; 
Themnér & Ohlson, 2014) is therefore central to the daily life of Nepalis.  
 
Minimal empirical research has addressed these issues in Nepal. One recent study by 
Askvik, Jamil, and Dhakal (2010) compared performance-based and identity-based 
foundations of institutional trust in Nepal and found that belonging to a specific 
category  of  caste/ethnicity,  class  or  religion  did  not  influence  Nepalis’  perceptions  of  
institutional trust. How citizens assessed the performance of these institutions, 
however, did significantly affect their institutional trust ratings. The theoretical model 
of this project takes this analysis further, by testing a range of instrumental variables, 
including distributive justice and outcome favourability, alongside process variables. 
Further, taking into account the internal representation citizens have of their group 
employs a psychological approach to identity-based analyses. This project is 
interested in how group identities interact with procedural and instrumental 
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antecedents of legitimacy, rather than directly producing evaluations of institutions, as 
studies by Askvik, Jamil, and Dhakal (2010), and others have done (e.g., Mishler & 
Rose, 2002; Lühiste, 2006). 
 
This chapter has detailed the socio-political background of Nepal in order to 
contextualise the present study and justify the selection of Nepal as a case study. The 
next chapter will describe the methodology used in this project. Specifically, I will 
describe the three phases of data collection that inform the results of this thesis- a 
pilot and two waves of nationwide fieldwork.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: METHODS 
 
This thesis aims to assess antecedents of institutional legitimacy in a post-conflict 
society, with Nepal chosen as a case study (see chapter 3). Data for this project were 
collected in three phases: a pilot survey, wave I, and wave II data collection. This 
chapter details the procedures adopted in the pilot (Section 1 below), wave I (Section 
2), and wave II (Section 3) data collection periods, as well as drawing upon firsthand 
observations of the fieldwork in Nepal. During all phases of the data collection I was 
present in Nepal and worked closely with local collaborators to prepare materials, 
train enumerators, and monitor the administration of the survey.    
 
There are a number of unique challenges involved in conducting research in a post-
conflict developing country (Desai & Potter, 2006; Devereux & Hoddinott, 1993;  
Scheyvens & Storey, 2003). Special considerations include the security of 
enumerators and research participants, (Apentiik & Parpart, 2006), sampling methods 
(Gould, 2006), and local cultural and linguistic barriers that influence how the 
research is perceived and understood by participants and gatekeepers (Renert et al., 
2013). The research questions being addressed in this thesis require survey items of a 
relatively sensitive and contentious nature, both socially and politically, and thus 
require careful regard for appropriateness and worthiness (Renert et al., 2013). This is 
particularly necessary for this case study of post-conflict Nepal, as social and political 
tensions were heightened during the fieldwork period for this research. This chapter 
incorporates the ways in which these considerations were taken into account as the 
project developed, from survey development and sampling frame, to local 
collaborators and fieldwork challenges. Since the pilot study had important 
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methodological implications for the subsequent main fieldwork periods, the first part 
of the chapter explains in the procedures and implications of the pilot test, before 
turning to the procedures for wave I and wave II of the main study. 
In order to undertake the fieldwork, local collaborators in Nepal were selected 
following a vetting process with several institutions and agencies. Eventually, the firm 
Interdisciplinary Analysts (IDA) was selected for its prior experience with conducting 
large-scale qualitative and quantitative fieldwork in Nepal for such agencies as the 
UNDP. IDA was contracted to assist with in-country ethical clearance, provide 
translation services and cultural advice, hire local supervisors and enumerators, 
facilitate training, and organise fieldwork logistics for the pilot, wave I and wave II.   
 
1. Pilot survey 
 
During the pilot I investigated the variables and response scales that I intended to 
administer in wave 1 and wave 2. Given that existing items on procedural justice and 
government legitimacy have largely been developed and validated in stable, Western, 
English-speaking societies (and mainly in the US; Tyler, 2006), the translation of 
these constructs to a post-conflict, developing society could not be assumed (Marshall 
& Rossman, 2010; Nakigudde et al., 2009). Additionally, these survey items mainly 
rely on the use of Likert scale responses, and there is some evidence that there are 
cultural differences in responses to Likert scales (Flaskerud, 1988), particularly 
between US and Asian populations (Lee at al., 2002). Therefore, I aimed to 
investigate the most reliable and valid method of administering the Likert scale in 
Nepal. The effectiveness and practical feasibility of using a stratified random 
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sampling method to ensure a representativeness was also tested in the pilot, as well as 
monitoring methods to maintain control during the main fieldwork phases. 
 
In summary, the pilot study was conducted in order to test:  
 instructions to participants, 
 translations and item wording, 
 social and political sensitivity of survey items, 
 reliability of scales, 
 most appropriate response format, 
 sampling methods,  
 survey length and timing, 
 methods of training large numbers of enumerators, and 
 practical considerations involved in the administration of a large-scale survey 
in a post-conflict developing country (e.g., the impact of seasonal variation, 
festivals, strikes and protests).  
 
Pilot Participants 
Participants were Nepalese citizens (n= 340), consisting of 168 males and 172 
females, with an age range of 18 to 80 years. Caste/ethnic composition of the sample 
was representative of broader Nepalese society, with 80 Hill Caste respondents, 80 
Hill Ethnics, 29 Hill Dalits, 28 Newars, 37 Madhesi Caste, 36 Terai-Madhesi Ethnics, 
20 Madhesi Dalits, and 30 Muslims (these eight main categories of caste/ethnic group 
were suggested and coded by Nepalese collaborators).  
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Pilot Sampling  
A stratified random sample with two strata variables – i.e. region and caste/ethnicity – 
was employed during the pilot. This was employed because existing information 
(Nepal National Population Census, 2011) indicates that region and caste/ethnicity are 
the primary lines of social division in the country. Two ecological regions for the pilot 
sampling were randomly selected (the Hill region and the Terai) and within these 
regions, 3 districts were randomly sampled (Kapilvastu, Kaski, and Palpa). A total of 
9 Village Development Committees (VDCs; similar to municipalities) were then 
randomly sampled within the districts (Purusottampur, Kapilbastu N.P, Jayanagar, 
Gajehada, Pokhara N.P, BharatPokhari, Pumdibhumdi, Tansen N.P., and 
Bhairabsthan). Caste/ethnic group sampling by region was based on Nepalese Census 
data, and at the village level, household selection was random if the village was 
ethnically homogenous, and purposive if the village was heterogeneous (i.e., to meet 
the caste/ethnic quota for that district). Within the household the participant was 
randomly selected.  
 
Within the village, household selection was made using the Right-Hand rule (e.g. 
European Union Minorities and Discrimination Surveys, 2009), in which the 
enumerator, on arriving in the village, takes the first right hand turn, then every 
second house on the right on that street is selected until the quota is met. Random 
selection within the household was achieved via the Kish Grid method (wherein the 
number of eligible participants is crosschecked with the household number to 
randomly select a participant). The Kish Grid is commonly used in large-scale social 
research, and is recognized as a valid method for equal-probability sampling when 
more than one case will be eligible for inclusion at a sampled address or household 
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(Kish, 1949). Participants were counted as eligible for inclusion on the Kish Grid if 
they were at least 18 years old and citizens of Nepal.  
 
Pilot Survey Materials 
Two survey instruments were piloted to cover a broad range of constructs relating to 
the research questions. Given that pilot surveys were not used for the data analysis 
presented in chapters 5 and 6, pilot materials are only briefly described in this section.  
 
Sex, age, education, caste/ethnic group, marital status, regional heterogeneity, and 
main source of income were assessed. Survey 1 comprised items assessing voice, 
procedural justice, distributive justice, legitimacy, law legitimacy, and government 
performance; all adapted from Sunshine and Tyler (2003a), and Murphy, Tyler and 
Curtis (2009) to fit the focus of the present study on government legitimacy. 
Perceptions of group influence measures were assessed, comprising a mixture of 
items for local and foreign groups, such as the eight main caste/ethnic groups in 
Nepal; government actors such as India, China, and the US; NGOs and INGOs, and 
the UN. Perceptions of trust and contact with these groups were also measured. 
Survey 2 variables included the same demographic information as survey 1. Voice, 
procedural justice, and legitimacy questions were repeated in survey 2. Additional 
items included caste/ethnic group and national group identification, relative power, 
status, legitimacy and stability of caste/ethnic groups, intergroup contact, trust and 
influence (using the same groups presented in survey 1).  
 
Because the target population was largely unfamiliar with this type of survey structure, 
and at face-value the questions may have appeared to be quite abstract, a definition 
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was added at the start of each section of the pilot questionnaire comprising the 
following statement:  “When we ask about the government, we would like you to think 
about the government in terms of the way in which the central government operates 
and  makes  decisions,  regardless  of  which  political  party  is  leading  the  government.” 
Enumerators assessed participant reactions to this statement during the pilot, i.e., 
whether participants found the instructions confusing or difficult to implement. An 
introductory statement also explained the response format, i.e., agreement ratings of 
statements.  
 
 
Response Scales 
As mentioned previously, most of the measures used in this research have been 
developed and validated in democratically stable, Western, English-speaking 
countries, and rely on Likert scale responses. There is some evidence that the 
interpretation of the five-point range of responses in the Likert scale may not translate 
equally across cultures (Lee et al., 2008). The Likert scale itself depends on a 
participant holding a mental representation of a number line, which has been shown to 
be culturally bound and to not develop in the absence of formal education (Deheane, 
Izard, Spelke, & Pica, 2008). Due to generally low levels of education in Nepal (total 
adult literacy rate, 2005-2010: 59%; UNICEF, 2011) there was therefore some 
concern over the use of Likert scales for this research. Specifically, it was uncertain 
how to best ensure comprehension of the scale for a relatively large proportion of 
uneducated and illiterate participants, given that they would be unaccustomed to 
traditional methods of academic testing. It was unclear whether verbal or visual 
administration of the Likert scale would be preferable. As evidence varies regarding 
 98 
the most reliable number of scale points in Western research populations (Dawes, 
2008), the ideal number of scale points was considered for this research. Some cross-
cultural researchers advocate pictorial presentation for illiterate populations 
(Nakigudde, 2009; Bellwood-Howard, 2012), but on consultation with IDA – and 
based on their previous experience in the country – the best approach was deemed to 
be a modified version of the Likert scale, rather than an entirely new agreement scale. 
Hence four response scales were piloted for both surveys, allowing approximately 40 
participants to respond to each response scale in each survey: 
 
- A verbal 1-5 Likert scale (1 = Not at all; 2 = A little; 3 = Some; 4 = A lot; 5 = 
Entirely).  
- A visual 1-5 scale (points as above, with the addition of a visual showcard (see 
Appendix B) 
- A verbal 0-10 scale (“If   1  means   you   don’t   agree   at   all,   and   10  means   you  
agree  entirely,  how  much  do  you  agree  with  this  statement?”)   
- A visual 0-10 scale (as above, with an additional visual showcard; see 
Appendix C) 
 
Translation 
In partnership with IDA, the surveys were composed in English, translated into 
Nepali, back-translated into English, and then re-translated into Nepali. Back- and re-
translation helped to remove typographical errors and isolate major discrepancies 
between the English and Nepali versions early in the process.  
 
 
 99 
Pilot procedure 
Enumerators 
There were a total of 12 enumerators, including 4 field supervisors, employed during 
the pilot fieldwork. Supervisors and enumerators were largely Nepali professionals 
and students in Kathmandu, though originating from the local region in which they 
would be conducting fieldwork. Most enumerators (90%) had Bachelor degrees, some 
(approx. 20%) also had Masters degrees, and many had worked for IDA previously, 
or had several years of experience in conducting qualitative and quantitative 
fieldwork in Nepal. They were sent to regions where they would be, for the most part, 
interviewing participants matched for caste/ethnicity in the hope that congruence 
between enumerators and participants would facilitate trust and openness during the 
interviews. Bilingual enumerators fluent in Hindi and Nepali were hired and trained to 
administer the survey, as in some areas in the Southern belt of Nepal where the border 
with India is porous, only Hindi and local dialects are spoken and Nepali is not 
understood. Given enumerators involved in the pilot data collection would also act as 
supervisors and trainers during wave I, they were employed on the condition that they 
would be available during the wave I main fieldwork period, and were trained in 
every element of the survey protocol and administration. Two days of training were 
held at IDA headquarters prior to the start of fieldwork, covering topics such as 
informed consent, sampling design, response scales, and mock interviews.  
Supervisors and enumerators were encouraged to comment and ask questions 
throughout the two days of training, and there were debates about random sampling, 
survey methods, informed consent, and survey constructs. Training sessions with the 
enumerators unintentionally served as a form of focus group for both the survey and 
the methods being used.  
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Pilot Fieldwork  
Fieldwork took place between 31st July 2012 and the 14th August 2012. Full informed 
consent procedures were followed with each participant selected on the Kish Grid, 
who could then choose whether or not to continue with the survey. If they elected not 
to continue, enumerators would thank the members of the household and move to the 
next sampling point using the Right-Hand method.  If they chose to continue with the 
survey, participants were randomly assigned to complete either Survey 1 or Survey 2, 
and randomly assigned a response scale condition: 1-5 visual, 1-5 verbal, 0-10 visual, 
or 0-10 verbal. Enumerators carried paper copies of each survey, on which they coded 
the response scale, and recorded all survey answers. Enumerators worked in the field 
in teams of 4 (1 supervisor and 3 enumerators) with each of the 3 teams collecting 
data from approximately 100 participants. 
 
A local fieldwork manager, a research officer/translator, and I monitored the 
fieldwork, meeting with supervisors and enumerators at field sites each day. 
Supervisors would report any problems that had occurred, including floods, 
nationwide strikes, harvesting and festivals, all of which made data collection difficult 
and required alterations to the fieldwork plan. However, given the widespread nature 
of these issues, subsequent analysis revealed that there were no systematic patterns in 
the participants who needed to be skipped for weather or social reasons. Supervisors 
also   described   participants’   reaction   to   the   survey:   whether   they  were   accepting   or  
suspicious; understood the questions; or exhibited signs of fatigue. The fieldwork 
lasted for a total of 14 days, after which the senior research staff, supervisors, and 
enumerators reconvened in Kathmandu and conducted a feedback workshop.  
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Enumerators reported that the informed consent procedure was clear and that they felt 
participants’  understanding  of   anonymity, confidentiality, and the right to withdraw 
made them comfortable with being honest about sensitive questions, and that there 
was little hesitation about giving answers. Overall, enumerators reported that although 
some participants struggled with the surveys initially, after some time they became 
more   comfortable   and   confident.   Some   participants   had   reported   ‘survey   fatigue’  
from living in areas where a large number of NGOs and INGOs were based. The 
timing of the interviews was reported to vary- from as little as 20 minutes for a highly 
educated participant, to around an hour for an uneducated participant. There were 
relatively lower item non-response rates compared   to   IDA’s   prior experience. We 
found that compared to similar themes explored in surveys previously, in which items 
were   posed   as   questions   rather   than   statements   (e.g.,   “How  much   do   you   trust   the  
government?”  as  opposed   to  “I   trust   the  government”),  our   results  had   significantly  
fewer missing responses.  
 
Finally, given the central importance of a consistent understanding of the term 
‘government’  as  used  in  this  survey, participants were prompted: “When we ask about 
the government, we would like you to think about the government in terms of how the 
central government operates and makes decisions, regardless of which political party 
is leading the government.”  Feedback was solicited on participant reactions to the 
definition provided in the survey and in their interpretation of the concept of 
government in subsequent discussions. Feedback from enumerators indicated that 
participants   had   understood   the   survey   definition   of   ‘government’,   and   in   further  
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discussions had appeared to be aware that the government was an institution separate 
from its political leaders. 7 
 
Pilot Results and Discussion 
Overall, the response rate for the pilot survey was approximately 90%. Analysis 
indicated that non-response was evenly distributed across units in the strata, 
suggesting no particular non-response bias. The results of the pilot determined that 
instructions to participants were clear and comprehensible, and aided understanding 
of the survey items. It was felt that the training schedule developed for enumerators 
was too rushed, and that an extra day (for a total of 3 days) should be allowed for the 
main fieldwork training. Although the survey covered sensitive items, no problems 
were reported with participants refusing to answer for social or political reasons.  
 
The various response scales were assessed (verbal 1-5, visual 1-5, verbal 1-10, visual 
1-10). The verbal 1-5 scale provided more even distributions and more reliable scales 
(i.e.,   Cronbach’s   alpha   scores   of   .5   and   above)   across most of the constructs, and 
generally greater convergent validity. Additionally, response times were shortest 
when surveys were administered via the verbal scales due to reduced time spent 
explaining the visual show cards. Statistical results corresponded with observations 
from the field that participants and enumerators found the verbal 1-5 scale the easiest 
to understand and administer. We reasoned that the verbal 1-5 scale was more 
naturalistic, as it mimicked the way citizens would discuss quantities in their everyday 
interactions, and verbal presentation allowed them to place their response within a                                                         7 Qualitative data was also collected during	  waves	  1	   and	  2	  of	   fieldwork	   assessing	   participants’	  conceptualisation of the institution of government as separate from its political leaders. Results indicated that citizens viewed politicians as representative of the institution of government rather than comprising the institution itself. These data are available on request from the author.  
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sentence,   e.g.,   “I   don’t   trust   the   government   at   all”.   Further,   the   closeness   of   the  
points on the 1-10 scale caused consternation amongst participants, and feedback was 
given that they did not understand the qualitative difference between agreeing at, for 
example, the 6th point of the scale as opposed to the 7th. That is, the 1-10 scale lacked 
validity for participants. Based on the results and observations outlined above, the 
verbal 1-5 scale was adopted for all items in wave I.  
 
2. Wave I survey 
Wave 1 Sampling 
The target population for the wave I and II surveys was the national population of 
adults aged 18 years and older in Nepal. Based on the pilot results showing some 
geographic variation, it was deemed important to achieve a level of geographic 
representativeness in the wave I and II surveys. As a result, a stratified random 
sample was employed – similar to the pilot survey– whereby participants were 
randomly sampled within districts, VDCs, wards and households (see Figure 5 for 
example; for full sampling frame see Appendices B and C). The wave I survey sample 
size was 1,500 respondents, which was estimated to permit reliable national estimates 
at a 95% confidence interval +/- 2.2% on an estimate of 50%. The response rate for 
the survey was high (95%) and methods for dealing with item-non-response in 
analyses are described below. 
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Figure 5. Sampling method Wave I.  
 
First, the country was divided into 16 geographical districts (Figure 2). Within the 
districts, 77 Village Development Committees (VDCs) were randomly selected, 
followed by Wards within the VDCs. An example of District-VDC sampling is 
illustrated in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6. Geographical districts in Nepal 
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Figure 7. Example District-VDC sampling for Eastern Nepal. 
 
District        All VDCs within district   Sampled VDCs 
Sampling within the village again used the Right-Hand rule, and the Kish Grid for 
random selection at the household level, as these methods were found to be effective 
in the pilot study.  
 
Wave 1 Participants  
A total of 1,500 participants were surveyed during wave I, consisting of 777 females 
and 723 males with an age range of 18-90 and a mean age of 39 years.  Caste/ethnic 
composition was representative of Nepalese society, with 462 Hill Caste respondents, 
376 Hill Ethnics, 107 Hill Dalits, 74 Newars, 256 Madhesi Caste, 98 Terai-Madhesi 
Ethnic, 78 Madhesi Dalit, and 49 Muslims. Again, these eight categories of 
caste/ethnic group were suggested and coded by our Nepalese collaborators, though 
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caste/ethnic group information was also collected at a more detailed level. Overall, 70 
of   Nepal’s   approximately 200 caste/ethnic groups were sampled during wave I. 
Literacy levels were also representative of the broader population, with 400 illiterate 
participants, 256 literate but uneducated, 216 with primary education, 183 lower 
secondary education, 129 upper secondary education, 156 with a school leaving 
certificate, 124 with an intermediate (diploma) certificate, and 36 with a Bachelor 
degree or above. Most participants were Hindu (n = 1181), with a small number of 
Buddhists (170), Muslims (53), Christians (23), Kirati (64; a native animistic religion), 
and 2 atheists.  
 
Wave 1 Measures 
A single survey was administered during wave I fieldwork and items and scales are 
described below (for all items see Appendix D) 
 
Demographic control variables 
Demographic information collected included age (for the purposes of analysis derived 
as a continuous variable in years), sex (dichotomous variable male = 1 female = 0; in 
wave 1 48.2% of participants were male), caste/ethnicity (self-nominated by 
participants), education (dummy-coded 8 categories with primary education as the 
reference group), religion (dummy-coded 6 categories with Hindu as the reference), 
monthly income (continuous), marital status (dummy-coded 3 categories with married 
as the reference), settlement pattern (measured on a scale of 1-5, where 1 was a 
settlement pattern in which caste/ethnic group lived completely separately and 5 a 
settlement pattern where caste/ethnic groups were completely intermingled) and 
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voting intentions (dummy-coded 10 categories with Nepali Congress (NC) as the 
reference category). 
 
Scales 
All scales in the survey were derived by summing and averaging items. Resulting 
scores were grand mean centred and used as continuous variables in analyses. For all 
scale scores, higher scores reflected higher levels of the concept. Tests of reliability 
were  performed  for  each  scale  using  Cronbach’s  Alpha,  which  is  presented  along  with  
mean and standard deviations of each score below.  
 
Legitimacy  
Legitimacy was  measured  as  people’s   trust   and confidence in the government, their 
respect for the government, and the perception that the government operates in the 
best interests of the people (drawing on the traditional conceptualisation of legitimacy, 
e.g., Tyler, 2011,8 e.g., ‘The government operates in the best interests of Nepalese 
people’;;  see  Appendix  D,  Item  22). Four items reflected these concepts, and a higher 
score on this scale reflects higher levels of perceived government legitimacy (M=2.45, 
SD=.90,  Cronbach’s  alpha=0.78).  
 
Identification  
The Inclusion of Self in Group scale (adapted from Schubert & Otten, 2002) assessed 
participants’  identification  with  their  caste/ethnic  group  and  the  national Nepal group 
(see Appendix D, Items 1 and 2). On average, participants identified very strongly                                                         8 There has been a recent debate in the literature about the theoretical conceputalisation of legitimacy in 
criminological research (see e.g., Jackson et al., 2012; Tyler et al., 2013 as it relates to moral 
obligation). In this project I draw on the traditional conceptualisation of legitimacy, as data collection 
had taken place prior to these most recent debates. 
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with both their subgroup (caste/ethnic group; M=4.46, SD=0.89) and superordinate 
group   (national   group;;   M=4.50,   SD=.79).   The   perception   of   their   group’s   level   of  
power in Nepalese society was also measured (M=2.62, SD=1.23, Cronbach’s  
alpha=0.78). 
 
Government Performance 
The two-item government performance scale (e.g.,  ‘The government has the ability to 
provide services   to   the   citizens   of   Nepal’;;   see   Appendix   D,   Item   27)   measured 
citizen’s  perceptions  that   the  government  could  provide  services  to  citizens and was 
able to govern effectively (M=2.85, SD=0.96,  Cronbach’s  alpha=0.44). 
 
Law Legitimacy 
The law legitimacy scale was adapted from Murphy, Tyler and Curtis (2009) and 
assessed   citizen’s   feelings   of   moral   obligation   to   obey   the   law,   and   willingness to 
obey the law even if it goes against what they personally feel is right (e.g. ‘I feel a 
moral  obligation   to  obey   the   law’;;  Appendix  D,  Item  26). The scale comprised two 
items and had a relatively high mean (M=4.01, SD=1.01,  Cronbach’s  alpha=0.61). 
 
Procedural Justice 
Procedural justice was operationalised via Tyler   and   Huo   (2002)’s concepts of 
fairness, respect and neutrality (e.g. ‘The government uses fair procedures when 
deciding  how  to  handle  situations’;;  Appendix  D,  Item  13). The scale comprised four 
items and was highly reliable (M=2.12, SD=0.87,  Cronbach’s  alpha=0.80).  
 
Distributive Justice 
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Two distributive justice items assessed whether certain caste groups received more 
from the government than others, and whether the rich received better services than 
the poor (e.g. ‘The government provides a better service to the rich than to the 
average  citizen’;;  Appendix  D,  Item  17;;  M=2.47,  SD=0.82,  Cronbach’s  alpha=0.40). 
 
Outcome Favourability 
The outcome favourability scale measured whether the government was perceived to 
deliver services and assistance to citizens, both individually and to their group (e.g. 
‘My ethnic/caste group receives a favourable share  of  government  help’;;  Appendix  D,  
Item 19; M=1.95, SD=0.78, Cronbach’s  alpha=0.50). 
 
Voice 
A three-item  voice  scale  assessed  citizens’  perceptions  that   they  could  participate  in  
government processes and were consulted by the government in making decisions 
(e.g. ‘Nepalese in general are consulted  in  how  the  government  is  run’;;  Appendix  D,  
Item 8; M=2.81, SD=0.75,  Cronbach’s  alpha=0.50). 
 
Group Influence 
In conjunction with my local collaborators I compiled a list of 13 local and regional 
groups who could conceivably influence the post-conflict government in Nepal (see 
Appendix D, Items 6 and 7). These comprised the eight main caste/ethnic categories 
in Nepal (local influences) and an assortment of regional, governmental, 
intergovernmental, and non-governmental actors (e.g., India, the US, the UN, INGOs). 
Participants were asked to rate the extent to which each of the groups influenced how 
the   government   was   run   and   operated.   Factor   analysis   revealed   that   participants’  
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influence ratings of these groups fell into two factors along the expected local and 
foreign lines. Two scales were then developed comprising either local groups 
(M=2.67,   SD=0.69,   Cronbach’s   alpha=0.83)   or   foreign   groups   (M=2.86,   SD=0.85,  
Cronbach’s  alpha=0.82). 
 
Group Trust 
Trust ratings were assessed for the same thirteen groups described above, and two 
scales were created- local  group  trust  (M=2.76,  SD=.84,  Cronbach’s  alpha=0.80)  and  
foreign  group  trust  (M=2.68,  SD=.85,  Cronbach’s  alpha=0.72).   
 
Wave 1 Procedure 
 
Enumerators and Training 
Due to the much larger sample size for wave 1 than the pilot, a total of 47 
enumerators were employed, including 12 field supervisors. Supervisors for the wave 
I fieldwork had all been involved in the pilot fieldwork, meaning they were familiar 
with the University research team and IDA staff and had an understanding of the 
survey items, response scales, and fieldwork procedures. They also assisted in 
training new enumerators, as well as acting as field supervisors. The pilot method of 
caste/ethnic matching was effective in facilitating trust in respondents, so as in the 
pilot, enumerators and participants were matched on caste and ethnicity as much as 
possible. Two training sessions were held – one in central-east Nepal (Kathmandu), 
and one in Far-West Nepal (Nepalgung). Both training sessions followed the same 
structure as the pilot, and lasted three days each. Training staff were the same for each 
session: the fieldwork coordinator and a research officer who also acted as a translator. 
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The training schedule and topics covered were based on the outcomes of the pilot 
training. Training topics included an overview of the research aims, changes to the 
survey and protocol, informed consent procedures, effective interview techniques, and 
troubleshooting interviews.  
 
Survey Administration 
The fieldwork took place between the 21st September 2012 and the 1st November 
2012. The procedure mirrored the pilot, wherein teams of 1 supervisor and 3 
enumerators travelled to the capital of the district they were assigned, and gradually 
moved outwards to more remote fieldwork sites. Within villages, they followed the 
Right-Hand rule and selected participants using the Kish Grid method (as outlined in 
the pilot procedure section of this chapter). Participants were asked to nominate a 
location for the interview, and as much as possible, enumerators were instructed to 
present in an informal yet engaged manner. At the end of each day, enumerators 
would report to supervisors and the paper surveys with recorded answers would be 
collected. Monitoring procedures followed the pilot, with a monitoring team of the 
fieldwork manager, a translator, and the author, traveling to main fieldwork sites and 
meeting with supervisors approximately every second day. 
 
 
 
3.  Wave II methods 
 
One year following the first wave of fieldwork, a second cross-sectional data 
collection took place. Procedures largely followed from the pilot and wave 1 
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fieldwork, therefore only variations from the methods described above are described 
in this section. 
 
Wave II Sampling 
As was the case in wave I, a stratified random sampling design was employed, with 
participants randomly sampled within the strata variable of region. This mirrored the 
procedures of the pilot and wave I. The country was divided into 16 geographical 
districts, and within the districts, Village Development Committees (VDCs) were 
randomly selected, followed by Wards within the VDCs. Sampling within the village 
again utilised the Right-Hand rule, and the Kish Grid for random selection at the 
household level, as in wave 1.  
 
Wave II participants 
A total of 1,500 participants were surveyed during wave II (F=773, M=727, age range 
18-90, mean age 39).  Caste/ethnic composition was representative of Nepalese 
society, with 547 Hill Caste respondents, 273 Hill Ethnics, 75 Hill Dalits, 70 Newars, 
277 Madhesi Caste, 147 Terai-Madhesi Ethnic, 79 Madhesi Dalit, and 32 Muslims. 
Again, these eight categories of caste/ethnic group were suggested and coded by our 
Nepalese collaborators, though caste/ethnic group information was also collected at a 
more detailed   level.   Overall,   70   of   Nepal’s   approximately   200   caste/ethnic groups 
were sampled during wave II. Literacy levels were also representative of the broader 
population, with 392 illiterate participants, 252 literate but uneducated, 171 with 
primary education, 189 lower secondary education, 152 upper secondary education, 
150 with a school leaving certificate, 141 with an intermediate (diploma) certificate, 
and 53 with a Bachelor degree or above. Most participants were Hindu (1303), with a 
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small number of Buddhists (75), Muslims (31), Christians (22), Kirati (66), and 3 
atheists.  
 
Measures 
A single survey was administered during wave II fieldwork. Scales repeated from the 
wave I survey included procedural justice, distributive justice, outcome favourability, 
group power, voice, and group influences. New items and scales included participant-
enumerator caste/ethnic congruency, gender congruency, perceptions of regional 
violence, trust in other institutions, performance of other institutions, and government 
delivery of specific services. These measures are detailed below (see appendix E for 
all items in the wave II survey). 
 
Demographics 
Demographic information collected included age, sex, caste/ethnicity, VDC, 
education, religion, profession, income, marital status, settlement pattern, and voting 
intentions.   
 
Legitimacy  
Four items measured government legitimacy, which assessed trust, respect, and 
confidence in the government (M=2.51, SD=.95, Cronbach’s alpha=0.88). 
 
Identification  
A  single  visual  item  assessed  participants’  identification  with  their  caste/ethnic  group  
and the national Nepal group. On average, participants identified very strongly with 
both their subgroup (caste/ethnic group; M=4.25, SD=0.98) and superordinate group 
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(national  group;;  M=4.68,  SD=.62).  The  perception  of  their  group’s  level  of  power  in  
Nepalese society was also measured (M=2.89, SD=1.20). 
 
Procedural Justice 
Procedural justice was operationalized via four items assessing fairness, neutrality, 
and respectful treatment (M=2.12, SD=0.85, Cronbach’s alpha=0.84). 
 
Distributive Justice 
Two distributive justice items assessed whether certain caste groups received more 
from the government than others, and whether the rich received better services than 
the poor (M=2.90, SD=1.10, Cronbach’s alpha=0.65). 
 
Outcome Favourability 
The outcome favourability scale measured whether the government was perceived to 
deliver services and assistance to citizens, both individually and to their group 
(M=2.08, SD=0.78, Cronbach’s alpha=0.59). 
 
Voice 
A three-item  voice  scale  assessed  citizens’  perceptions  that   they  could  participate  in  
government processes and were consulted by the government in making decisions 
(M=2.84, SD=0.77, Cronbach’s alpha=0.51). 
 
Regional civil unrest (new item included in wave 2) 
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A  single  item  assessed  participants’  perceptions  that   the  level  of  civil  unrest   in   their  
region had increased or decreased in the previous year, with higher means indicating 
an increase of violence (M=2.63, SD=.93). 
 
Trust in other institutions 
Participants were asked to rate their trust in several local, regional, and central 
institutions, including the local government (M=2.74, SD=1.04), the village 
development committee (regional authority; M=2.82, SD=1.06), the police (M=2.94, 
SD=1.10), the Nepalese Army (M=3.40, SD=1.13), and the judiciary/courts (M=3.15, 
SD=1.24).  
 
Performance of other institutions 
In this section, participants were asked to rate the perception that different local, 
regional, and central institutions were able to perform their job effectively, including 
the local government (M=2.64, SD=.96), the village development committee (M=2.70, 
SD=98), the police (M=2.94, SD=1.05), the Nepalese Army (M=3.35, SD=1.09), and 
the judiciary/courts (M=3.10, SD=1.22).  
 
Service delivery 
Participants were asked to assess the ability of the government to provide specific 
service to the citizens of Nepal. These services included the ability to deliver basic 
infrastructure (M=3.03, SD=1.21), food (M=2.61, SD=1.23), housing (M=2.59, 
SD=1.26), health services (M=2.96, SD=1.20), education services (M=3.15, SD-1.14), 
control crime (M+2.50, SD=1.22), manage the economy (2.41, SD=1.91), and handle 
unemployment (M=1.99, SD=1.22). 
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Interviewer effects 
To control for possible interviewer effects, enumerators were asked to complete two 
items at the end of the survey. One item asked if the enumerator and the participant 
were the same gender (53% same gender, 47% different genders). A second item 
asked how close the enumerator and the participant were in terms of caste/ethnicity on 
a scale of 1=Not at all to 5=Entirely (M=2.25, SD=1.44).  
 
Wave II Procedure 
The procedure for wave II followed the procedure of wave I as closely as possible. 
For this reason, some details are omitted from the procedure section below to avoid 
repetition.  
 
Enumerators and Training 
For wave II a total of 47 enumerators were employed, including 12 field supervisors. 
Enumerators who had worked on wave I were encouraged to return for wave II, and 
approximately 50% had worked on both surveys. Two training session were held 
again- one in central-east Nepal (Kathmandu), and one in Far-West Nepal 
(Nepalgung). Both training sessions followed the same structure, and took three days 
each. Training topics included an overview of the research aims, changes to the 
survey and protocol (for those who had worked on the pilot), informed consent 
procedures, effective interview techniques, and troubleshooting interviews.  
 
Survey Administration 
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The fieldwork took place between the 5th September 2013 and the 10th October 2013. 
Teams of 1 supervisor and 3 enumerators travelled to the capital of the district they 
were assigned, and gradually moved outwards to more remote fieldwork sites. Within 
villages, they followed the Right-Hand rule and selected participants using the Kish 
Grid method. Monitoring procedures followed the pilot and Wave I, with a 
monitoring team meeting with supervisors approximately every second day and 
communication via mobile phone was held daily.  
 
4. Waves I and II: Data Analysis 
 
This study addresses research questions relating to legitimacy outcomes in two cross-
sectional surveys. The majority of the analyses described in chapters 5 and 6 treat 
Nepal as a single nationwide sample. The third research question, pertaining to social 
interaction effects on legitimacy outcomes, utilises a multilevel statistical design 
taking into account regional groups nested within the sample, the stratified sampling 
design makes this set of analyses possible. Specific models will be detailed in the 
following two chapters, but the common procedures used are outlined here.  
 
Missing data 
Participant refusal rates were negligible during wave 1 (i.e., an estimated refusal rate 
of approximately 1%). Although informed consent procedures clearly communicated 
that participation was voluntary, cultural norms within Nepal seemed to encourage 
participants’   acquiescence   in   completing   the   survey.   No   participants   subsequently  
reported dissatisfaction with their participation.  
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Gummer and Roßmann (2013) describe a three-step strategy for dealing with item 
non-response. First, basic descriptive statistics are calculated to determine the extent 
of item nonresponse. Item nonresponse was approximately 10-20% for most variables 
across both waves of fieldwork. Next, Gummer and Roßmann (2013) recommend 
evaluation of selected questions. It was found that there were relatively low 
(approximately 10%) nonresponse rates for items assessing the dependent variable 
(legitimacy) and key predictors (procedural justice, distributive justice, government 
performance, outcome favourability, voice). The highest item non-response was in the 
group trust and influence items (approximately 25%), which reflected genuine lack of 
knowledge of the groups themselves (e.g., citizens living on the southern Indian 
border often had never heard of China). As key variables displayed relatively minimal 
nonresponse rates, and the cause of high levels of nonresponse did not reflect 
meaningful bias, item nonresponse was not considered to be a problem in the datasets. 
As a result of these tests, no adjustments were made in models to account for non-
response.  
 
Testing for factors associated with individuals’ perceptions of legitimacy 
The primary aim of the analyses in chapters 5 and 6 is to better understand factors that 
explain   individuals’  assessments  of   legitimacy.  This   required  a   form  of  multivariate  
analysis. I employed a version of regression – aimed at explaining the relationships 
between  variables  with  a   line  of   ‘best   fit’.  Since the outcome variable is continuous 
and relatively normally distributed, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) was the most 
appropriate method for fitting a multivariate model to the data (Pohlman, 2003). The 
basic specification for a multivariate OLS is as follows:   
 
 119 
Where the relationship between variables γ1 and χ1 is described using the equation of 
the line of best fit   with   α   indicating   the   value   of   γ1 when χ1 is equal to zero (also 
known as the intercept), β   indicating   the   slope   of   the   line   (also   known   as the 
regression coefficient), and  ε representing the error term.  
 
There are a number of assumptions that underlie OLS, including linearity, normality, 
homogeneity of variance, independence, and model specification. The assumptions of 
linearity, normality, and independence were met. There was some evidence of 
heteroscedasticity, wherein the variance along a number of regression lines of best fit 
was slightly positively skewed. A natural log transformation of the data was 
performed and the OLS models were run with the transformed data, but no significant 
differences in results were observed. Thus the non-transformed data were utilised in 
all models. Finally, the data were inspected visually for outliers and none were 
deleted, and missing data was deleted listwise from all analyses.  
 
An additional pitfall for multivariate OLS is multicollinearity (when two or more 
predictors in the model are correlated). Multicollinearity can be detected by 
calculating the variance inflation factor (VIF) for each predictor. If VIF is more than 
10 this indicates a potential problem with multicollinearity (Farrar & Glauber, 1967). 
Another means of formally detecting multicollinearity is tolerance. As general rules 
of thumb, a tolerance of less than 0.20 or 0.10 and/or a VIF of 5 or 10 and above 
indicates a multicollinearity problem (O’Brian, 2007). VIF and tolerance statistics 
indicated no problem with multicollinearity in the individual-level analyses 
(henceforth, only VIF statistics will be reported).  
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Testing for moderation 
First, moderating effects of third variables on the relationship between independent 
variables (i.e., individual-level or neighbourhood-level variables) and dependent 
variables (i.e., legitimacy outcomes) were assessed. Baron and Kenny (1986) describe 
the moderating function of third variables as one that affects the direction and strength 
of the relationship between an independent variable and an outcome variable. The 
existence of a moderating effect is assessed through the presence of a significant 
interaction term generated through the product of the independent variable and the 
moderator variable. For example, this study is interested in assessing the moderating 
effect of national identification on the proposed relationship between procedural 
justice and legitimacy (see chapter 2). A significant interaction term between national 
identification and procedural justice would indicate that the strength of the 
relationship between procedural justice and legitimacy varies depending on the 
strength  of  a  citizen’s  identification at the national level. 
 
An important component of testing for moderation between two independent 
continuous variables is first centring each variable. Centring refers to the process of 
subtracting the same value (typically the sample mean score) from each individual’s  
score. In this project, continuous variable scores were centred around the grand mean, 
i.e., each score was centred around the sample mean for that variable (Raudenbush & 
Bryk, 2002). Binary variables were left in their original metric.  
 
Testing for a social interaction effect – multilevel analyses 
A final set of analyses (presented in chapter 6), was to test whether individuals may 
influence or be influenced by nearby others in forming their views on legitimacy. To 
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address the research question positing a social influence on legitimacy, it was 
necessary to first test whether there was any evidence of clustering of views on 
legitimacy within geographic areas, and then, if so, to statistically account for 
geographical clustering of Nepalese citizens within Village Development Committees 
(VDCs). For this purpose, in chapter 6 a series of multilevel models are estimated 
using HLM 6.0 (Kreft & de Leew, 1998; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; Snidjers & 
Bosker, 1999). When data are clustered, individuals living within the same cluster 
(i.e., VDC) may not be completely independent, as they will be exposed to the same 
influences. Multilevel procedures permit the partitioning of variance in outcomes 
among individual- and VDC-levels.  
 
The models estimated in this analysis represent two levels: the individual level and 
the VDC level. The object of the analysis was to examine legitimacy perceptions as a 
function of both individual-level and VDC-level conditions. Using this multilevel 
strategy it was possible to address three related aspects of these relationships: 1) 
whether legitimacy clusters within VDCs; 2) the extent to which clustering could be 
accounted for by individual-level variables; and 3) the effect of others living in the 
VDC on individual-level legitimacy views. 
 
Level 2 units – Village Development Committees 
For this social interaction analysis, VDCs (Village Development Committees) are 
used as the level 2 groups, or in other words, individual respondents (level 1) were 
nested within VDCs. In this study, the number of participants in each VDC was large 
enough to provide power to the multilevel analysis (20-40 participants in each VDC; 
Snijders & Bosker 2012 consider this an appropriate number of level 1 units within 
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level 2 units). A unit of analysis smaller than this, such as wards within VDCs, would 
not have enough participants sampled within each ward to provide interpretable 
results. VDCs were used as the nesting group for three further reasons: first, they are a 
geographical unit, meaning that citizens within each VDC live closely together. 
Second, they are socially meaningful, in that VDCs are community-focussed within 
which people interact, and thereby influence, each other (Government of Nepal, 2012). 
Third, VDCs are politically meaningful, in that they are the lowest unit of government 
in Nepal, with the head of each VDC being a village-elected chief. VDCs were 
originally designed as a way of structurally organising citizens and encouraging 
liaisons between the public and centralised government institutions in Nepal 
(Government of Nepal, 2012).  
 
If VDCs are socially meaningful units to the extent that living within a particular 
VDC may influence citizens’ legitimacy views, three predictions follow. First, rather 
than homogeneous legitimacy perceptions, it would be expected that there is variation 
within VDCs in the extent to which people hold views about government legitimacy 
(i.e., within-VDC variance). Second, across the populations of Nepal, it should be 
possible to observe grouping or clustering of citizens within regions where group 
members hold similar views (i.e., between-VDC variance). That is, we would expect 
those with similar views to live in similar communities. Third, we would expect to see 
an endogenous effect (McQuestion, 2003),  where   an   individual’s   legitimacy  beliefs  
both  influence  and  are  influenced  by  the  group’s  views.  This  reciprocal  relationship,  
or social interaction effect, would mean that   citizen’s   views   should   be   highly  
correlated with those within their VDCs.  
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Social interaction models (Durlauf, 2001) are used to estimate whether average VDC-
level views about legitimacy affect   individual   respondents’   legitimacy   views   even  
after accounting for their individual perceptions of, for example, instrumental 
outcomes and relational quality with the government. Following Durlauf (2001) and 
McQuestion (2003), a two-level random intercept logistic model was estimated. The 
logistic or dichotomous   outcome  variable   addresses   an   ‘identification  problem’   that  
social interaction (autocorrelation) would create in a linear model (Manski 1993). For 
the purposes of this analysis it was necessary to recode the respondent-level five-point 
legitimacy outcome into a dichotomous variable – where high scores above the 
sample mean = 1, and low scores below the sample mean = 0.   
 
To derive the VDC-level legitimacy variable, what McQuestion (2003) has referred to 
as   a   ‘non-self’   group   mean   score was employed. For each respondent this is 
calculated as the number of respondents in the VDC, excluding him or herself, who 
report legitimacy scores above the mean divided by the total number of respondents in 
a VDC (McQuestion, 2003). More specifically, this measure reflects the number of 
‘other’   respondents   who   lived   in   a   particular   VDC   and   reported   a   high   legitimacy  
score.   Excluding   the   respondent’s   score   ensures   that   the   VDC-level measure of 
legitimacy does not include the average score of others who live in the same VDC. 
Put simply, the purpose of this step was to remove each individual respondent from 
the VDC score to more accurately assess the contribution of views of others in the 
VDC to individual views. The resulting score was then dichotomised so that it was 
coded 1 for all respondents who lived in a VDC with a VDC-level legitimacy score 
above the sample mean, and was coded 0 if the score was below the sample mean. 
 
 124 
Social interaction model specification 
Durlauf (2001) demonstrated that endogenous social effects are estimable in nonlinear 
models and can be represented by the group mean outcome. The latter represents a 
rational   actor’s   beliefs   about   the   choices   other   actors   have   made,   given   her  
information set. This expected average choice effect is weighted by the magnitude of 
direct interactions she has with these actors and is independent of individual 
preferences, attributes, and exogenous group characteristics. Following Durlauf 
(2001) and McQuestion (2003), I use maximum likelihood to fit the following two-
level random intercept logistic model: 
 
 
 
where   πij is the probability that respondent i in cluster j experiences legitimacy 
outcome yij, εij is an individual error term, and β2 and β1 are parameters measuring, 
respectively, the social interaction effect and individual effects due to covariates Xij. 
β0j is a random cluster-level intercept, ϒ00 and ϒ01 are parameters, z1j is a dummy 
variable and u0j is a cluster-level random effect. As explained above, this non-self 
mean measure avoids the bias that could result from having the same participant’s 
outcomes on both sides of the equation. 
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The analytical strategy is to identify the random effect (McQuestion, 2003). If u0j is 
insignificant in this model there is no VDC-level autocorrelation of that behavior. If 
the non-self mean measure is insignificant then there are no substantive grounds for 
inferring an endogenous social effect. However, if both u0j and β2 are significant and 
if u0 diminishes when WYj-iϑ is added to the model, then, by deduction, the revealed 
behaviors of others explain some of the clustering of outcome Y in that VDC. Such a 
finding would support a theory in which social norms or related endogenous social 
processes determine individual legitimacy outcomes. 
 
 
Summary 
This chapter has detailed the methodology employed in the present study, including 
the pilot test, wave I data collection, wave II data collection, and the data analysis 
strategy used in the next chapters. As this study involves transferring scales that have 
previously only been validated in developed peacetime contexts, special care was 
required in conducting this fieldwork. Lessons from the pilot test contributed to the 
reliability and validity of wave I and II data. Next, chapter 5 describes analyses 
conducted with the wave 1 data, while chapter 6 describes analyses conducted with 
the wave II data.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: WAVE I RESULTS 
 
In the literature review chapter of this thesis, a three-component theoretical model 
was developed, describing the antecedents of legitimacy in post-conflict societies. 
The first component compares instrumental and procedural predictors of perceived 
post-conflict government legitimacy and proposes moderators of these relationships. 
The second component describes the effects of various group influences operating in 
Nepalese society, and their influence over government legitimacy. The third 
component proposes a social interaction effect on legitimacy perceptions.  
 
This chapter presents the results of the nationwide data collection in Nepal to test the 
model. Multivariate OLS regression models were estimated for each component of 
the theoretical model, and will be presented in turn below. The data presented in this 
chapter was collected during the first wave of fieldwork in 2012. Data collected 
during the second wave of fieldwork is presented in chapter six. 
 
 
Section 1: Instrumental and procedural sources of government legitimacy 
 
The first component of the theoretical model compares procedural and instrumental 
predictors of legitimacy. Procedural justice is the perception that the government 
makes decisions fairly, acts with neutrality, and treats citizens with dignity and 
respect. Government performance measures the perceived ability of the government 
to provide services and govern effectively. Outcome favourability refers to the 
perception that government resources are favourable personally, and distributive 
justice refers to the perception that resources are distributed fairly across society. The 
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proposed moderators (Baron & Kenny, 1986) of the relationship between procedural 
justice and legitimacy include strength of identification (at both the caste/ethnic and 
national Nepali level), perceived caste/ethnic group power, and law legitimacy (the 
perception that the nation’s laws are rightful and ought to be obeyed).  This model 
controls for age, sex, income, marital status, education, heterogeneity of village 
settlement, and voting intentions. Missing data were excluded list-wise, and the data 
were inspected for outliers, though none were deleted. All IVs and DVs were 
measured on a scale of 1-5 and were grand-mean centred prior to being entered into 
the regression models. Table 1 presents the un-centred means of all the component 
one IVs and DVs, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations between all the 
variables.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations, component one 
 
                            M(SD) Caste/ethnic ID Nepali ID Group 
power 
Government 
performance 
Outcome 
favourabil
ity 
Distributi
ve Justice 
Law 
Legitimacy 
Procedura
l Justice 
Legitimacy 
Caste/ethnic ID 
4.46 
(.89) 
- .35** -.01 .03        .06  -.01        -.01 .09** .01 
Nepali ID 
4.50 
(.79) 
 
- .07 -.04 -.13** -.02           .12** -.03 -.04 
Group power 
2.62 
(1.23) 
  
- -.02 .14** -.04   .25** .10** .13** 
Government 
performance 
2.85 
(.96) 
   
- .26** .07* .03 .35** .42** 
Outcome 
favourability 
1.94 
(.78) 
    
- .07* .03 .37** .41** 
Distributive 
Justice 
2.76 
(1.24) 
     
- -.17** .10** .12** 
Law Legitimacy 
4.01 
(1.01) 
      
- .00 .12** 
Procedural 
Justice 
2.12 
(.86) 
       
- .50** 
Legitimacy 
2.45 
(.89) 
 
  
.129** .418** .408** -.157** .121** .499** - 
Note. 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
M= mean; SD = standard deviation 
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Descriptive statistics show high levels of identification at both the caste/ethnic (M = 
4.46) and national (M = 4.50) levels, though mean perceptions of caste/ethnic group 
power are moderate (M = 2.62) (Table 1). Legitimacy scores are below the numeric 
midpoint on the 1-5 scale (M = 2.25), indicating that overall, citizens have a low 
perception   of   the   Nepal   government’s   legitimacy.   Procedural justice scores are also 
below the midpoint (M = 2.12),  indicating  low  perceptions  of  the  government’s  ability  
to make decisions fairly and treat people with respect. Scores on the instrumental 
variables indicated similar mean perceptions of distributive justice (M = 2.76) and 
government performance (M = 2.85), with outcome favourability lower (M = 1.94). 
Among the IVs, citizens reported the highest satisfaction with the legitimacy of the 
laws (M = 4.01). Legitimacy was positively correlated with the main IVs, particularly 
procedural justice (r =.50), government performance (r =.42), and outcome 
favourability (r =.41). Legitimacy was also positively correlated with perceived 
caste/ethnic group power (r  =.13), though not with strength of caste/ethnic or national 
identification. Caste/ethnic identification and national identification were also 
significantly correlated (r =.35), and there were moderate correlations between some 
IVs, particularly procedural justice and outcome favourability (r =.37), as well as 
procedural justice and government performance (r =.35). 
 
Next, the effects of procedural justice, government performance, outcome favourability, 
and distributive justice on legitimacy were estimated using OLS regression. The model 
also tested for the moderating effects of caste/ethnic group power, law legitimacy, 
caste/ethnic and national identification. That is, whether the strength of relationship 
between procedural justice and legitimacy is enhanced or undermined by these 
variables. Finally, the moderating effect of caste/ethnic and national identification on 
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the relationship between distributive justice and legitimacy was also estimated. All IVs 
and moderators were grand mean-centred, and control variable categories were 
dummy-coded. Table 2 presents the final model of the regression.  
 
Table 2. Wave 1 final model moderated OLS regression, component one – legitimacy 
regressed on IVs and interaction terms.  
      
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001  
B= unstandardized OLS regression coefficient, SE B = standard error, B = standardised OLS 
regression coefficient, t = t-value   
Model adjusted for: Age, Sex, Income, Marital Status, Regional Heterogeneity, Voting intentions, 
Education. See methods chapter for descriptions of these variables. 
 
(Constant) 
B 
2.80 
SE B  
.14 
  β   t 
20.316 
Government Performance .23 .02 .25 9.806** 
Outcome favorability .23 .03 .21 7.997** 
Distributive Justice .06 .02 .08 3.215** 
Law Legitimacy .12 .02 .14 5.474** 
Procedural Justice .30 .03 .29 10.619** 
Caste/ethnic ID -.06 .03 -.06 -2.292* 
Nepali ID .05 .03 .04 1.736 
Power .01 .02 .02 .791 
 
Procedural justice x 
Law Legitimacy 
.08 .03 .08 3.223** 
Procedural Justice x 
Power 
-.06 .02 -.07 -3.070* 
Procedural justice x 
Caste/ethnic ID 
-.05 .03 -.04 -1.580 
Procedural justice x 
Nepali ID 
.09 .04 .06 2.309* 
Distributive justice x 
Caste/ethnic ID 
.06 .02 .07 3.188** 
Distributive justice x 
Nepali ID 
-.02 .03 -.01 -.555 
                                                                                 R2 = .39               n=1,169 
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The final model accounted for 39% of the variance in government legitimacy [F(28, 
1169) = 27.70, p < .001, R2 = .39].  Given that the IVs displayed moderate zero-order 
correlations, the data were tested for evidence of multicollinearity. Tolerance and VIF 
were acceptable for each IV (tolerance scores ranged from .701-.961), ruling out 
potential problems with multicollinearity (as described in the previous chapter; 
O’Brian  2007). Residuals were normally distributed, though there was some evidence 
of heteroscedasticity. 
 
Net of the other variables, the variable most predictive of government legitimacy was 
procedural justice (β=.29, p <.001). When procedural justice was added to the model, 
R2 increased from .308 to .380, explaining an additional 8% of variance in the model. 
Of the three instrumental variables tested in this model, government performance was 
the most predictive of legitimacy, though less so than procedural justice (β=.25, p 
<.001). Outcome favourability also positively predicted legitimacy (β=.21, p <.001), 
followed by distributive justice (β=  .08, p <.001). Law legitimacy positively predicted 
legitimacy and was in the middle of the instrumental variables in terms of predictive 
value (β=   .14, p <.001). Strength of national Nepali identification was not directly 
associated with legitimacy (β=   .04, p=.083), though strength of caste/ethnic 
identification negatively predicted legitimacy (β=   -.06, p <.05). Perceived power of 
one’s  caste/ethnic group was not predictive of legitimacy (β=  .02, p=.429).  
 
Four of the six interaction terms were significant: procedural justice × law legitimacy 
(β=.08, p <.001); procedural justice × power (β=   -.07, p <.01); procedural justice × 
national identification (β=.06, p= <.05); and distributive justice × caste/ethnic 
identification (β=  08, p <.001). Procedural justice × caste/ethnic identification did not 
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reach significance (β=   -.04, p=.114), nor did distributive justice × national 
identification (β=   -.01, p=.579). Significant interactions will be explored in separate 
sections below. 
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Procedural justice × law legitimacy  
The interaction between procedural justice and law legitimacy was significant (β=  .08, 
p < .001). Simple slopes analysis revealed that when procedural justice is low (-1SD), 
the slope of law legitimacy  is  insignificant,  β=  .05 p =.105, whereas when procedural 
justice is high (+1SD), the slope of law legitimacy  is  significant,  β =.20, p <.001. By 
way of illustrating the interaction, plots were created using high and low values (1SD 
above and below the mean) of the IV and moderator (Figure 8).  
 
 
Figure 8. Adjusted OLS model estimating the effect of law legitimacy on the 
relationship between procedural justice and legitimacy. High and low values are 
defined as plus or minus one standard deviation from the mean. The interaction 
illustrated in this figure is significant (p<.001, n=1,169)   
 
That is, when procedural justice is high, the perception of the state’s   laws   as 
legitimate will increase overall perceptions that the government is legitimate. When 
procedural justice is low, there is no benefit provided by legitimate laws. That is law 
legitimacy will not enhance the perceived legitimacy of the government in the 
absence of procedural justice.  
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Procedural justice × power  
This analysis tested whether the relationship between procedural justice and 
legitimacy  varied  according   to   the  perceived  power   that  citizens’  caste/ethnic  group  
wielded in Nepalese society. The interaction   term   was   significant,   β=-.07, p <.01, 
indicating that group power was a moderator of the procedural justice/legitimacy 
relationship. By way of illustrating the interaction, plots were created using high and 
low values (2SD above and below the mean) of the IV and moderator (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 9. Perceived caste/ethnic group power moderates the relationship between 
procedural justice and legitimacy. High and low values are defined as plus or minus 
two standard deviations from the mean. The interaction illustrated in this figure is 
significant (p <.05; n=1,169).   
  
Simple slopes analysis revealed that when power was perceived to be low (-1SD), the 
simple slope of procedural  justice  was  stronger  (β=.36, p <.001) than when power was 
high   (β=.26, p <.001). That is, the relationship between procedural justice and 
legitimacy was stronger for citizens who perceived that their group had low power in 
Nepalese society.  
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Further probing of the interaction revealed that when procedural justice was low (-
1SD), legitimacy was higher for high power groups than low power groups, β=.06, p 
<.05. However, when procedural justice was high, group power was not statistically 
significant,  β=-.02, p=.510. 
 
In summary, after adjusting for the other variables in the model, citizens who 
perceived that their caste/ethnic groups had low power reacted more negatively to 
procedural injustice than citizens who perceived their group had higher power.  
However, there was no difference in legitimacy perceptions between high and low 
power groups when procedural justice was high. This analysis speaks to the salience 
of procedural injustice for low power groups.  
 
Procedural justice × identification 
 
The interaction between procedural justice and caste/ethnic identification did not 
reach statistical significance,   β=-.04, p =.114; however, the interaction between 
procedural justice and Nepali identification  was  significant,  β=.06, p <.001. In other 
words, the relationship between procedural justice and legitimacy depends on citizens’ 
strength of identification with the national Nepali group, but not their caste/ethnic 
group. 
 
Simple slopes analysis revealed that the relationship between procedural justice and 
legitimacy is stronger for high national   identifiers   (+1SD),  β  =.40, p <.01, than low 
national identifiers (-1SD),  β  =.30, p <.01. By way of illustrating the interaction, plots 
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were created using high and low values (1SD above and below the mean) of the IV 
and moderator (Figure 10). 
 
Figure 10. Relationship between procedural justice and legitimacy moderated by 
strength of identification as Nepali. High and low values are defined as plus or minus 
one standard deviation from the mean. The interaction illustrated in this figure is 
statistically significant (p <.05, n=1,169).   
 
 
This analysis reveals that the relationship between procedural justice and legitimacy is 
stronger for citizens who strongly identify at the national (Nepali) level, whereas 
strength of caste/ethnic identification does not affect the relationship between 
procedural justice and legitimacy.  
 
 
Distributive justice ×identification 
The interaction between distributive justice and Nepali identification was non-
significant,  β=-.02, p =.579, whereas the interaction between distributive justice and 
caste/ethnic identification   was   significant   β=.08, p <.001. That is, the relationship 
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between   distributive   justice   and   legitimacy   depends   on   citizen’s   strength   of  
identification with their caste/ethnic group, but not the national Nepali group.  
 
Simple slopes analysis revealed that when caste/ethnic identification was low (-1SD), 
the simple slope of distributive justice was non-significant,   β=.01, p=.828. In other 
words, there was no relationship between distributive justice and legitimacy for 
citizens with low caste/ethnic identification. When caste/ethnic identification was 
high (+1SD), the simple slope was   significantly   positive,   β=.14, p <.001, meaning 
that the relationship between distributive justice and legitimacy was significant. By 
way of illustrating the interaction, plots were created using high and low values (1SD 
above and below the mean) of the IV and moderator (Figure 11). 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Caste/ethnic identification moderates the relationship between distributive 
justice and legitimacy. High and low values are defined as plus or minus one 
standard deviation from the mean. The interaction illustrated in this figure is 
significant (p <.001, n=1,169).   
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Further probing of the interaction revealed that when distributive justice was low (-
1SD), citizens who identified strongly with their caste/ethnic group perceived the 
government to be less legitimate than citizens with weaker caste/ethnic identification, 
β=.10, p <.05. When distributive justice was high (+1SD), there was no difference 
between high and low caste/ethnic identification β=.02, p=.632. 
 
In summary, citizens who reported high caste/ethnic identification also reported a 
drop in perceived legitimacy when distributive injustice was perceived, but this was 
not the case for citizens who were low in caste/ethnic identification. 
 
With regards to component one of the proposed government legitimacy model, 
analysis in this section revealed that procedural justice was more predictive of 
legitimacy than every instrumental variable in the model, although the instrumental 
variables did weakly predict legitimacy after adjusting for the other variables in the 
model. As expected, this relationship was moderated by identification, power, and law 
legitimacy. Specifically, the relationship between procedural justice and legitimacy 
was stronger when both reported law legitimacy and procedural justice were high, but 
law legitimacy was not associated with higher legitimacy when procedural justice was 
low. Next, the relationship between procedural justice and legitimacy was stronger for 
citizens who felt their group had lower power, as they reacted more strongly to 
perceived procedural injustice. Finally, the relationship between procedural justice 
and legitimacy was stronger when citizens identified more strongly at the national 
level, and the relationship between distributive justice and legitimacy was stronger 
when citizens identified more strongly at the caste/ethnic level.  
 
Analysis of component two of the model will now be presented.  
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Section 2: Voice, influence, and legitimacy in the post-conflict state  
 
Component two addresses the role of citizen voice and group trust and influence in 
predicting legitimacy. In this component of the legitimacy model, voice (i.e., citizens’  
perception that they have the ability to provide input into government decision-
making) is expected to positively predict legitimacy. Further, this component 
measures perceptions of local (i.e., Nepali) and foreign group influence over the 
government, and their effect on legitimacy. Perceptions of local group trust and 
influence are composite measures combining ratings of influence of several Nepalese 
groups (e.g., Hill Caste, Terai Madhesi Janajati, Muslims). Perceptions of foreign 
trust and influence are composite measures comprising influence ratings of relevant 
foreign groups (e.g., India, the UN, the US, INGOs, China).  
 
A moderated multiple regression model tests these relationships, firstly for the direct 
effects of the IVs, as well as for a possible moderation effect of the foreign group 
legitimacy – specifically, the legitimacy relationship by perceived caste/ethnic group 
power. The model controls for age, sex, income, marital status, education, 
heterogeneity of village settlement, and voting intentions. All IVs and moderators 
were grand mean-centred, and control variable categories were dummy-coded. 
Missing data were excluded case-wise, and the data were inspected for outliers, 
though none were deleted. Table 3 presents the uncentred means of all component one 
IVs and DVs, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations between all variables. 
Table 4 presents the final model of the regression.  
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations for all component two IVs and DVs 
 
 
 
Voice 
 
M (SD) 
 
 
2.18 (.75) 
Voice 
 
          
     - 
Nepal group 
trust 
 
.17*** 
Foreign group 
trust 
 
.13** 
Nepal group 
influence 
 
                   .17** 
.Foreign group 
influence 
 
.17** 
            Power 
. 
 
.24** 
Legitimacy 
 
 
.21** 
Nepal group 
trust 
2.76 
(.84)  - .38
** .42** .15** .010 .17** 
Foreign group trust 
2.68 
(.85)   - .11
** .38** .013 .12** 
Nepal group 
influence 
2.68 
(.69)    - .39
** .14** .19** 
Foreign group 
influence 
2.86 
(.74)     - .10
** .10** 
Power 
 
2.62 
(1.23) 
     - .13** 
Legitimacy 
 
2.46 (.90) 
 
      - 
Note.  
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
M= mean; SD = standard deviation 
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First, citizens reported greater trust in local groups (M=2.76) than foreign groups 
(M=2.68). Conversely, they reported greater average foreign group influence (M=2.86) 
over the government than local groups influence (M=2.68).   Citizens’   perception   of  
voice (i.e., their personal ability to provide input into decision-making, M=2.18) was 
below the scale midpoint and lower than their ratings of group influences. Trust ratings 
were significantly correlated, in that people who trusted local groups also tended to 
trust foreign groups (r =.38). Additionally, people who perceived high influence of 
local groups also perceived higher influence of foreign groups (r =.39). The more 
power citizens perceived their caste/ethnic group to have, the more personal voice they 
believed they experienced (r =.24). Perceived voice was also positively associated with 
the perceived influence of local groups (r =.14) and foreign groups (r =.13). 
Legitimacy was significantly positively correlated with all IVs and moderators. Next, a 
moderated multivariate OLS regression was performed to analyse the unique 
contribution of each variable in predicting government legitimacy. 
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Table 4. Component two, final OLS regression model predicting legitimacy 
  
*p<.05, **p<.001, ***p<.001 
 
B= unstandardized OLS regression coefficient, SE B = standard error, B = standardised OLS regression 
coefficient, t = t-value. Model adjusted for: Age, Sex, Income, Marital Status, Regional Heterogeneity, Voting 
intentions, Education. See methods chapter for descriptions of these variables.  
 
The final model accounted for 15.5% of the variance in government legitimacy, 
[F(1197) = 7.063, p < .001, R2 = .155].  Tolerance and VIF were acceptable for each 
IV (tolerance scores ranged from .701-.961), ruling out potential issues of 
multicollinearity. Residuals were normally distributed, though there was some 
evidence of heteroscedasticity.  
 
 
 
B 
 
SE B 
 
B 
 
t 
(Constant) .09 .22  .386 
Voice .17 .04 .15 4.102** 
Power .08 .02 .11 3.265** 
Nepal trust .09 .04 .08 2.018* 
Foreign trust .08 .04 .08 2.093* 
Nepal influence .13 .05 .11 2.725* 
Foreign influence -.03 .04 -.03 -.845 
 
Power × voice 
 
.01 
 
.03 
 
.02 
 
.521 
Power × Nepal  
group trust 
.04 .03 .05 1.297 
Power × Nepal  
group influence 
-.07 .03 -.08 -2.016* 
Power × foreign  
group trust 
.01 .03 .01 .268 
Power × foreign  
group influence 
-.09 .03 -.12 -3.179* 
                                                                           R2 = .155         n=1,197 
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The variable most predictive of government legitimacy was voice (β=.15, p <.001). 
Trust in both local groups (β=.08, p <.05) and foreign groups (β=.08, p <.05) equally 
positively predicted legitimacy. The perceived influence of local groups also positively 
predicted legitimacy overall (β=  .11, p <.01). However the perception of foreign group 
influence was not associated with legitimacy in either direction (β=  -.03, p=.399).  
 
Two of the five interaction terms were significant: power × Nepal group influence 
(β=.-.08, p <.05) and power × foreign  group  influence  (β=  -.12, p <.01). Power × voice, 
power × Nepal group trust, and power × foreign group trust, did not reach significance. 
Significant interactions are discussed in detail below.   
 
 
Group influences × caste/ethnic group power 
 
The first analysis tested whether the relationship between local influence and 
legitimacy varied according   to   the  perceived  power  of  one’s   caste/ethnic   group.  The  
interaction   term   was   significant,   β=-.07, p <.01, indicating that group power was a 
moderator of the local influence/legitimacy relationship. By way of illustrating the 
interaction, plots were created using high and low values (1SD above and below the 
mean) of the IV and moderator (Figure 12).  
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Figure 12. Perceptions of local group influence on legitimacy, moderated by 
caste/ethnic group power. High and low values are defined as plus or minus one 
standard deviation from the mean. The interaction illustrated in this figure is 
significant (p<.001, n=1,197).   
 
 
Simple slopes analysis revealed that when caste/ethnic group power was high, (+1SD), 
the simple slope of local influence was non-significant  (β=.02, p=.745). In other words, 
there was no relationship between local influence and legitimacy for citizens from 
high-power caste/ethnic groups. When power was low (-1SD), the simple slope was 
significantly   positive,   β=.20, p <.001, meaning that the relationship between local 
influence and legitimacy was positive for low-power citizens. In summary, the 
perception of local Nepali influence positively affected perceptions of legitimacy for 
low-power, but not high-power groups.  
 
By contrast, the influence of foreign groups affected low and high power citizens in the 
opposite direction. By way of illustrating the interaction, plots were created using high 
and low values (1SD above and below the mean) of the IV and moderator (Figure 13).  
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Figure 13. The relationship between perceived foreign influence and legitimacy 
moderated by caste/ethnic group power. High and low values are defined as plus or 
minus one standard deviation from the mean. The interaction illustrated in this figure 
is significant (p <.05, n=1,197).   
 
When power was low, perception of foreign influences did not affect government 
legitimacy (β=.05, p=.250), whereas when power was high, perception of foreign 
influence decreased the legitimacy   of   the   government   (β=-.12, p<.01). That is, the 
perception of foreign influence over the government negatively affected legitimacy for 
high-power, but not low-power citizens.  
 
In   summing  up   analysis   revealed   that   two   elements   of   ‘local   ownership’– voice and 
local trust and influence – were positively associated with legitimacy as expected. 
Foreign influence, however, was not directly associated. Further, the relationship 
between influence and legitimacy was moderated by perceived group power. High 
power groups perceived lower legitimacy when foreign group influence was perceived 
to be high, and low-power groups perceived lower legitimacy when local influence 
was perceived to be low.  
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Summary of Wave 1 results 
 
The first stage of analysis in this chapter compared instrumental and procedural predictors of 
legitimacy. Results revealed that judgments of procedural justice strongly influenced 
government legitimacy, resulting in higher coefficients than any of the instrumental variables 
included in the model (i.e., government performance, outcome favourability, and distributive 
justice). Government performance (i.e., the perception that the government can provide 
services and govern effectively) was also strongly influential. Procedural justice also 
interacted with a number of variables that moderated the strength of the relationship between 
procedural justice and legitimacy. The perception of having low caste/ethnic group power 
increased the strength of the relationship between procedural justice and legitimacy, as did 
the level of national identification. Strong caste/ethnic identification also increased the 
strength of the relationship between distributive justice and legitimacy. Results showed that 
law legitimacy had little influence on perceptions of government legitimacy in the absence of 
procedural justice beliefs. 
 
The second component explored the effects of group influences and caste/ethnic group power 
on legitimacy. Findings in this chapter demonstrated that voice (i.e., the perception that 
citizens could influence the decision-making processes of the government) was the strongest 
predictor in the model. An aggregate measure of the influence of various local caste/ethnic 
groups on legitimacy was also significant, and I found that this relationship was moderated 
by perceived group power. That is, legitimacy scores for high-power caste/ethnic groups were 
not influenced by a perceived lack of local group influence, whereas for groups with low 
power, less influence by local groups significantly decreased perceptions of government 
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but this relationship was also moderated by caste/ethnic group power, in that the perception 
of foreign influence over the government negatively affected legitimacy for high-power, but 
not low-power citizens.  
 
The next chapter describes the results of the second wave of fieldwork (conducted in 2013; 
see methods chapter for details). In that chapter, a new and more specific measure of 
government performance is introduced to the component 1 model, and a multilevel model is 
used to examine contextual effects of nested groups in the wave II sample.    
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CHAPTER SIX: WAVE II RESULTS 
 
The current chapter presents results from the second wave of data collection in three parts. 
Section 1 presents an analysis of the relationship between service delivery and legitimacy. 
Section 2 presents an analysis of the relationship between criminal justice and local political 
institutions and central government legitimacy. Section 3 presents the analysis of a social 
interaction effects. The data analysis strategy for each of these sections was described in 
chapter 4.  
 
The analyses presented in this chapter also introduce extra control variables into the 
regression models. First, although the best effort was made in the fieldwork to match 
enumerators and participants along caste/ethnic and gender lines, with over 300 caste and 
ethnic groups the heterogeneity of Nepalese society meant exact matching was not always 
possible. Although the study procedures and caste/ethnic mix of the enumerators could not be 
altered for wave II data collection, two questions were introduced in the survey so that effects 
produced by incongruences in caste/ethnic and gender matching (for example, socially 
desirable responses) could be statistically controlled. At the end of each completed survey, 
enumerators were asked to rate how close they and the participant were in terms of 
caste/ethnicity (response categories ranging from 1= Not at all to 5= Entirely), and whether 
they were the same gender as the participant. These ratings were then entered into the models 
as control variables. Additionally, the models presented in this chapter   include  participants’  
ratings of the level of civil unrest (defined for participants as protests, political action, strikes, 
or violence) in their region in the previous year. Given security is a priority of post-conflict 
governments (Brinkerhoff 2007; see chapter 2), it is possible that immediate security threats 
undermine the legitimacy of the government directly, introducing systematic bias into the 
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sample. Introducing a measure of regional violence ensures that immediate security threats, 
which may undermine the legitimacy of the government in some regions but not others, are 
also statistically controlled.  
 
 
Section 1: Service delivery and legitimacy 
 
The previous chapter presented results from the first wave of data collection, and revealed 
that procedural justice is the strongest predictor of post-conflict government legitimacy. 
Government performance, however, also strongly predicted legitimacy in the models. The 
first section of this chapter explores the relationship between government performance and 
legitimacy in greater detail. The scale used to measure government performance in wave 1 
was a two-item  scale  assessing  respondents’  views  about  the  government’s  ability  to  provide  
services  to  the  citizens  of  Nepal,  and  whether  the  government  was  ‘able  to  govern  effectively’  
(see Appendix D, Items 27 and 28). The literature reviewed in chapter 2 on government 
performance in the field of statebuilding places a particular emphasis on the delivery of basic 
services as an antecedent of state legitimacy (e.g., Carpenter, Slater, and Mallet 2012). 
Empirical studies in this area will often target the provision of a particular service and its 
effect on legitimacy, for example, the relationship between the delivery of water services and 
government legitimacy (e.g., see Brinkerhoff 2012). More generally, the statebuilding 
literature on legitimacy in fragile and conflict-affected states has called for a more rigorous 
empirical approach to examining the relationship between service delivery and state 
legitimacy (Brinkerhoff, Wetterberg, & Dunn 2012; McLoughlin 2014).  
 
One potential methodological critique of the comparison between instrumental and 
procedural predictors of legitimacy, examined in wave I (see chapter 5), is that the scale used 
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to measure government performance was too broad and abstract. The ability of the 
government to provide basic housing for citizens is likely to have a different effect on 
legitimacy than the ability to manage the economy, and asking citizens to provide a blanket 
rating of service delivery may have weakened the wave 1 effect of performance on legitimacy. 
Thus, one aim of the wave 2 data collection was to improve the measure of government 
performance in case the comparatively strong procedural justice effect was the product of 
measurement error. Perceptions of the ability of the Nepalese government to provide eight 
core government services (Brinkerhoff 2012) were measured during the Wave 2 data 
collection: basic infrastructure (e.g., roads, electricity), food, housing, health services, 
education, crime control (and/or security), economic management, and employment (see 
Appendix E, Items 23-32). This chapter first describes the results of a replication of the 
Component 1 OLS regression model with these specific government services entered into the 
model separately and compares this to perceptions of procedural justice in predicting 
government legitimacy (section 1).  
 
The analysis presented in this section also aims to measure the effect of specific government 
services on the perception of legitimacy. Participants completed ratings of the ability of the 
government to provide each service in the wave 2 survey. All IVs and DVs were measured on 
a scale of 1-5 and were grand-mean centred prior to being entered into the regression models. 
Missing data was excluded list-wise, and the data was inspected for outliers, though none 
were deleted. Table 5 presents the un-centred means of all component one IVs and DVs, 
standard deviations, and zero-order correlations between all variables. The regression model 
controls for age, sex, income, marital status, education, heterogeneity of village settlement, 
and voting intentions. Participant/enumerator caste/ethnic and gender congruency, and 
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regional civil unrest, were also entered as control variables and are presented along with other 
IVs in Table 6.  
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Table 5. Uncentred means of all IVs and DV, plus zero-order correlations, N=1137  
Note. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
 Mean 
(SD) 
Legiti
macy 
Caste/ 
ethnic 
ID 
Nepali 
ID 
Procedu
ral 
justice 
Distribut
ive 
justice 
Outcome 
favourabi
lity 
Law 
Legitim
acy 
Basic 
infrastruc
ture 
Food Housing Health Education Crime Economy 
 
Legitimacy 
 
2.51 
(.95) 
 
- 
 
.04 
 
-.01 
 
.55** 
 
.10* 
 
.42** 
 
.29** 
 
.30** 
 
.25** 
 
.23** 
 
.31** 
 
.30** 
 
.27** 
 
.17** 
 
Caste/ethnic 
ID 
 
4.28 
(.98) 
  
- 
 
.28** 
 
.02 
 
-.06* 
 
.01 
 
.14** 
 
-.10** 
 
-.12** 
 
-.10** 
 
-.08** 
 
-.01 
 
-.09** 
 
-.08** 
 
Nepali ID 
 
4.68 
(.62) 
   
- 
 
.00 
 
-.04 
 
-.09** 
 
.10** 
 
-.09** 
 
 
-.08** 
 
-.08** 
 
-.06** 
 
-.03 
 
-.08** 
 
-.09** 
 
Procedural 
justice 
 
2.16 
(.84) 
    
- 
 
.10** 
 
.41** 
 
.16** 
 
.23** 
 
.19** 
 
.15** 
 
.21** 
 
.17** 
 
.17** 
 
.16** 
 
Distributive 
justice 
 
2.91 
(1.10) 
     
- 
 
.01 
 
-.10** 
 
.07** 
 
.03 
 
.03 
 
.08** 
 
.05 
 
.09** 
 
.08** 
 
Outcome 
Favourability 
 
2.08 
(.78) 
      
- 
 
.16** 
 
.22** 
 
.18** 
 
.18** 
 
.20** 
 
.17** 
 
.19** 
 
.18** 
Law 
Legitimacy 
 
4.08 
(.99) 
       
- 
 
.23** 
 
.23** 
 
.24** 
 
.31** 
 
.35** 
 
.27** 
 
.26 
 
Basic 
infrastructure 
 
3.03 
(1.21) 
        
- 
 
.71** 
 
.67** 
 
.71** 
 
.62** 
 
.58** 
 
.57** 
 
Food 
 
2.61 
(1.23) 
         
- 
 
.88** 
 
.74** 
 
.60** 
 
.63** 
 
.66** 
Housing 2.59 
(1.26) 
          
- 
 
.75** 
 
.61** 
 
.64** 
 
.69** 
 
Health 2.96 
(1.19) 
           
- 
 
.75** 
 
.62** 
 
 
.65** 
Education 3.15 
(1.14) 
           - .61** .61** 
Crime 2.50 
(1.22) 
            - .75** 
Economy 2.41 
(1.19) 
             - 
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It is interesting to note that the mean for the legitimacy outcome variable in wave II is 2.51, 
unchanged from estimate in wave I. The mean of the main model IVs also remain largely similar 
between the wave one and two surveys. Uncentred means of the service variables indicate ratings 
below the numerical scale midpoint of 3, with the highest rating of government performance 
being education (M=3.15). Ratings of individual services were highly correlated, and all were 
positively correlated with legitimacy. Next, the effects of procedural justice, outcome 
favourability, distributive justice, identification, and the service variables on legitimacy were 
estimated using OLS regression. All IVs were grand mean-centred, and control variable 
categories were dummy-coded. Table 6 presents the final model of the regression.  
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Table 10. Adjusted OLS model regressing legitimacy on main model IVs with additional variables of government services 
 B Std. Error Beta  t  
Additional control 
variables 
 
 
Participant/enumerator congruency 
 
-.01 
 
.02 
 
-.02 
 
-.72 
Participant/enumerator gender 
congruency 
-.02 .04 -.01 -.45 
Regional civil unrest .01 .02 .01 .22 
 
 
Main model replication 
 
 
Caste/ethnic ID 
 
.01 
 
.02 
 
.01 
 
.49 
Nepali ID -.01 .04 -.01 -.35 
Procedural justice .46 .03 .40 15.49** 
 
Distributive justice .06 .02 .07 2.83** 
Outcome favourability .23 .03 .19 7.38** 
Law Legitimacy .15 .02 .16 6.27** 
 
 
Basic infrastructure 
 
.06 
 
.03 
 
.07 
 
2.12* 
Food .00 .04 .00 -.04 
Housing -.01 .04 -.01 -.23 
New performance 
variables 
Health .05 .04 .06 1.41 
Education .05 .03 .06 1.74 
Crime .04 .03 .04 1.23 
 
Economy .02 .03 .02 .53 
Employment .08 .03 .10 3.10** 
 
 
R2=.446** 
 
 
 
N=1137 
  
Note. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
B= unstandardized OLS regression coefficient, SE B = standard error, B = standardised OLS regression coefficient, t = t-value.   
Model adjusted for: Age, Sex, Income, Marital Status, Regional Heterogeneity, Voting Intentions, and Education.  
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The final model accounted for 44.6% of the variance in government legitimacy, [F(31, 1110) = 
28.03, p < .001, R2 = .446].  Despite moderate bivariate correlations among IVs, tolerance and 
VIF statistics were within an acceptable range (VIF of less than 10 indicates that 
multicollinearity is not a problem; Farrar & Glauber, 1967; O’Brian, 2007). Residuals were 
normally distributed, indicating the multicollinearity was not unduly influencing the model.  
 
Four main points can be taken from this analysis. First, the main effects presented in chapter 5 
remained stable between Wave 1 and Wave 2. Each of the predictors that were significant in 
Wave 1 are also significant, and to a similar degree, in Wave 2. The replication of main effects 
provides evidence for the reliability of the data used in this project. Second, none of the 
additional control variables are significant. Although participants and enumerators were often 
from different caste/ethnic groups (the mean of the 1-5 caste/ethnic congruency rating was 2.25, 
with   enumerators   rating   themselves   as   ‘Not   at   all’   the   same  caste/ethnicity   as   the  participant  
46% of the time), this did not have a significant effect on the relationships tested in the model. 
Likewise, participants were only the same gender 53% of the time, but this also did not 
contribute to a significant amount of variance. Most participants felt that the level of civil 
unrest in their village was the same (35%) or slightly less (42.1%) than the previous year, with 
15% feeling   that   it   was   ‘slightly  more’   or   ‘much  more’.   These   ratings   did not significantly 
influence the model. 
 
Third, few of the individual government services significantly predicted legitimacy. Basic 
infrastructure was significantly predictive, as was the perceived ability of the government to 
provide employment for citizens. But these coefficients were smaller than any predictors in the 
main model (β=.06 and. β=.08, respectively), and no other government services were predictive. 
Finally, net of the specific service variables, procedural justice is still the strongest predictor of 
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legitimacy in this model. In fact, its unstandardized coefficient is even larger in this analysis 
than in Wave 1 (β=.30 in Wave 1 and β=.46 in Wave 2). In summary, individual government 
services do not appear to influence judgements of central government legitimacy for the most 
part, and improving and specifying the measurement of government performance does not 
diminish the effect of procedural justice on legitimacy.  
 
Section 2: Institutional trust and performance 
The second wave of fieldwork also aimed to address the role of different political institutions in 
influencing the legitimacy of the central government. In Nepal, citizens living outside of 
Kathmandu potentially have little to no contact with representatives of the government, and 
may have the perception that the central government has little influence over their lives. 
Previous research in the statebuilding literature has argued that positive encounters with 
government officials might enhance state legitimacy, particularly in post-conflict contexts 
where mistrust and fear of authorities are prevalent (Brinkerhoff, Wetterberg, and Dunn 2012). 
The importance of relational quality in procedurally just treatment makes this an especially 
pertinent investigation in the current project. That is, the question of interest is whether citizens 
are deriving their perceptions of central government procedural justice through their 
interactions with local authorities. In the Wave 2 survey, participants completed trust and 
performance ratings of several social and political institutions: their local government, police, 
Nepalese Army, the courts/judiciary, and Village Development Committees (VDCs).  
 
Thus, this analysis presented in section 2 aims to measure the effect of trust and institutional 
performance on the legitimacy of the central government. Participants completed ratings of 
their perceived trust and performance of five institutions: the local government, VDC, police, 
Army, and judiciary. All IVs and DVs were measured on a scale of 1-5 and were grand-mean 
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centred prior to being entered into the regression models. Missing data were excluded list-wise, 
and data were inspected for outliers, though none were deleted. Table 7 presents the un-centred 
means of all component one IVs and DVs, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations 
between all variables. Since correlations between main model variables were presented in 
Table 5, Table 7 only presents the new institutional trust and influence variables. As the 
individual service delivery items were largely non-significant in the previous model, for this 
analysis  they  were  combined  into  a  single  item  measuring  ‘government  performance’  with  high  
reliability (alpha = .938). The regression model presented in Table 8 controls for age, sex, 
income, marital status, education, heterogeneity of village settlement, and voting intentions. 
Participant/enumerator caste/ethnic and gender congruency, and regional civil unrest, were also 
entered as control variables and are presented along with other IVs in Table 8.  
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Table 7. Uncentred means of all IVs and DV and zero-order correlations between al variables, N=1098  
 
Note. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
 Mean 
(SD) 
Legiti
macy 
Gov 
Perform
ance 
Procedu
ral 
justice 
Trust 
local 
gov 
Trust 
VDC 
Trust 
police 
Trust 
Nepal 
Army 
Trust 
judiciar
y 
Perform 
local gov 
Perform 
VDC 
Perform 
police 
Perform 
Nepal 
Army 
Perform 
judiciary 
 
Legitimacy 
 
2.51 
(.95) 
 
- 
 
.33** 
 
.55** 
 
.22** 
 
.18** 
 
.33** 
 
.30** 
 
.35** 
 
.21** 
 
.20** 
 
.30** 
 
.27** 
 
.35** 
Gov 
Performance 
2.59 
(1.00) 
 - .22** .13** .09* .14** .11** .11** .11** .08** .20** .13** .11** 
Procedural 
justice 
2.16 
(1.01) 
  - .17** .13** .24** .22** .30** .20** .18** .23** .20** .30** 
Trust local gov 2.74 
(1.03) 
   - .77** .32** .26** .32** .74** 
 
.67** .28** .21** .27** 
Trust VDC 2.82 
(1.06) 
    - .30** .27** .36** .67** .74** .29** .21** .31** 
Trust police 2.94 
(1.10) 
     - .62** .43** .32** .32** .79** .49** .38** 
Trust Nepal 
Army 
3.39 
(1.13) 
      - .50** .26** .27** .55** .78** .44** 
Trust judiciary 3.15 
(1.24) 
       - .30** .38** .41** .48** .81** 
Perform local 
gov 
2.64 
(.96) 
        - .79** .36** .24** .32** 
Perform VDC 2.70 
(.983) 
         - .35** .26** .39** 
Perform police 2.92 
(1.05) 
          - .58** .43**  
Perform Nepal 
Army 
3.35 
(1.09) 
           - .54** 
Perform 
judiciary 
3.10 
(1.22) 
            - 
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Results demonstrate that Nepalese citizens hold the highest trust and performance perceptions 
of the Nepalese Army (M=3.39 and M=3.35, respectively). Local governments are trusted the 
least (M=2.74) and also receive the lowest performance ratings (M=2.64). All institutional 
trust and performance variables were highly intercorrelated, and were all correlated positively 
with legitimacy. Interestingly, although central government performance was significantly 
positively correlated with local institutional performance, the correlations were relatively low 
(r =.082  - .197). The relationship between procedural justice and local institutional trust was 
higher (r =.125 - .301). However the strongest bivariate relationships were observed within 
the institutional trust and performance variables (up to r =.785). Next, the effects of 
procedural justice, outcome favourability, distributive justice, identification, and the service 
variables on legitimacy were estimated using OLS regression. All IVs were grand mean-
centred, and control variable categories were dummy-coded. Table 12 presents the final 
model of the regression.  
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Table 8. Adjusted OLS model regressing legitimacy on main model IVs with additional variables 
of institutional trust and performance.   
 
 B Std. Error Beta            t 
 
 
 
(Constant) 
 
1.71 
 
.20 
  
8.707 
Participant/enumerator 
congruency 
.00 .02 .00 -.150 
Additional control 
variables 
Participant/enumerator 
gender congruency 
-.01 .04 .00 -.191 
Regional civil unrest -.02 .02 -.01 -.613 
 
 
Caste/ethnic ID 
 
.02 
 
.02 
 
.02 
 
.742 
Nepali ID -.08 .04 -.05 -2.008* 
Main model 
replication 
Procedural justice .40 .03 .35 13.388** 
Distributive justice .06 .02 .07 2.889* 
 Outcome favourability .19 .03 .15 5.861** 
Law Legitimacy .13 .03 .14 5.094** 
 
Central government 
performance 
.11 .03 .11 4.110** 
 
Local government trust 
 
.13 
 
.04 
 
.14 
 
3.409** 
Institutional  
trust 
VDC trust -.08 .04 -.09 -2.249* 
Police trust .09 .04 .11 2.634** 
 Nepalese army trust .08 .03 .09 2.308* 
Judiciary/courts trust .00 .03 .00 .073 
 
 
Local government 
performance 
 
.01 
 
.04 
 
.01 
 
.169 
VDC performance .03 .04 .03 .636 
Institutional 
performance 
Police performance -.03 .04 -.03 -.814 
Nepalese Army 
performance 
-.04 .04 -.04 -1.051 
 
Judiciary/courts 
performance 
.08 .03 .10 2.426* 
        R2=.475     N=1098 
    
 
 
 
 
Note. *p<.05, **p<.01, p<.001 B= unstandardized OLS regression coefficient, SE B = standard error, B = 
standardised OLS regression coefficient, t = t-value. Model adjusted for: Age, Sex, Income, Marital Status, Regional 
Heterogeneity, Voting Intentions, and Education.   
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The final model accounted for 47.5% of the variance in government legitimacy, [F(35, 1063) = 
27.52, p < .001, R2 = .475].  Despite strong bivariate intercorrelations of IVs, tolerance and VIF 
statistics were within an appropriate range and residuals were normally distributed, indicating 
that multicollinearity was not influencing the model outcome. As in the previous analysis, the 
main model effects of Wave 1 were replicated (i.e., a strong procedural justice coefficient, and 
smaller, but statistically significant, instrumental variable coefficients).  
 
Second, differences emerged between institutional trust and performance variables and their 
influence on legitimacy. Specifically, trust ratings of local institutions were largely positively 
associated with legitimacy (including the local government, police, and army). There were two 
exceptions to this pattern: VDC-level trust, which displayed a negative relationship with central 
government legitimacy; and the judiciary/courts, which showed no significant relationship. By 
contrast, institutional performance ratings largely showed little relationship with central 
government legitimacy. The exception to this pattern was again the judiciary/courts, which 
displayed a significant positive relationship with legitimacy (β= .08). That is, perceived 
performance (but not trust) of the judiciary/courts helps to predict the legitimacy of the central 
government.   
 
The final important finding from this analysis is the effect that local institutional trust and 
performance have on the regression coefficient of procedural justice. When trust and 
performance variables were entered hierarchically following the main predictors, addition of the 
institutional trust ratings reduced the procedural justice coefficient from .46 to .40. In the next 
step, the addition of institutional performance ratings further decreased the procedural justice 
coefficient to .40. However, despite the reduced coefficient, procedural justice remained the 
strongest predictor in the model.  
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In summary, net of the other variables,   citizen’s   trust   in   institutions   other   than   the   central  
government had a small influence on the perceived legitimacy of the central government. 
Performance of these institutions, however, largely did not influence legitimacy. Further, the 
addition of institutional trust and influence ratings only marginally reduced the effect of 
procedural justice on legitimacy, indicating that little of the effect of procedural justice on central 
government legitimacy is due to citizen perceptions of local institutions. 
 
Section 3: Testing endogenous or social interaction effects  
In this final section of analysis, I address the question of whether, and to what extent, citizens’  
views on legitimacy shape and become shaped by the views of others who live nearby. The 
sampling design – with respondents living in VDCs – makes it possible that respondents interact 
with one another, influencing and being influenced by the beliefs of others. This final section in 
the chapter presents the results of a social interaction – or   ‘endogenous   effects’   (McQuestion  
2003) – model   in  which   the   influence   of   the   ‘neighbourhood’   average   view  of   legitimacy  on   a  
respondent’s   own   view   of   legitimacy   is   estimated   (see   Chapter   3   for   model   specification).   To  
ensure that  the  respondent’s  own  legitimacy  score  is  not  also  included  in  the  group  mean  score  of  
his or her nearby neighbours, I follow McQuestion (2003) by deriving a   ‘non-self’ group mean, 
which removes a  respondent’s  score  from  his  or  her  group  score.    
 
To briefly provide an overview, I examine the social interaction effect using a multilevel strategy 
(Raudenbush  &  Bryk  2002).  The  following  analysis  models  respondents’  views  of  legitimacy  as  
dichotomous variables coded 1 for as above the sample mean and 0 otherwise. Individual level 
predictors used in this analysis are the same as the previous sections: demographics (including age, 
sex, education, income, regional heterogeneity, caste/ethnicity, and voting preference) and 
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individual predictors (taken from the main Component 1 model, including procedural justice, 
government performance, distributive justice, and outcome favourability, measured on a 
continuous scales of 1-5 and centred for this analysis). Level-2 IVs at the group- or VDC-level, 
include the VDC non-self group mean legitimacy score.    
 
Table 9. Descriptive statistics for Nepalese citizens, N=1500 respondents grouped within N=77 
VDCs 
 
 
 Mean SD 
 
Individual-level 
variables 
 
Sex 
 
.48 
 
.50 
Age 39.59 15.11 
 
Demographic  
variables 
Education .57 .50 
Regional heterogeneity 1.96 .94 
 Income 2.59 1.01 
    
 Procedural justice 2.17 .85 
Individual-level 
predictors 
Distributive justice 2.91 1.10 
Outcome favourability 2.08 .78 
 Law Legitimacy 4.08 .99 
Government performance 2.60 1.01 
 
VDC-level variables 
 
 
 
 
VDC-level legitimacy  
 
 
.56 
 
.50 
 
Non-self VDC mean legitimacy  
 
                  .43                  .50 
Note. Continuous variables measured on a scale of 1-5.  
Dichotomous variables are coded as follows: Sex (0= female, 1=male); Education (0= no formal education, 
1=formally educated); VDC-level legitimacy (0=below sample mean, 1= above sample mean); Non-self VDC mean 
high legitimacy (0= below VDC mean and 1=above VDC mean).  
Voting intentions were coded as dummy variables and are not presented in this table.  
 
I proceed with this analysis in a step-wise fashion, the results of which are presented in Table 10 
Three central issues are examined relating to the observation of a social interaction effect. The 
first step is to assess whether there is, in fact, a geographical clustering in legitimacy scores, i.e., 
whether high legitimacy scores are more likely to be reported in some VDCs than others. The 
second step is to assess whether VDC-level variation can be explained by individual-level factors 
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(i.e., composition effects). For example, in this step I test whether clustering in legitimacy scores 
may be due to the fact that people who live within a certain VDCs share a particular demographic 
characteristic like education, or receive similar outcomes from the government. The third step is to 
test   the   extent   to   which   others’   views   about   legitimacy   determine   the   chance of a particular 
respondent having a similar view, over and above any characteristics that have previously been 
shown to be associated with individual legitimacy beliefs (such as sex, or procedural justice).  
 
1. Do legitimacy perceptions vary significantly across VDCs? 
As a first step, to gauge whether there is statistically significant variation between VCDs in the 
high legitimacy scores – which would suggest that legitimacy scores are clustered at the VDC 
level – an unconditional or empty model was estimated (not shown). This model contains no 
predictors, but simply calculates the magnitude of the variation between VDCs in  ‘high  legitimacy 
scores’.   Results   from this first step showed a statistically significant amount of between-VCD 
variation in the probability of respondents reporting high legitimacy (σu= .80, p<0.001), 
suggesting that there is an endogenous social effect, or VCD-level autocorrelation of high 
legitimacy scores, which is grounds for further testing what might explain this effect.  
 
2. Do individual-level factors explain variation in legitimacy? 
Table 14 shows results for two-level random intercept logistic regression models (Durlauf 2001, 
McQuestion 2003, Fitzgerald et al. 2013). All models include demographic characteristics and the 
VDC-level   ‘social   interaction’ measure is added in the third model. Model 1 shows the 
relationship  between  respondents’  demographic  characteristics and their chances of having higher 
legitimacy scores. Respondent-level performance and justice variables were added in Model 2. As 
expected,   respondents’  performance and justice views were strongly associated with legitimacy 
perceptions. Consistent with other analyses, citizens who perceive high levels of procedural justice 
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were over 2.4 times more likely to have high (above-mean) legitimacy views.  However, the 
addition of the performance and justice variables in Model 2 did not eliminate the significance of 
the random effect (σu =.39, p<0.001). Thus, after adjusting for individual respondents’  
demographic, performance, and justice characteristics there continued to be evidence of 
statistically significant VDC-level clustering in legitimacy perceptions.  
 
 
Table 10. Logistic model of above-mean levels of legitimacy for Nepalese citizens   
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Odds ratio Odds ratio Odds ratio 
Fixed Effects 
 
Intercept 
 
.726 
 
.723 
 
 
.685 
Sex 1.27* 1.30 1.29 
Demographic 
variables 
Age 1.00 .999 1.00 
Education .791 .704 .708 
 Regional heterogeneity .900 .947 .941 
 Income .106 1.05 .106 
     
Individual-level 
variables 
Procedural justice  2.48*** 2.36*** 
Distributive justice  1.19*   1.16 
 Outcome favourability  1.80*** 1.74*** 
Law Legitimacy  1.60*** 1.53*** 
 
 
 
 
VDC-level 
variables 
Government performance  1.69*** 1.63*** 
 
VDC-level legitimacy 
above the mean (binary)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.61*** 
Random effects 
 
 
Variance component 
 
 
.84*** 
 
 
.39*** 
 
 
.23** 
 
Random effect reduction 
from empty model  
 
5% 
 
48.8% 
 
29.6% 
 
Model fit statistics 
 
-2 log likelihood 
 
-2.134 
 
 
-1.630 
 
-1.633 
N=1500 respondents grouped within N=77 VDCs           *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001  
Note. Dichotomous variables are coded as follows: Sex (0= female, 1=male); Education (0= no formal education, 
1=formally educated); VDC-level legitimacy (0=below sample mean, 1= above sample mean).  
Model adjusted for voting intentions; odds ratios for political party preference were non-significant in each model.  
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3. Is there evidence of a social interaction effect for perception of legitimacy? 
Model 3 includes the VDC-level measure of legitimacy. The effect of VDC-level legitimacy was 
substantial and statistically significant (p<.001). Net of the demographic and individual-level 
variables, a citizen living in a VDC where the VDC-level legitimacy scores were higher than the 
sample mean was over 2.6 times more likely to also have high legitimacy views (p<0.001). 
Moreover, the random effect in the final model was substantially reduced (from .39 to .23), 
indicating that VDC-level normalisation predicts 19.2% of between-VDC variation, even after 
accounting for performance and justice views and demographic characteristics.  
 
In summary, this analysis demonstrates that there is significant variation in legitimacy views, and 
these differences are differentially distributed across socially and politically meaningful 
geographical units in Nepal. In addition, the results support the existence of an endogenous or 
social interaction effect where the legitimacy beliefs of people living in your area seem to exert 
some type of influence on individual perceptions of legitimacy. Specifically, nearly 20% of 
between-VDC variation in legitimacy scores is accounted for by the legitimacy perceptions of 
citizens’   communities,   beyond   the   individual-level predictors already highlighted in this results 
chapter. This highlights an effect over and above demographic characteristics, or individual 
perceptions of, e.g., government performance. This potentially means that a citizen living in a 
particular VDC who perceives that the government provides good instrumental outcomes to 
citizens, and makes decisions in a procedurally fair way, may still derive a considerable portion of 
their legitimacy views from other citizens within that VDC, outside of those institutional-level 
judgements.  
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Summary 
In this chapter three analyses have been conducted. The first analysis aimed to measure the 
influence of the government’s   ability   to   provide   services   to   citizens,   for   the   purpose   of   testing  
whether this diminished the effect of procedural justice. It was found that few government services 
predicted legitimacy, and that the addition of these variables to the model did not decrease the 
predictive power of procedural justice. This indicates that the results obtained in Wave 1 data, 
which demonstrated a strong procedural justice effect compared to instrumental variables, were 
not due to the imprecise measurement of government performance.  
 
The second analysis tested the possibility that procedural justice judgements might be derived in 
part from trust and performance judgements of local institutions. Results indicated that trust 
ratings of several institutions predicted legitimacy, including the police, local government, and the 
Army, but that performance judgements of these same institutions did not influence government 
legitimacy. Moreover, trust and performance ratings did not diminish the effect of procedural 
justice on legitimacy.  
 
The third analysis tested for a social interaction effect on legitimacy, utilising a multilevel 
modelling   strategy   to   calculate   the   influence   of   others   legitimacy   views   on   a   respondents’  
individual views. It was found that significant variance   in   respondents’   legitimacy   scores  were  
influenced by the average legitimacy scores within their VDC. That is, citizens who live in a VDC 
where legitimacy views are above the national mean are more likely to have positive legitimacy 
views themselves.  
 
Results in this chapter also added additional control variables to the models, including respondent-
interviewer  caste/ethnic  and  gender  congruency,  and  level  of  violence  in  respondents’  regions  in  
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the previous year. Neither of these variables was shown to influence legitimacy. Finally, the 
results from wave II replicated the results of the wave I data, speaking to the reliability of the data 
presented in previous chapters.  
 
The next chapter discusses the implications of these results, in addition to the results presented in 
chapter 5.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION  
 
In this thesis I have sought to understand how institutional legitimacy is rebuilt in post-conflict 
societies, using Nepal as a case study. This issue is important and timely as legitimacy is 
recognised as essential for citizen compliance and long-term stability, but the precursors of post-
conflict legitimacy are empirically under-researched. In this chapter, I will discuss the results of 
each component of the theoretical model presented in chapter 2 in turn, placing these results in the 
context of existing theory and research. I discuss potential methodological and theoretical 
limitations, along with the implications of these results for post-conflict statebuilding theory and 
practice.  
 
 
Component 1: Instrumental and procedural sources of government legitimacy 
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The first component of the theoretical model aimed to contrast instrumental sources of legitimacy 
(i.e., the capacity to govern effectively, e.g., Schmelze 2011) with procedural sources of 
legitimacy (i.e., the fairness of procedural mechanisms, e.g., Rothstein 2009). This component 
proposed relationships between procedural justice and legitimacy, as well as instrumental 
outcomes (government performance, distributive justice, and outcome favourability) and 
legitimacy. Further, the relationship between procedural justice and legitimacy was expected to be 
moderated by superordinate identification, power, and law legitimacy, while the relationship 
between distributive justice and legitimacy was expected to be moderated by subgroup 
identification. I will first discuss the main effects uncovered in the results, followed by the 
moderated relationships.  
 
First, the results supported the main relationships proposed in component 1 of the theoretical 
model. Procedural justice, distributive justice, government performance, and outcome 
favourability were all positively associated with legitimacy. Procedural justice was most strongly 
associated with institutional legitimacy, followed by government performance, outcome 
favourability, and distributive justice.  
 
The Relative Power of Procedural Justice 
These results are in line with previous findings by Rothstein (2009; also Epstein 2012; Tyler 
2009) who found that in post-conflict societies, institutional legitimacy was generated via 
perceptions of procedural fairness in the implementation of public policies. Further, these results 
add to the body of research illustrating that people are particularly attuned to relational cues in 
making assessments of authorities. These findings suggest that even in the earliest emergence of 
new political institutions, citizens primarily evaluate the legitimacy of these institutions based on 
the fairness of the government’s   decision-making and the quality of the relationship between 
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citizens and state (i.e., the perception of being treated with dignity and respect). That is, in a post-
conflict environment, immediately following democratic transition, citizens may look to 
authorities for relational information to determine their judgements of the legitimacy of the new 
institutions. The current results also extend previous work on procedural justice in transitional 
contexts by comparing instrumental and procedural sources of legitimacy, and show that 
procedural sources of legitimacy are considerably more associated with legitimacy than 
instrumental outcomes.  
 
In chapter 2 I reviewed literature that posits government performance as   the   ‘starting   point’   of  
legitimation in post-conflict states (e.g., Roberts 2011, McLoughlin 2013). The present study 
found that government performance is less predictive of legitimacy than procedural justice, even 
during a period when new political institutions are forming. This is an intriguing result in the 
context of the endemic poverty that exists in Nepal, where citizens who are not provided services 
from the government face potentially life-threatening consequences. Distributive justice in 
particular has been proposed to be crucial in securing government legitimacy in post-conflict 
societies (McLoughlin 2013), with some scholars suggesting that addressing distributive injustice 
should be the first priority in a post-conflict period (e.g., Stewart 2008). In the present study, 
however, distributive justice was the weakest predictor of legitimacy. It is possible that this is a 
product of the caste system in Nepal, whereby the expectation of group-based distributive injustice 
is so ingrained that violations of fairness in this domain are seen as less egregious. This may 
explain why outcome favourability, which assesses favourable personal outcomes, was more 
predictive of legitimacy than the group-based distributive justice measure.  
 
Next, these findings contribute to an increasing focus in the procedural justice literature on the 
relative   importance   of   authorities’   effectiveness   and   procedural   fairness   under   conditions   of  
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security threats. For example, in the context of policing in South Africa, Bradford, Hough & 
Jackson (2013) found that although procedural justice was correlated with police legitimacy, the 
effect was smaller than in Western contexts, and police effectiveness was relatively more 
predictive of legitimacy (see also Tankebe, 2008, who found a similar pattern in Ghana). The 
present findings do not support claims of relatively greater influence of instrumental outcomes and 
institutional effectiveness on legitimacy in non-Western, non-peacetime contexts. Procedural 
justice was a considerably stronger influence on legitimacy perceptions than the instrumental 
outcomes in the context of post-conflict Nepal. However, the present study focused on the 
legitimacy of the central government rather than institutions such as the police, who are 
specifically tasked  with  managing  security.  Although  in  the  present  study  the  government’s  ability  
to control crime was not associated with legitimacy, this indicates that the ability of the police to 
control crime in Nepal would possibly not show a similar pattern to the findings of Bradford et al. 
(2013). In chapter 2, I introduced the idea that one role of a post-conflict government is to 
establish citizen expectations of what state institutions can deliver, and then meet those 
expectations. Potentially, the specific security domain of policing institutions creates citizen 
expectations of performance that can be more readily identified as having been met or 
disappointed in unstable environments.  
 
Next, component 1 of the theoretical model also proposed three potential moderators of the 
relationship between procedural (and distributive) justice and legitimacy. Specifically, it was 
anticipated that the relationship between procedural justice and legitimacy would be moderated by 
superordinate identification, perceived group power, and law legitimacy. These moderators were 
included in the theoretical model based on research indicating that procedural justice harnesses 
social identity to produce its positive effects (e.g. see Huo 2003; Lind & Tyler 1992). I will now 
discuss the results of each moderated relationship in turn. 
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The moderating role of identification. In chapter 2, a social psychological model of procedural 
justice (the group value model; Tyler & Lind 1992) was invoked to explain why procedural justice 
is   important   in   terms  of  citizens’   relationships  with  authorities.  Relational models of procedural 
justice are based on the idea that identification is central to perceptions of procedural justice, and 
fair and respectful treatment by authorities  signals  both  an  individual’s  worth  within  a  group,  and  
the worth of the group itself. In this conceptualisation, identification   is   the   ‘bridge’   between  
justice and legitimacy (Tyler & Blader 2003; Bradford et al 2013). In support of this theoretical 
model, in the present study procedural justice was moderated by superordinate identification. The 
more Nepalese citizens identified with the national group, the stronger the relationship was 
between procedural justice and legitimacy. Conversely, the relationship between distributive 
justice   and   legitimacy   was   moderated   by   subgroup   identification,   in   that   the   more   citizens’  
identified with their caste/ethnic group, the more salient fair distributions of resources were in 
terms of evaluating the legitimacy of the government. These results indicate that although strong 
caste/ethnic identification does not undermine the effect of procedural justice on post-conflict 
legitimacy, it appears to increase the relative salience of distributive justice. This result is likely 
due to the heightened awareness of the intergroup context when citizens identify at a subgroup 
level, leading to increased salience of intergroup injustice.  
 
This pattern of moderated relationships replicates earlier work (e.g., Huo 2003; Huo et al 1996) 
suggesting that   superordinate,   or   national,   identity,   shapes   citizen’s   relationships   with   the  
government in a different way to subgroup (e.g., ethnic) identity. Superordinate identity is 
theorized to be more important for relational concerns because when citizens identify strongly at 
the national level, the government is perceived as representing an ingroup, and when subgroup 
identities are stronger, the government is perceived as representing an outgroup (Taylor 2001). In 
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the case of a central government, the information being conveyed through justice relates to 
citizens’   status   and   value   within   the   national   group   (Loader and Mulcahy 2003; Reiner 2010; 
Waddington 1999). The finding of such an effect in post-conflict Nepal indicates that similar 
psychological processes may be at work in the context of a developing society with extremely 
strong subgroup identities and a superordinate national identity that could be considered strained 
by years of conflict (Bhatta 2013; Diamon, Linz, & Lipset, 1995). In the context  of  Nepal’s caste 
system, which is a special circumstance of intergroup relations due to its explicit status differences 
and impermeable group boundaries (see chapter 3), this result provides initial evidence that 
procedural justice can still operate through social identification in a wide range of socio-cultural 
contexts. 
 
The moderating role of power. Next, the relationship between procedural justice and legitimacy 
was moderated by perceived group power. This moderated relationship was included in the 
theoretical model because relational theories of procedural justice suggest that attention to justice 
concerns may be higher among those who have the lowest social standing, as fair procedures 
communicate signals of respect from authorities and society (Huo, Binning, & Molina, 2010a; 
Smith, Tyler, Huo, Ortiz, & Lind, 1998; Tyler, Degoey, & Smith, 1996). In line with this previous 
work, procedural justice was more strongly associated with legitimacy for Nepalese citizens who 
perceived their caste/ethnic group as having less power in society. Specifically, citizens who 
perceived that their caste/ethnic groups had low power reported decreased legitimacy when they 
perceived procedural injustice than citizens who perceived their group had higher power (there 
was no difference in legitimacy perceptions between high and low power groups when procedural 
justice was high). This analysis speaks to the relative importance of procedural injustice for low 
power groups, who represent the most vulnerable citizens in unjust systems.  
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Virtually no previous work has investigated the moderating role of power in a post-conflict setting. 
This is despite applied statebuilding frameworks stressing the importance of fostering a sense of 
inclusion for marginalised groups in order to build the legitimacy of the new state (e.g., DFID 
2010). One previous study conducted in Tanzania (Epstein et al 2012) found that levels of process 
satisfaction were more important in evaluating post-conflict political parties for minority than 
majority groups. The present study extends this finding by measuring institutional legitimacy (as 
opposed to incumbent support) and contrasting procedural justice with instrumental outcomes. 
However, the same conclusion is reached in the present study—procedural justice is especially 
effective in building legitimacy for citizens who perceive their position in society as marginalised. 
In the context of Nepal this result is especially interesting, as both the rhetoric of the Maoists 
during the insurgency, and subsequent post-conflict government agendas broadcast the importance 
of including and empowering low caste and indigenous groups in Nepalese society. The present 
results suggest that procedurally just treatment may be particularly effective in rebuilding post-
conflict institutional legitimacy for these citizens.  
 
The moderating role of law legitimacy. The final moderator proposed in the theoretical model is 
law  legitimacy,  encompassing  citizens’  feelings  of  moral  obligation  to  obey  the  law.  The  aim  was  
to establish how procedural justice and law legitimacy interact to influence perceptions of 
legitimacy. This is a moderating relationship predicted in the broader procedural justice and 
legitimacy literature (e.g., Murphy, Tyler & Curtis 2009). Results of the present study indicated 
that when procedural justice was high, the perception of laws as legitimate increased overall 
perceptions that the government is legitimate. When procedural justice was low, there was no 
benefit provided by legitimate laws.  
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A main effect was also observed, in that high law legitimacy was associated with high government 
legitimacy. However, the direction of this relationship is unclear—it could be that legitimate laws 
will encourage perceptions of government legitimacy, although it seems equally viable that a 
legitimate government will produce rules and laws that citizens feel morally obligated to obey 
(this was discussed as a benefit of post-conflict legitimacy in chapter 2). The present study also 
suggests that law legitimacy is somehow different from the other variables in this model, as the 
mean on this scale was considerably higher than any other predictor, and much higher than the 
legitimacy mean itself. This was perhaps related to the phrasing of the law legitimacy items, which 
assessed  citizens’   feelings  of  moral  obligation   to  obey   the   law,  and  willingness   to  obey   the   law 
even if they were personally opposed to the specific rule. These items may have been subject to 
socially desirable responding, as answering in the negative could have been perceived as admitting 
to intending to break the law. 
 
Revisiting Instrumental Legitimacy  
Despite the above discussion focussing on the importance of procedural justice in predicting post-
conflict legitimacy, instrumental outcomes were not irrelevant in citizens’   evaluations   of   the  
government. Government performance in particular displayed a strong relationship with 
legitimacy compared to the other instrumental variables. This result warranted further 
investigation; therefore in the second wave of data collection (presented in chapter 6) the 
significant relationship between government performance and legitimacy was explored in more 
detail. Sacks (2011) introduced ‘service  delivery’  as a broad term that can encompass a range of 
fundamental societal requirements from basic sanitation needs to crime control. Therefore the 
second   wave   of   fieldwork   included   items   assessing   citizens’   perceptions   of   several different 
domains of service delivery (infrastructure, food, shelter, health, education, crime, economy and 
employment), as opposed to the broad  rating  of  ‘government  performance’ utilised in wave 1.  
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The mixed benefits of service delivery. Results indicated that largely, individual government 
services were not associated with legitimacy, and those that were (infrastructure, employment), 
displayed relatively weak effects. This suggests that government provision of individual services 
is not strongly associated with legitimacy. In terms of previous research, a weak relationship 
between instrumental outcomes and legitimacy has been suggested to be a function of expectations 
(e.g., Sacks 2012). Although the additional service provision data collected in Wave 2 was an 
attempt to correct for this possibility, it is still possible that differing expectations between certain 
segments in Nepalese society explains the general pattern of null results observed here. For 
example, the provision of improved housing may have dramatically improved legitimacy 
perceptions for citizens living in fragile structures, but not wealthy citizens living in secure 
Kathmandu compounds. In the future, comparable data could be analysed as a function of group 
membership, i.e., caste/ethnicity, or demographic information such as socioeconomic status.  
 
Additionally, citizen expectations around government service provision will also be constantly 
shifting and evolving over time. Once initial service provisions have been met, expectations may 
then shift upward to higher levels of service provision (Roberts 2008). In this scenario, citizens 
will reward relative quality of performance rather than absolute improvements, such that the 
relationship may only be observed longitudinally, rather than cross-sectionally as in the present 
study. These results also suggest that previous work attempting to link service delivery to 
legitimacy (e.g., Brinkerhoff et al 2012) perhaps suffers from the inclusion of only one domain of 
service delivery. Had the present study investigated only the provision of basic infrastructure as a 
proxy  for  ‘service  delivery’,  the  conclusion may have been that service delivery does predict post-
conflict legitimacy. If health service provision were assessed, the conclusion would be the 
opposite. Although high-quality data from post-conflict developing countries is difficult to obtain, 
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the present study reveals the dangers in relying on simple proxy variables for complex concepts 
such as government performance. As it stands, the present results were not consistent enough to 
make the claim that service delivery predicts legitimacy. However, the important message from 
this analysis is that the introduction of specific services into the model did not diminish the effect 
of procedural justice. In fact, an increase in the variance in legitimacy accounted for by procedural 
justice was observed between wave 1 and wave 2 with the specific measure of performance.  
 
The weak roles of trust and performance. The second wave of fieldwork also aimed to test 
whether perceptions of central government legitimacy could be predicted by institutional trust and 
performance ratings of non-central government institutions, i.e., the police, the Army, regional 
government, local government, and the judiciary. It was suggested that citizens may be more 
likely to engage interpersonally with representatives from these institutions, and therefore form 
judgements about the procedural justice and legitimacy of the central government on the basis of 
such interactions. However, results did not support this hypothesis. Institutional trust ratings of 
local institutions were largely positively associated with legitimacy (including the local 
government, police, and army, with two exceptions: VDC-level trust, which displayed a negative 
relationship with central government legitimacy; and the judiciary/courts, which showed no 
relationship). By contrast, institutional performance ratings largely showed little relationship with 
central government legitimacy. The exception to this pattern was the performance of 
judiciary/courts, which displayed a significant positive relationship with legitimacy. The results 
suggest   that   citizens’   trust   in   criminal   justice   and   political   institutions   are   connected   to   the  
legitimacy of the central government, but the performance of these same institutions is not. Again, 
however, the important finding from this analysis was the effect that local institutional trust and 
performance had on the regression coefficient of procedural justice. When trust and performance 
variables were entered into the model, a slight reduction in the variance accounted for by 
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procedural justice was observed. However, procedural justice remained the strongest predictor in 
the model, indicating that citizens were not basing assessments of central government legitimacy 
on interactions with local authorities. This result is unexpected, as the literature often assumes a 
connection between trust and performance of criminal justice institutions, local political 
authorities, and the central government. Police and justice institutions in particular have been 
identified as foundations of legitimacy for post-conflict governments, and confidence in these 
institutions are seen as pivotal in the process of democratic transition (Karstedt 2014; Mischler & 
Rose 1998). The present study reveals little association between the performance of these 
institutions and the legitimacy of the central government, and no relationship between trust in the 
judiciary and central government legitimacy.  
 
Practical and Theoretical Implications of Component 1 
Overall, the results from the second wave of data collection did not undermine the conclusion 
from the first wave of data collection. That is, in evaluating post-conflict institutions, citizens rely 
largely on relational information conveyed by fair decision-making and respectful treatment. 
 
These results are not an argument against the provision of government services or humanitarian 
aid. It is obvious that in a post-conflict environment, the provision of food, water, shelter, 
infrastructure, security, and health and education services are essential. However the results here 
indicate that these services seem to be less important in terms of building the legitimacy of new 
democratic institutions than previously thought. In terms of how this finding applies to post-
conflict policy, I return to the literature discussed in chapter 2, where it was stated that the belief 
that service provision builds legitimacy has led statebuilding practitioners, such as the UN and 
NGOs, to administer aid through governments and local authorities, rather than directly to citizens. 
Subsequent loss of aid through government corruption is thought to be outweighed by the 
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legitimacy gains achieved when a government is seen to be providing services to citizens. The 
results of the present study question the wisdom of this approach. Capacity building is 
undoubtedly important in the long-term, but the present study shows no evidence to suggest that a 
citizen in a post-conflict country observing an INGO building roads will instead direct their 
loyalty to that INGO, rather than the government. In terms of building institutional legitimacy, 
government resources may be better spent ensuring the public perceives decision making as 
neutral and respectful towards citizens.  
 
Although these findings do not contradict decades of previous procedural justice research, they do 
contribute to this literature by applying the theory outside of a developed, Western, peacetime 
context. Critiques of procedural justice theory often question its applicability to non-Western 
contexts where resources are scarce, where there is no pre-existing system legitimacy (Gibson 
1989) and where security threats are more prevalent (Tankebe 2008). The Nepal context fulfils all 
of these potential challenges to the theory, and yet the expected relationship between procedural 
justice and legitimacy was observed—and proved difficult to weaken. Moreover, the moderation 
of the relationship by national identification and group power suggests (but at this stage cannot 
confirm) that the causal mechanisms proposed by the group value model operate in this context as 
well. These results undermine the idea that acceptance of rational-legal sources of authority take 
time to develop, or that citizens in non-Western countries  are  ‘not  ready’  for  democratic  processes. 
In Nepal, emerging from centuries of non-democratic traditional authority and only four years 
following the  country’s  first  elections,  citizens overwhelmingly made assessments of institutional 
legitimacy through their judgements of procedural justice.  
 
Component 1 Summary 
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The relationships proposed in component 1 of the theoretical model were supported by the data 
presented in chapters 5 and 6. This work extends the contexts to which procedural justice theory 
can be applied, as at the present time only a small amount of research has tested procedural justice 
theory outside of Western, economically advanced, stable democratic contexts (e.g., Sacks 2011; 
Tankebe 2008). Results suggest that procedural justice is particularly useful for building post-
conflict legitimacy, especially for citizens who identify at the national level or who have relatively 
less social power. Further, procedural justice effects are demonstrated in the absence of 
interpersonal interaction between authorities and citizens, and regardless of citizen perceptions of 
the ability of the government to provide services and distribute resources fairly.  
 
 
Component 2: Voice, influence, and legitimacy in the post-conflict state  
 
 
 
Component 2 proposed   a   relationship   between   key   elements   of   ‘local ownership’  
and government legitimacy. In chapter 2, literature debating the importance and contingencies of 
local ownership in post-conflict reconstruction was explored, which holds that engaging local 
citizens and minimizing foreign influence over post-conflict processes builds sustainable 
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institutional legitimacy in the long-term (Donais 2012; Schuman 2014; Pfister 2014; Hullmeller 
2014). Much of the literature on local ownership is based on observational case studies. This 
project attempted to investigate the concept quantitatively by measuring the relative trust and 
influence of a) local Nepalese caste/ethnic groups, and b) foreign groups, including regional 
governmental, non-governmental, and inter-governmental organisations. All groups were relevant 
to the Nepalese context, in an attempt to ground this component in local experience (see chapter 3). 
Perceived caste/ethnic group power was also investigated as a potential moderator, in line with 
research showing that expectations derived from cultural norms around power can influence 
reactions to voice.  
 
As mentioned above, this component of the theoretical model was an attempt to operationalize two 
components   of   the   prominent   statebuilding   theory   of   ‘local   ownership’   in   post-conflict 
reconstruction. There are also two elements of the procedural justice model of legitimacy that 
share considerable overlap with theorizing on post-conflict legitimacy: the importance of voice, 
and the importance of neutrality, which overlap with the statebuilding concepts of local 
participation and local ownership. This component therefore attempts to link statebuilding theories 
of local ownership with the procedural justice literature in a way that is grounded in the Nepalese 
context.  
 
The power of voice. Results indicated that voice (i.e. the perception that citizens could influence 
the decision-making processes of the government) was the strongest predictor of legitimacy in the 
component 2 model. Further, Nepalese citizens trusted local groups more than foreign groups, and 
overall, local and foreign group trust predicted increased legitimacy. In terms of group influence, 
local group influence was positively associated with legitimacy, whereas foreign group influence 
was not. Positive effects of voice and local trust and influence suggest than some degree of local 
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participation and influence provides benefits in terms of legitimacy perceptions. However, the 
negative consequences of foreign group influence on institutional legitimacy, as predicted by the 
local ownership literature, were not observed in the present study. Further, none of the 
relationships observed in the component 2 model were as strong as the procedural justice and 
instrumental effects of component 1. However, the weaker main effects may partly be due to the 
moderating effect of perceived caste/ethnic group power. 
 
That is, the perception of less Nepali group influence adversely affected perceptions of legitimacy 
for low-power, but not high-power, groups. Given that the influence ratings were an aggregate of 
the eight main caste/ethnic categories in Nepalese society (see chapter 3), this measure could be 
considered to represent influence by all groups throughout the caste/ethnic hierarchy. For this 
reason, citizens whose groups traditionally have less power in society would likely interpret lower 
scores on this measure as a lack of inclusive participation across all levels of Nepalese society. By 
contrast, even if most other caste/ethnic groups in Nepalese society lacked influence over 
institutions, those from high-power groups can still expect to wield political power, which would 
explain why their legitimacy perceptions were not negatively affected by less local influence in 
general. In terms of foreign group influence, however, the opposite relationship was observed. 
That is, perception of foreign influence over the government negatively affected legitimacy for 
high-power, but not low-power citizens (for low power citizens, legitimacy was higher when 
foreign group influence was perceived to be high). This result could be interpreted as a perceived 
threat to the status quo for more powerful citizens, both directly in terms of foreign groups ‘taking  
away’  power   from   local  elites  and also in terms of the perceived threat of foreign advocacy for 
inclusion of marginalised groups in the reconstruction process. These moderated relationships are 
a quantitative reflection of observational case studies that demonstrate how fraught the 
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implementation of local ownership can be in a post-conflict society (e.g., Roberts 2004; 
Brinkerhoff & Mayfield 2005). 
 
It is also worth noting that voice was not moderated by caste/ethnic group power, suggesting that 
perceptions of individual participation in political decision-making may be beneficial for most 
citizens. This was an unexpected result, given that in a highly stratified society like Nepal, caste 
groups at the bottom of the social hierarchy have traditionally been denied voice and may have 
lower expectations of receiving voice (e.g., Brockner et al., 2001; Tyler, Lind, & Huo, 2000; 
Francesco & Chen, 2000). It was expected that for low power caste/ethnic groups, being denied 
voice would have a lesser effect on the perceived legitimacy of the government than for high-
power groups. No evidence was found for this hypothesis, as group power did not moderate the 
relationship between voice and legitimacy. However, the studies cited above investigate the 
influence of voice on perceived procedural fairness, rather than legitimacy itself. It seems from the 
present study that these findings do not translate directly to group power moderating the 
relationship between voice and legitimacy in a post-conflict context.   
 
This component speaks to ongoing debates about the nature and implementation of local 
ownership in post-conflict reconstruction. Knoll (2006), for example, conceives the debate as a 
conflict between the degree of local participation and the quality of local participation. Certainly 
in the present study, citizens were not asked to assess the quality of the influence of the groups. 
This means that a particular group could have a high influence over government processes, but 
that some citizens would perceive this influence as positive and others as negative. The present 
study contributes to this debate by illustrating that different groups in society appear to have 
different perceptions of local and foreign influence. Future research may investigate the mitigating 
factors of the perceived quality of this influence.  
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Some peacebuilding scholars may object to the empirical approach taken in this section as 
opposed to the nuanced case studies more typical of the local ownership literature. Necessarily for 
quantitative research conducted on a large scale, some of the measures used here are broad, i.e., 
measuring influence of different groups and aggregating the ratings. It would be possible, and 
desirable, to further unpack the local ownership results presented here in future research. Which 
specific groups within Nepalese society are the most trusted, and perceived to have the most 
influence? How do trust and influence interact to produce legitimacy? Nepal’s  caste/ethnic  system  
has within it crosscutting allegiances and intersections with regional clustering of groups. Even in 
terms of the foreign groups presented, citizens who live on the border with India may be more 
trusting and accepting of Indian influence than citizens who live in the Himalayas and rarely come 
into contact with Indians. Future research could examine these relationships closely, taking into 
account trust and contact with other relevant groups.   
 
Component 2 Summary  
 
Broadly, it is held that successful development and post-conflict reconstruction is country-led and 
country-owned (World Bank 2005), and that local ownership builds post-conflict legitimacy 
(Brinkerhoff 2005; de Carvahlo 2011). A plethora of critical analyses center on local ownership 
and post-conflict legitimacy, but expectations around local ownership don't always materialise in 
practice.   In  component  2  it  was  proposed  that  ‘local  ownership’—operationalized as local voice, 
trust, and influence over post-conflict decision-making processes—promotes the perception of 
government legitimacy. Results indicated that voice, local trust and influence, and foreign group 
trust all positively predicted legitimacy, but that perceived foreign group influence did not 
negatively affect legitimacy. The relationships between local and foreign group influence were 
 186 
moderated  by  perceived  group  power,   indicating   that   ‘local  ownership’  can  operate  on  different  
levels and for different segments of the population.  
 
Component 3: Social interaction effect 
 
 
 
The third way that legitimacy is generated and sustained was proposed to be through the social 
influence of other citizens. Previous research on the alignment of beliefs and political attitudes 
with perceived social norms, as well as theorising on social interaction effects that influence 
citizens’   beliefs,   lead to the hypothesis that legitimacy may be produced socially in addition to 
being a response to institutional assessments. The possibility of a social influence on legitimacy 
has been theorized (e.g., Horne 2009; Meares 2009), but never empirically examined, and 
critiques of procedural justice theory include the neglect of social interaction in theorising on how 
legitimacy perceptions are built (Loader 2012). Thus, it was suggested in the third component of 
the theoretical model that citizens both influence and are influenced by those around them, and 
that this influence acts in addition to individual-level perceptions of institutional behaviour (as 
proposed in components 1 and 2).  
 
The specific aim of this component was to employ a social interaction modelling approach to 
examine variation in legitimacy beliefs across the Nepalese sample as a function of regional 
 187 
grouping. Assessed was (1) variation within the Nepalese sample in the extent to which they held 
high perceptions of legitimacy, (2) grouping or clustering of citizens within social networks where 
group members held similar views and (3) an endogenous effect whereby individuals’  views  about  
institutional legitimacy both  influence  and  are  influenced  by  the  group’s  views. 
 
Overall, the results demonstrated that there was significant variation in views about legitimacy, 
and these views were differentially distributed across Village Development Committees 
throughout Nepal. In addition, the results supported the existence of an endogenous or social 
interaction effect whereby the collective behaviours and beliefs of a group affect individual 
members of the group (Durlauf 2001). Practically, this could mean that even if a citizen perceives 
that the government provides services, and makes decisions with neutrality, if they live in a 
community where perception of government illegitimacy is the norm, a significant proportion of 
their individual legitimacy views could be influenced in that direction. This finding is intuitive, 
but has never been demonstrated in the context of legitimacy beliefs before.  
 
There are a number of theoretical implications that can be drawn from this finding. The social 
interaction effect shows at a minimum that individual and group attitudes towards post-conflict 
institutions are correlated within regional groups. Previous research has shown that political 
attitudes are open to community influence (e.g., Putnam 1996) and vary between nations (e.g., 
Anderson & Singer, 2008). However, the present finding diverges from this existing research by 
attempting to explain clustering of legitimacy perceptions through an endogenous effect, rather 
than exogenous factors such as regional socioeconomic status. Although exogenous factors may 
well influence legitimacy beliefs, endogenous factors, or the influence of peers on individual 
beliefs (Manski 2000), is a new conceptualisation of how legitimacy is generated. This finding 
draws   attention   to   the   overlooked   role   of   regional   context   in   the   formation   of   citizens’  
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relationships with authorities and the importance of incorporating the meaningful influence of 
citizens’  social  groups.  This  seems  especially  important  in  the  context  of  a  collectivist  society  such  
as Nepal, where bounded familial and social groups strongly shape an individual's behaviours and 
attitudes.  Finally, this conceptualisation of legitimacy creates a role for citizens in the post-
conflict state beyond passive observation and assessment of institutions. Instead, social interaction 
effects posit citizens as active agents influencing those around them, and highlight the potential for 
citizens to be sources of change in the post-conflict environment. 
 
This result cannot speak to the causal mechanisms through which social groups influence 
individual legitimacy perceptions, and more theorizing and applied research is needed in this area.  
The literature reviewed in chapter 2 cited social psychological work on norms as a potential causal 
mechanism, such that individual attitudes align with social norms (i.e., perceived social 
consensus). In this formulation, the way people perceive institutional rules and structures, as well 
as how they believe others perceive institutions, will influence individual legitimacy perceptions 
of central government institutions. Additionally, this finding opens up a new perspective on 
existing research concerning rebuilding post-conflict legitimacy. For example, elections are said to 
enhance post-conflict government legitimacy by providing citizens with an opportunity for voice 
and participation in the new democratic system. The present finding of a social interaction effect 
suggests that successful elections may also build legitimacy by contributing to the normative 
perception that other citizens perceive the government—and the system of democracy itself—as 
legitimate. That is, the behaviours of other citizens that express agreement with the political order 
can reproduce and reinforce institutional legitimacy (Bottoms & Tankebe 2012). Although the 
present study has focused only on a social interaction effect on legitimacy, it is also conceivable 
that many of the predictors in this study could also be individual-level perceptions that are at least 
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partially derived from a social interaction effect, a consideration that is worthy of further 
investigation.  
 
This finding suggests another potentially fruitful avenue for future legitimacy research. In chapter 
2, social psychology literature on norms provided the starting point for the idea that legitimacy 
may be, in addition to a bottom-up   phenomenon,   a   shared   value   incorporating   “social   and 
structural  factors”  (Pettigrew  1991,  p.10).  The  accompanying  literature  on  social  change  via  norm  
change may therefore prove helpful in theorising solutions to legitimacy deficits. Incorporating 
structural change at an institutional level is one component of norm change (Pettigrew 1991, 
Lewin 1951, Paluck 2013), suggesting the potential for norm change through top-down 
improvements in government services and processes as suggested earlier in this chapter (and by 
the vast procedural justice literature). However, a second strategy could be targeting not what an 
individual personally thinks or feels about authorities, but rather what they perceive other 
members of their group think or feel. Paluck (2009a, 2009b) investigates prejudice reduction 
through norm change using experimental paradigms and interventions in post-conflict Rwanda and 
Congo. She finds that interventions that target the collective norms of a group can facilitate 
changes in perceived norms and lead to reconciliation-related behaviours. Could a similar 
approach be useful in the context of rebuilding legitimacy through norm change? Further 
experimental and applied work in this area is recommended, including further investigation of 
normative effects by measuring norms directly. However, this thesis provides initial evidence that 
legitimacy, in addition to being influenced by top-down perceptions of institutional behaviour, is 
also influenced by a social interaction effect and thus potentially amenable to interventions aimed 
at norm change.  
 
Component 3 Summary 
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When  there  is  uncertainty  and  instability  around  who  is  in  charge  at  critical  junctures  in  a  nation’s  
history, it is understandable that citizens will look to those around them for information regarding 
the new social order. Thus, this component explored the idea that legitimacy perceptions can be 
generated socially and indirectly via fellow citizens (Loader 2012; Bottoms & Tankebe 2012). 
Evidence was found for a social interaction—or endogenous—effect whereby citizens both 
influence and are influenced by those around them. Although the exact causal mechanism for this 
effect could not be assessed in the present project, social psychological research on norms 
provides a basis for theorizing how the perception of social consensus can influence individual 
beliefs. This finding opens new theoretical ground in legitimacy studies, including the possibility 
of interventions targeting norm change to influence legitimacy beliefs.  
 
 
Combining the three components  
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Post-conflict transitions are deeply destabilizing periods that resonate through societies with long-
term effects on citizens’   perceptions   of central government institutions (Hutchison & Johnson, 
2011). There is currently a gap in understanding between macro-political processes  and  citizens’  
psychological processes during these transitional events. This theoretical model attempts to link 
these two levels of understanding, utilizing established social psychological theories and more 
contested theories based on post-conflict case studies and practices in the field. In this model, each 
component—the instrumental vs. relational model of legitimacy, local ownership concepts, and 
social influence effects—is drawn together in a way that attempts to comprehensively describe the 
antecedents of government legitimacy in a post-conflict society. Although the results for each 
component were analysed and presented separately, this thesis provides support for the overall 
theoretical model. In this final section I will discuss some ways in which each component is 
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theoretically linked, and discuss some implications of my findings in relation to existing post-
conflict legitimacy research, and situating the results in the Nepal context. 
 
First, components 1 and 2 are presented above as both falling   under   ‘relational’   antecedents   of  
legitimacy, despite being derived from the social psychological literature on procedural justice and 
the   statebuilding   literature   on   ‘local   ownership’   respectively.   There is considerable overlap 
between these two fields, as previous statebuilding researchers have discussed procedural 
elements—such as corruption or fair elections—that reference relational theories of legitimacy 
without testing them specifically. Overall, the results of component 1 and 2 suggest that citizens 
are deeply concerned with how they are treated by authorities, and treatment that creates the 
perception of respect and inclusion generates a greater perceived legitimacy. In this study 
procedural justice and local ownership both display effects that hint at the underlying role of social 
identity,   such   as   citizens’   identification   with   the   superordinate   national   group   and   caste/ethnic  
subgroups and their perceptions of power within the social hierarchy. Finally, although this project 
only tested a social interaction effect on legitimacy, it is also conceivable that perceptions of 
procedural justice and government performance could also be influenced socially. Thus, 
potentially, the three components could be interconnected through social interaction effects.  
 
Despite comparatively weaker effects than relational concerns, instrumental outcomes still share 
significant variance with perceived legitimacy, and effectiveness and justice should not be 
considered a zero-sum equation in the quest for legitimacy. The inability of post-conflict 
governments to provide fundamental public goods and services also has an impact outside of 
legitimacy considerations, such as the   immediate   prospects   for   tending   to   citizens’  basic needs, 
restarting economic activity, and long-term prospects for assuring welfare, reducing poverty, and 
facilitating socio-economic growth (Brinkerhoff 2005). Additionally, this project cannot speak to 
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the importance of sequencing in terms of relational and instrumental concerns. Nepal is an 
example of a post-conflict society with relatively minimal continued violence following the peace 
agreement (see chapter 3). Debates regarding rebuilding post-conflict societies often focus on the 
sequencing and prioritisation of the tasks of post-conflict reconstruction, and it seems reasonable 
that establishing security, an instrumental function of the government, might be considered a 
priority in some contexts before attempting to establish government legitimacy. These issues are 
complex and interconnected, and any definitive recommendations are outside the scope of this 
thesis.  
 
Yet, these findings highlight the importance of situating legitimacy within relationships among 
institutions and society. Legitimacy establishes a solid foundation for the relationship between 
government and society that implies more than the absence of coercion (Rosanvallon 2011), and 
the results of this project support this claim. Every relationship explored in this thesis rests on the 
underlying psychological representations of social identities in Nepal. That is, the connection 
between the governing and the governed cannot be understood without also understanding how 
social relationships between citizens are shaped. This thesis illustrates that any model of post-
conflict legitimacy that does not take into account how citizens see themselves in terms of their 
social identities will be lacking a central mechanism through which legitimacy in post-conflict 
societies is produced.  
 
Considering Issues of Applicability and Impact 
These results may also address concerns by scholars and practitioners who reject the transfer of 
the Western model of democratic institutions to non-Western post-conflict societies. There is 
skepticism that a relatively standardised model of post-conflict democratic transition can be 
successfully grafted onto non-Western developing societies (e.g. Call and Cook, 2003). However, 
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citizens in this project appeared to largely assess the legitimacy of the government through 
procedural elements (procedural justice, voice, local participation) that align with the principles of 
liberal democracy practiced in the West. The results presented here are also in line with many of 
the criteria—or universal correlates—of legitimacy included in objective theories of legitimacy 
(e.g., Gilley 2006; 2012). This is at odds with the perception that the descriptive approach to 
studying legitimacy exists outside of normative moral considerations.  
 
Turning to the specific case study in question, it is worth asking what the reception of this 
message would be within the central government of Nepal itself. Despite the revolutionary 
rhetoric, most of the senior political staff at the top of Nepalese political parties remain high caste 
Hindu men, and the social stratification of the caste system is still prevalent in Nepalese society 
today. Essentially, this means that there are still special interests to be protected by the individuals 
in charge of leading the country into an established democratic system that is accepted as 
legitimate by Nepalese citizens. Given that one of the central tenets of procedural justice theory is 
neutrality, this presents a major roadblock. Despite this, the key point of legitimacy is that it 
consolidates power in the long run, so protecting interests as opposed to building sustainable 
power could be posed as a question of short-term vs. long-term political strategy. Research of this 
kind could hopefully persuade politicians that citizens everywhere, particularly the most 
vulnerable, are adept at interpreting signals of their value from authorities. Ultimately, politicians 
cannot  afford  to  say  that  they  don’t  care  about legitimacy. However, building legitimacy through 
procedural justice is important not just  because  it  is  ‘sellable’ to the population, but because, being 
premised on fairness, it is also what is best for citizens, and pertains to the quality of democracy 
itself.  
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Nepal’s  second  democratic  elections were held in November 2013, and at the time of writing, the 
newly elected Constituent Assembly is involved in the process of promulgating a constitution. The 
excerpt below is from the Kathmandu-based  ‘Business  Standard’  newspaper  released  on  the  15th 
December 2014:  
“With   the   Jan   22   deadline   hardly   five   weeks   away,   Nepal's   Constituent   Assembly   (CA)   Monday   initiated  
deliberations on resolving the contentious issues coming in the way of framing the country's new constitution. During 
a meeting earlier in the day, Nepali ruling and opposition parties had different attitudes on how to settle the sticking 
points hampering the exercise. The ruling parties -- Nepali Congress and Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist-
Leninist (CPN-UML) -- said the contentious issues should be resolved through a voting process, while opposition 
parties continued to insist that it would not be possible to promulgate the new constitution without consensus of all the 
political parties. The key contentious issues in the debate, among others, relate to the form of government, the 
electoral system, name, number and the boundaries of federal provinces, protection of preferential rights, the 
independence of the judiciary and arrangements for the transitional period after the promulgation of the new 
constitution.” 
Protracted post-conflict political arguments about the best way for political parties to structurally 
resolve issues can be frustrating for citizens and international observers alike. But this project 
illustrates how crucial it is to approach this process thoughtfully. The post-conflict task of putting 
in place mechanisms that will foster citizen perceptions of procedural justice in the long run seem 
to be, on the basis of the evidence from this research, worth more than any potential short-term 
political instability. The questions being debated in Nepal currently—e.g., whether parliamentary 
decisions should be made by a simple majority vote or if they should be unanimous—may appear 
from the outside to be petty political struggles. However, the outcomes of these decisions will 
shape citizen perceptions of government legitimacy, and potentially the long-term success of 
democracy in Nepal, for years to come.  
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How applicable are these results outside of Nepal? This model was developed with the intention of 
creating a general model that could be applied across post-conflict contexts. As mentioned above, 
security is a key difference between Nepal and other post-conflict societies, in that post-conflict 
violence in Nepal is minimal. Whether similar results would be found in more violent 
environments such as Iraq or Afghanistan, or whether it is only applicable in a truly  ‘post-conflict’  
state, would require further comparative work.  Further, the transition in Nepal was unusual in that 
it was an organic, homegrown revolution (as opposed to an inter-state war or the result of 
international intervention). Still, the context in Nepal echoes that of many other ongoing post-
conflict transitions—minimal resources, group-based divisions and inequalities, and the shifting of 
sources of authority from traditional to legal-rational, from monarchy and patrimony to democracy. 
Finally, cross-cultural contingencies can be built into the model—for example, in component 2 a 
composite   measure   of   any   geopolitically   relevant   groups   could   be   included   under   ‘group  
influences’.   In  Nepal,  caste/ethnic   identities  were  used  as  subgroup  categories, but so could any 
ethnic or religious subgroups in other societies. Applying the model in other post-conflict contexts 
would also reflect a broader trend within the literature on procedural justice and legitimacy 
towards uncovering what is universal in the psychological process of legitimation and what is 
culturally bounded.  
 
Limitations 
As these results are based on a cross-sectional methodology there are some limitations to the 
conclusions that can be drawn from this thesis. Although the direction of the relationships 
proposed in the model have been largely derived from previous theory and experimental work, 
causal relationships cannot be concluded from the data presented here. Further, the direction and 
strength of the relationships may be especially liable to change in a constantly shifting transitional 
society. Fortunately, there is an opportunity to address these concerns. Following the two waves of 
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cross-sectional data collection described in this thesis, I returned to Nepal for a third wave of data 
collection. This third dataset is longitudinal, with over 1000 of the 1500 participants from wave 2 
surveyed again 9 . Most interestingly, the longitudinal data collection took place following a 
national election held in Nepal in November 2013. This nationwide election resulted in the loss of 
power by the main Maoist political party (the CPN-Maoist) and the electoral success of the 
conservative, non-communist Nepali Congress party (the party who previously held power under 
the parliamentary monarchy system; see chapter 3). This panel data will go further to testing 
causal mechanisms underlying legitimacy perceptions. For example, longitudinal increases in 
procedural justice can be compared to increases or decreases in instrumental outcomes and 
connected to legitimacy gains, and accordant shifts in identification can be accounted for. Further 
evidence for a social interaction effect can be examined, such as whether perceptions of legitimacy 
may change as a function of changing social consensus in the absence of institutional-level 
changes in procedural justice and instrumental perceptions. Finally, an election in which the 
incumbent Maoist party lost power opens up a broader set of research questions about post-
conflict democratic transition. Can procedural justice buffer the effects of preferred political party 
loss? Is regime legitimacy undermined by changes in political party leadership? How do citizens 
in post-conflict societies balance the positives of democratic rule (participation, accountability) 
with the negatives (political infighting, slower decision-making)? Essentially, a longitudinal 
dataset such as this allows a more thorough investigation of the central research question 
underpinning this thesis: under what circumstances and why does the perceived legitimacy of 
central government institutions increase, decrease, or remain stable in post-conflict societies? 
 
 
 
                                                        9 Due to the timing of the third wave of data collection, these data were not able to be included in this thesis.  
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Summary 
In this chapter I have discussed each component of my theoretical model based on the results 
presented in Chapters 5 and 6, and situated my findings within the existing literature, along with a 
general discussion of the implications and limitations of my findings. Component 1 discussed the 
demonstrated relative contributions of instrumental and procedural antecedents of legitimacy, 
Component 2 discussed the findings of voice and group influence in terms of statebuilding 
theories of local ownership, and Component 3 discussed the finding of a significant social 
interaction effect on legitimacy perceptions. 
 
In the next chapter the main conclusions of this thesis are summarised, and some broader 
implications of these findings proposed. The research questions posed in chapter 1 are answered, 
before suggesting future directions for this line of research based on the limitations discussed in 
this chapter.   
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis aimed to investigate how perceptions of institutional legitimacy can be cultivated in a 
post-conflict environment. At the outset of this thesis, three research questions were posed:  
 
1) What is the relative contribution of instrumental and relational concerns in building post-
conflict institutional legitimacy? 
2) Does  ‘local  ownership’  build  post-conflict institutional legitimacy, and is it effective for all 
citizens? 
3) Is there a social interaction effect on legitimacy perceptions, in that citizens will both 
influence and be influenced by those around them? 
 
I have attempted to address the topic of post-conflict legitimacy both in an abstract and applied 
sense, by employing existing measures and theories of legitimacy from Western peacetime 
contexts along with measures that ground this research in the statebuilding experience of post-
conflict Nepal. Nepal’s  post-conflict period—from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement reached 
in 2006 until the present—is characterized as a shift from traditional authority to legal-rational 
authority, as the state transforms from a Hindu monarchy with power structures based in caste 
hierarchy, patriarchy and instrumental control into a secular democratic republic. The current 
intermediary   phase   of  Nepal’s   transition   from  a   long-standing traditional authority to a modern 
liberal political system has made it a particularly interesting case study in which to investigate 
citizens’   post-conflict legitimacy beliefs. In the theoretical model tested in this thesis, I 
encapsulated key variables relating to this process of transition in Nepal, taking into account both 
international norms of post-conflict reconstruction and local understandings of relevant concepts.   
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Based on the analyses and discussion presented in this thesis, the research questions posed in 
chapter 1 can now be answered in turn.  
 
1: What is the relative contribution of instrumental and relational concerns in building post-
conflict institutional legitimacy? 
 
First, it was found that procedural justice contributed more to local perceptions of post-conflict 
government legitimacy than instrumental outcomes including government performance, 
distributive justice, and outcome favourability. This relationship persisted after accounting for the 
government’s  ability  to  deliver  any  particular  service  to  citizens,  as  well  as  trust  and  performance  
ratings of criminal justice and local political institutions. These results also controlled for 
demographic characteristics, potential methodological bias such as interviewer/participant 
differences, regional caste/ethnic heterogeneity, and political unrest in the previous year. That is, 
the relationship between procedural justice and post-conflict government legitimacy observed here 
can be considered robust and reliable. Procedural justice was found to operate through group 
identification and power to exert its positive effects, indicating that procedural justice mechanisms 
premised on Social Identity Theory can be applied outside of developed peacetime contexts.  
 
2:  Does  ‘local  ownership’  build  post-conflict institutional legitimacy, and is it effective for all 
citizens? 
 
Second, insofar  as  ‘local  ownership’  may  be  conceived  as  citizen  voice  and  local   influence  over  
post-conflict government processes, this project finds evidence for a positive effect of local 
ownership on post-conflict government legitimacy. However, the negative effect of foreign 
influence predicted by local ownership theories was not observed. Rather, the outcome of 
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perceived foreign influence depended on how much power the participant felt their caste/ethnic 
group had in Nepalese society. Local elites were more likely to display a negative relationship 
between foreign influence and legitimacy, whereas those with less power were more affected by a 
lack of inclusive local participation. In sum, local ownership does not function in the same way for 
all citizens in post-conflict societies. This result can be situated between both the social 
psychological literature on the role of expectations in reactions to voice, and statebuilding studies 
that observe local elites and marginalised groups as having different experiences of post-conflict 
mechanisms of inclusion and participation.  
 
3: Is there a social interaction effect on legitimacy perceptions, in that citizens will both 
influence and be influenced by those around them? 
 
Evidence for a significant social interaction effect was found, in which citizens in a post-conflict 
society   influence   each   other’s   legitimacy   beliefs. This finding advances the novel idea that 
legitimacy is more than a product of citizen judgements of institutional processes and behaviours, 
and can also be built through reciprocal social relationships. In chapter 7 the implications of this 
finding was canvassed and the potential for new ways of conceiving and building institutional 
legitimacy. However there are also practical implications in terms of how politicians can harness 
these effects. If people care about what those around them think, then authorities need to be 
concerned not only with convincing individuals of the legitimacy of the government, but also with 
convincing individuals that others are convinced as well. Ultimately, understanding legitimacy in 
terms of bounded social relationships and the norm enforcement that they facilitate could 
significantly alter the way that post-conflict processes are communicated to citizens.  
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This study concludes that post-conflict legitimacy is best built through procedural justice, which 
exerts  its  positive  effects  by  harnessing  citizens’  identification  with  national  authorities.  That  this  
result was observed in the cultural context of extremely strong subgroup identities (i.e., the caste 
system in Nepal) demonstrates the robustness of this finding. The second major conclusion is that 
legitimacy may also be built through social influence, highlighting the importance of bringing 
context into legitimacy research.  
 
Thus, the theoretical model developed in chapter 2 aided in answering the three research questions 
posed at the outset of this thesis. In doing so, I also address broader issues regarding the study of 
legitimacy. First, I find that relational theories of legitimacy travel into different cultures and 
political contexts, which until this point has remained under-researched. As discussed in chapter 2, 
cooperation through non-instrumental motivations such as identification matters a great deal 
during times of crisis or transition, as governments lack the resources to monitor and punish 
transgressions. The findings of this study indicate that there is an alternative to the exercise of 
brute power in such contexts. Further, this study contributes to the developing literature on 
procedural justice and the exercise of political authority. What  was  defined  in  chapter  2  as  ‘regime’  
legitimacy is an understudied area in empirical legitimacy research. The present project found that 
existing   legitimacy   theories  could  be  applied   to  citizens’  expectations  and  understandings of the 
institution  of  the  central  government.  This  thesis  also  highlights  the  advantages  of  studying  ‘local  
legitimacy’,   i.e.,   legitimacy   in   the eyes of the local population. This descriptive, or subjective, 
approach to legitimacy is common in psychological and criminological research, but less common 
in the fields of political science and statebuilding. By employing this conceptualisation of 
legitimacy in the present study, I was able to study psychological representations of authorities, 
linking macro-political processes to internal psychological states. This approach allowed for 
discussion on the internal motivations of citizens in post-conflict societies, and highlights the 
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importance  of  political  authorities  building  citizens’  understanding  of  shared  public  values  at the 
outset of democratic transitions.  
 
Finally, this research transfers key concepts that were developed to explain legitimacy perceptions 
in predominantly Western, peacetime, longstanding democratic systems into a non-Western, 
conflict affected, newly democratic political context. Doing so promotes an interdisciplinary 
understanding of legitimacy that draws on the strengths of applied statebuilding work and social 
psychology, whilst compensating for the drawbacks of each approach. Statebuilding research 
approaches typically involve in-depth case studies, which are open to the criticism that theories 
developed from such an approach are not generalizable outside of a specific local context.  
Conversely, social psychology as a discipline has been undergoing self-examination pertaining to 
the use of mostly white, Western, educated samples (Henrich et al 2010). This project 
demonstrates a nexus between social psychological and statebuilding research on legitimacy, and 
argues that the integration of these fields can enhance understandings of post-conflict processes. 
 
In discussing the limitations of this research in the previous chapter, the issue of generalizability 
was raised. Arguments about the generalizability of the present results mirror a broader debate 
within the field of applied post-conflict   reconstruction   about   ‘local   context’   vs.   ‘best   practice’.  
That is, how useful are general frameworks for post-conflict reconstruction, and how prescriptive 
should these frameworks be? Or can post-conflict reconstruction only be conducted from a 
ground-up understanding of local context? Care has been taken in this thesis towards building a 
general model of legitimacy into which specific local circumstances can be built (as discussed in 
the previous chapter). Often social psychological theories assume a form of universalism in 
citizens’   reactions   to   authorities,   and   research   such   as   this   helps   to validate these claims. Yet, 
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further comparative and longitudinal research will help in the development of reliable general 
theories for rebuilding post-conflict legitimacy.  
 
In chapter 2 the importance of rebuilding government legitimacy in a post-conflict society was 
justified using arguments from the statebuilding literature. First, post-conflict societies are 
susceptible to further violence, and it is proposed that low legitimacy perceptions may fuel this 
process.  Second, post-conflict legitimacy is said to quell ethnic tensions and assist in the 
formation of collective identity. Finally, legitimacy is said to promote rules and laws that are seen 
as fair and necessary, central to establishing the rule of law in post-conflict societies. However, it 
should also be noted that a purely consequentialist perspective of legitimacy may be limited, and 
that an interest in improving the quality of democracy can be an end in itself. In transitional 
societies there exists an opportunity to establish systems and structures that do not simply import 
Western liberal democratic models directly, but instead improve them, and create new ways of 
engaging citizens within a democracy. The present research indicates that citizens in this context 
are deeply concerned with how they are treated and included by authorities. How might this 
understanding be incorporated into post-conflict reconstruction practices?  
 
Post-conflict societies are a context   in  which  citizens’  conceptualisations  of  political   institutions  
are newly forming, and as such, represent an opportunity to learn from flaws in existing 
democratic systems and build institutions premised on ideas such as those contained in this thesis. 
That is, studies such as this are ultimately concerned with legitimacy as a future oriented political 
ideal that improves the quality of democracy itself.  Building political institutions that contain new 
mechanisms aimed at fostering citizen perceptions of neutrality, respect, and participation—that 
also provide ample opportunities for citizens to hear what others think—could potentially create 
more stable and inclusive societies. Ultimately, breaking away from old systems of traditional and 
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hierarchical authority could shift democracies into increasingly more evolved and modern 
incarnations. 
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Appendix A: Population of major caste and ethnic groups in Nepal 
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Appendix B: Pilot 1-5 visual showcard (English version) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1------2------3------4------5 
 
 
 
 
 
Not at all-------A little-------Somewhat--------A lot-------Entirely 
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Appendix C: Pilot 1-10 visual showcard (English version) 
 
 
1---2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----10 
 
 
 
 
 
Not at all---------------------------------------------------------Entirely 
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Appendix D: Ecological development region to district sampling (Wave I) 
  
Eco-Dev Region District Sample District Population Population Sample Sample 
    (1st-Stage) Size (Eco-Dev) Size (District) Size (Eco-Dev) Size (District) 
Eastern Mountain Taplejung Sankhuwasabha 392,089 No need 38 38 
  Sankhuwasabha           
  Solukhumbu           
Eastern Hill Panchthar Panchthar 1,601,347 No need 76 76 
  Ilam           
  Dhankuta           
  Terhathum           
  Bhojpur           
  Okhaldhunga           
  Khotang           
  Udayapur           
Eastern Tarai Jhapa Morang 3,818,119 965,370 216 94 
  Morang Siraha   637,328   60 
  Sunsari Saptari   639,284   62 
  Saptari           
  Siraha           
Central Mountain Dolakha Dolka 517,655 No need 46 46 
  Sindhupalchok           
  Rasuwa           
Central Hill Kavrepalanchok Kavrepalanchok 1,914,790 No need 100 100 
  Nuwakot           
  Sindhuli           
  Ramechhap           
  Dhading           
  Makwanpur           
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Kathmandu Valley Kathmandu Lalitpur 2,517,023 468,132 132 28 
  Lalitpur Kathmandu   1,744,240 
 
104 
  Bhaktapur       
 
  
Central Tarai Dhanusa Bara 4,707,517 687,708 268 56 
  Mahottari Parsa   601,017   50 
  Sarlahi Chitwan   579,984   48 
  Rautahat Mahottari   627,580   52 
  Bara Dhanusa   754,777   62 
  Parsa           
  Chitawan           
Western Mount Manang Mustang 19,990 No need 18 18 
  Mustang           
Western Hill Gorkha Parbat 2,811,135 146,590 144 66 
  Lamjung Lamjung   167,724   78 
  Tanahu           
  Syangja           
  Kaski           
  Myagdi           
  Parbat           
  Baglung           
  Gulmi           
  Palpa           
  Arghakhanchi           
Western Tarai Nawalparasi Rupandehi 2,095,640 880,196 118 68 
  Rupandehi Nawalparasi   643,508   50 
  Kapilbastu           
MW Mount Dolpa   388,713 No need     
  Jumla           
  Kalikot           
  Mugu           
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  Humla           
MW Hill Pyuthan Rolpa 1,687,497 224,506 118 46 
  Rolpa Surkhet   350,804   72 
  Rukum           
  Salyan           
  Surkhet           
  Dailekh           
  Jajarkot           
MW Tarai Dang Banke 1,470,472 491,313 82 38 
  Banke Dang   552,583   44 
  Bardiya           
FW Mount Bajura   463,345 No need     
  Bajhang           
  Darchula           
FW Hill Achham Achham 862,215 No need 76 76 
  Doti           
  Dadeldhura           
  Baitadi           
FW Tarai Kailali Kanchanpur 1,226,957 No need 68 68 
  Kanchanpur           
Total 75 25 26,494,504   1,500 1,500 
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Appendix E: Full sampling frame (Wave I) 
 
Eco-Dev Region Sample District Sample Sample VDC/Mun Sample Ward Sample Random no  Random no Random no 
  (1st-Stage) 
Size 
(District) (2nd-Stage) (3rd-Stage) Size (VDC) for VDC for ward for ward 
Eastern Mountain 1 .Sankhuwasabha 38 1. Kharang 9, 2 18 14 9 2 
      2. Jaljala 5, 2 20 11 5 2 
Eastern Hill 2. Panchathar 76 3. Durdimba 6, 5 18 9 6 5 
      4. Olane 4, 9 18 24 4 9 
      5. Sarang Danda 4, 8 20 34 4 8 
      6. Sidin 8, 1 20 35 8 1 
Eastern Tarai 3. Morang 94 7. Kadmaha 4, 3 20 33 4 3 
      8. Sijuwa 6, 2 20 53 6 2 
      9. Madhumalla 7, 8 20 38 7 8 
      10. Tandi 7, 1 20 60 7 1 
      11. Biratnagar Mun. 16, 18 14   16 18 
  4. Siraha 60 12. Sukhachina 1, 7 22 103 1 7 
      13. Lagadigoth 2, 3 24 62 2 3 
      14. Lahan Mun. 7, 9 14   7 9 
  5. Saptari 62 15. Bakdhauwa 8, 7 22 5 8 7 
      16. Dhanagadi 7, 8 20 32 7 8 
      17. Rajbiraj Mun. 6, 1 20   6 1 
Central Mountain 6. Dolkha 46 18. Kalinchowk 9, 2 22 27 9 2 
      19. Babare 9, 8 24 2 9 8 
Central Hill 7. Kavrepalanchok 100 20. Simalchour Syampati 1, 2 20 84 1 2 
      21. Sanowangthali 5, 3 20 77 5 3 
      22. Bhumlutar 7, 2 20 9 7 2 
      23. Nagre Gagarche 3, 8 20 61 3 8 
      24. Dolalghat 9, 3 20 26 9 3 
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Kathmandu Valley 8. Lalitpur 28 25. Gotikhel 8, 9 14 20 8 9 
      26. Lalitpur Sub-metro. 10, 18 14 
 
10 18 
  9. Kathmandu 104 27. Sundarijal 7, 6 20 53 7 6 
      28. Manmaiju 1, 2 22 38 1 2 
      29. Balambu 8, 9 20 4 8 9 
      30. Kathmandu metro. 30, 6, 16, 10 42   30 6 
Central Tarai 10. Bara 56 31. Majhariya 1, 7 20 63 1 7 
      32. Motisar 6, 3 22 66 6 3 
      33. Kalaiya Mun. 3, 11 14   3 11 
  11. Parsa 50 34. Mainapur (Pakaha) 3, 4 16 49 3 4 
      35. Birawaguthi 5, 1 18 21 5 1 
      36. Birgunj Mun. 11, 3 16   11 3 
  12. Chitwan 48 37. Parbatipur 1, 8 16 29 1 8 
      38. Madi Kalyanpur 9, 3 18 25 9 3 
      39. Bharatpur Mun. 4, 13 14   4 13 
  13. Mahottari 52 40. Badiya Banchauri 9, 7 18 4 9 7 
      41. Damhimarayee 1, 2 20 17 1 2 
      42. Jaleshwor Mun. 11, 4 14   11 4 
  14. Dhanusa 62 43.Thilla Yaduwa 9, 8 22 96 9 8 
      44. Aurahi 7, 6 22 2 7 6 
      45. Janakpur Mun. 15, 1 18   15 1 
Western Mount 15. Mustang 18 46. Jomsom 8, 3 18 7 8 3 
Western Hill 16. Parbat 66 47. Khaula Lakuri 5, 7 22 29 5 7 
      48. Bajung 1, 6 22 4 1 6 
      49. Bhangara 2, 4 22 9 2 4 
  17. Lamjung 78 50. Chiti 6, 8 20 19 6 8 
      51. Bangre 2, 9 18 5 2 9 
      52. Ishaneshwor 1, 8 20 33 1 8 
      53. Chakratirtha 7,3 20 16 7 3 
Western Tarai 18. Rupandehi 68 54. Manpakadi 3, 1 22 45 3 1 
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      55. Asuraina 7, 4 22 4 7 4 
      56. Bishnupura 8, 9 24 11 8 9 
  19. Nawalparasi 50 57. Baidauli 8, 2 15 5 8 2 
      58. Pragatinagar 5, 4 20 51 5 4 
      59. Ramgram Mun. 10, 11 15   10 11 
MW Hill 20. Rolapa 46 60. Kotgaun 4, 2 22 29 4 2 
      61. Gairigaun 5, 4 24 11 5 4 
  21. Surkhet 72 62. Ranibas 8, 3 16 44 8 3 
      63. Babiyachaur 1, 5 20 3 1 5 
      64. Sahre 3, 1 20 46 3 1 
      65. Birendranagar Mun. 10, 1 16   10 1 
MW Tarai 22. Banke 38 66. Phattepur 3, 6 22 34 3 6 
      67. Nepalgunj Mun. 1, 7 16   1 7 
  23. Dang 44 68. Hapur 4, 6  14 15 4 6 
      69. Rajpur 3, 6 16 28 3 6 
      70. Ghorahi Mun. 7, 4 14   7 4 
FW Hill 24. Achham 76 71. Sutar 1, 9 20 68 1 9 
      72. Tosi 3, 5 18 72 3 5 
      73. Kalikasthan 7, 6 20 38 7 6 
      74. Bhagyaswori 6, 1 18 8 6 1 
FW Tarai 25. Kanchanpur 68 75. Sankarpur 5, 1 26 17 5 1 
      76. Raikawar Bichawa 6, 9 26 14 6 9 
      77. Bhimdatta Mun. 18, 15 16   18 15 
Total 25 1,500 62 VDCs and 15 Mun.   1,500       
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Appendix F: Wave I survey items 
 
 Caste/ethnic identification 
1. The small circle below denotes you as an individual. The larger circle 
represents your caste/ethnic group. Could you select a diagram that most closely 
represents your relationship with your caste/ethnic group? 
 
 
National identification 
2. The small circle below denotes you as an individual. The larger circle 
represents Nepal as a national group, ie, all other Nepalese people. Could you 
select the diagram that denotes your relationship with your national group? 
 
Caste/ethnic group power 
3. My ethnic/caste group has the power of influence in society, compared to other 
ethnic/caste groups. 
 
Local group trust 
4. In this section, we will be asking you about your levels of trust in different 
caste/ethnic groups in Nepalese society. Think about how much you trust these 
different groups in general: 
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Hill Caste 
Hill Ethnic 
Hill Dalit 
Newar 
Madhesi Caste 
Terai Madhesi Janajati 
Madhesi Dalit 
Muslim 
 
 
Foreign group trust 
5. Now we will ask about your trust in international groups- countries and 
organizations- operating in Nepalese society. Think about how much you trust 
these groups in general: 
 
India 
The UN 
China 
The US 
INGO’s 
 
Local group influence 
We would now like to ask your opinion on the different caste/ethnic groups in 
Nepalese society and how much influence they have over how the government is 
run. When we ask about the government, we would like you to think about the 
government in terms of the way in which the central government operates and 
makes decisions, regardless of which political party is leading the government. 
 
6. In your opinion, to what extent do the following groups influence how the 
government is run? 
 
Hill Caste 
Hill Ethnic 
Hill Dalit 
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Newar 
Madhesi Caste 
Terai Madhesi Janajati 
Madhesi Dalit 
Muslim 
 
Foreign group influence 
Now we will ask about some international groups- countries and organisations- 
operating in Nepalese society. Think about how much influence these groups have 
over the way the central government operates and makes decisions. 
 
7. In your opinion, to what extent do the following groups influence how the 
government is run? 
 
India 
The UN 
China 
The US 
INGO’s 
 
Voice 
In these questions, we are interested in your opinion on the extent to which 
Nepalese people in general are allowed to participate in government decision-
making. When we ask about the government, we would like you to think about the 
government in terms of the way in which the central government operates and 
makes decisions, regardless of which political party is leading the government. 
 
8. Nepalese in general are consulted in how the government is run. 
9. Nepalese in general have the opportunity to participate in the political process. 
10. Nepalese could initiate change in the government if they wanted. 
11. I personally have a say in how the government is being developed and run. 
 
Procedural justice 
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We are interested in your opinions on fairness in government decision-making. When 
we ask about the government, we would like you to think about the government in 
terms of the way in which the central government operates and makes decisions, 
regardless of which political party is leading the government. To what extent do you 
agree with the following statements? 
 
12. The government tries to be fair when making decisions. 
13. The government uses fair procedures when deciding how to handle situations. 
14. The government treats people fairly. 
15. The government deals with people respectfully.  
 
Distributive justice 
We are interested in your opinion regarding the equality and fairness in the 
distribution of government services. Think about distribution of services to your own 
ethnic/caste group compared to others. To what extent do you agree with the 
following statements? 
 
16. The government sometimes gives people from specific caste/ethnic 
backgrounds less assistance than they give others. 
17. The government provides a better service to the rich than to the average 
citizen.  
18. Overall, the distribution of resources by the government is fair. 
 
 
Outcome favourability 
19. My ethnic/caste group receives a favourable share of government help. 
20. The decisions of the government generally tend to be favourable to me 
individually. 
 
Legitimacy 
We would now like to ask you some questions about your opinions of the government 
of Nepal. When we ask about the government, we would like you to think about the 
government in terms of the way in which the central government operates and makes 
decisions, regardless of which political party is leading the government. 
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21. I trust the government. 
22. The government operates in the best interests of Nepalese people.  
23. I have confidence in the government 
24. I have respect for the government. 
 
Law Legitimacy 
These questions will ask about your opinions of the laws the government makes. To 
what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
 
25. I should always obey the law even if it goes against what I think is right. 
26. I feel a moral obligation to obey the law. 
 
Government Performance 
We are interested in your opinions on how the government is performing. To what 
extent do you agree with the following statements? 
 
27. The government has the ability to provide services to the citizens of Nepal. 
28. The government is able to govern effectively. 
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Appendix G: Wave II survey items 
 
Caste/ethnic identification 
1. The small circle below denotes you as an individual. The larger circle 
represents your caste/ethnic group. Could you select a diagram that most closely 
represents your relationship with your caste/ethnic group? 
 
 
National identification 
2. The small circle below denotes you as an individual. The larger circle 
represents Nepal as a national group, ie, all other Nepalese people. Could you 
select the diagram that denotes your relationship with your national group? 
Caste/ethnic group power 
3. My ethnic/caste group has the power of influence in society, compared to other 
ethnic/caste groups. 
 
Voice 
In these questions, we are interested in your opinion on the extent to which 
Nepalese people in general are allowed to participate in government decision-
making. When we ask about the government, we would like you to think about the 
government in terms of the way in which the central government operates and 
makes decisions, regardless of which political party is leading the government. 
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4. Nepalese in general are consulted in how the government is run. 
5. Nepalese in general have the opportunity to participate in the political process. 
6. Nepalese could initiate change in the government if they wanted. 
7. I personally have a say in how the government is being developed and run. 
 
Procedural justice 
We are interested in your opinions on fairness in government decision-making. When 
we ask about the government, we would like you to think about the government in 
terms of the way in which the central government operates and makes decisions, 
regardless of which political party is leading the government. To what extent do you 
agree with the following statements? 
 
8. The government tries to be fair when making decisions. 
9. The government uses fair procedures when deciding how to handle situations. 
10. The government treats people fairly. 
11. The government deals with people respectfully.  
 
Distributive justice 
We are interested in your opinion regarding the equality and fairness in the 
distribution of government services. Think about distribution of services to your own 
ethnic/caste group compared to others. To what extent do you agree with the 
following statements? 
 
12. The government sometimes gives people from specific caste/ethnic 
backgrounds less assistance than they give others. 
13. The government provides a better service to the rich than to the average 
citizen.  
14. Overall, the distribution of resources by the government is fair. 
 
 
Outcome favourability 
15. My ethnic/caste group receives a favourable share of government help. 
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16. The decisions of the government generally tend to be favourable to me 
individually. 
 
Legitimacy 
We would now like to ask you some questions about your opinions of the government 
of Nepal. When we ask about the government, we would like you to think about the 
government in terms of the way in which the central government operates and makes 
decisions, regardless of which political party is leading the government. 
 
17. I trust the government. 
18. The government operates in the best interests of Nepalese people.  
19. I have confidence in the government 
20. I have respect for the government. 
 
Law Legitimacy 
These questions will ask about your opinions of the laws the government makes. To 
what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
 
21. I should always obey the law even if it goes against what I think is right. 
22. I feel a moral obligation to obey the law. 
 
Government performance 
We are interested in your opinions on how the government is performing. To what 
extent do you agree with the following statements? 
 
23. The government is able to govern effectively. 
24. The government of Nepal has the ability to deliver basic infrastructure in 
Nepal (e.g., roads, electricity, water, irrigation).  
25. The government of Nepal has the ability to feed the people of Nepal 
26. The government of Nepal has the ability to provide housing for the people 
of Nepal  
27. The government of Nepal has the ability to deliver health services in Nepal 
28. The government of Nepal has the ability to deliver education services in 
Nepal 
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29. The government of Nepal has the ability to control crime in Nepal 
30. The government of Nepal has the ability to manage the economy in Nepal 
31. The government of Nepal has the ability to deal with unemployment in 
Nepal 
32. The government of Nepal has the ability to prevent corruption in Nepal 
 
Trust and performance of other institutions  
We are now going to ask you about your level of trust in certain civil institutions, 
other than the central government. How much do agree with the following 
statements? 
 
33. I trust my local government 
34. I trust my village development committee 
35. I trust the police 
36. I trust the Nepalese army 
37. I trust the judiciary/courts 
 
We are now going to ask you the performance of civil institutions other than 
the central government. How much do agree with the following statements? 
 
38. My local government performs its job effectively 
39. My village development committee performs its job effectively 
40. The police perform their job effectively 
41. The Nepalese Army performs its job effectively 
42. The judiciary/courts perform their job effectively 
 
Current perceived security 
We would now like you to think about civil unrest, including strikes, protests, riots, 
and political violence, in your village development region in the last year.  
 
43. How would you describe the general level of civil unrest in your village 
development region at present, compared to the same time last year?  
[Much less/Slightly less/Same/Slightly more/Much more] 
